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ABSTRACT

THE EFFECTS OF USING SECURITY FRAMES ON GLOBAL AGENDA SETTING
AND POLICY MAKING

SEPTEMBER 2015
SIRIN DUYGULU ELCIM, B.A., SABANCI UNIVERSITY
M.A., KOC UNIVERSITY
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS, AMHERST

Directed by: Professor Charli Carpenter
Why do transnational advocacy campaigns on environmental, health, human
rights or humanitarian causes sometimes (but not always) frame these problems as
security issues? This is an important question because there is an under-analyzed
assumption made by some transnational advocacy networks (TANs) and securitization
studies scholars that framing an issue as a security threat has an overall positive effect on
convincing states to take actions in addressing transnational social problems. The lack of
systematic comparison across cases limits our ability to reveal the advocates’ motivations
in adopting security frames and the contrasting effects that securitization might have at
various stages of advocacy campaigns. It is crucial to address this question as it will help
us better understand the sources of transnational advocacy campaigns’ influence over
states as well as the inner dynamics of advocacy strategies.
The study conducts a systematic comparative analysis of thirty-eight transnational
advocacy campaigns to test whether the assumed correlation between using security
frames and reaching advocacy success would hold when analyzed comparatively. The
vii

study then takes a closer look at the question by conducting a comparative
analysis of nine cases and an illustrative analysis of a securitized campaign
(Conflict Diamonds) to address the similarities between securitization and other
acts of framing as well as to shed light onto the inner dynamics of securitization.
Based on this analysis, the study argues that rather than being unique and
correlated to transnational advocacy success, as argued by the literature, security
frames operate like any other frame, and in order for such framing decisions to
translate into advocacy success they need to coexist with an enabling strategic
environment. The study also provides insights into the conditions that shape
advocates’ framing choices. In addition to the widely cited role of the broader
political context, the study also finds the advocacy networks’ own dynamics as
well as the advocates’ previous experiences and their fields of expertise to be
important in shaping their framing choices. The study also argues that advocates
engage in multivocalization, which refers to the inclination of the advocates to
invoke multiple frames simultaneously to reach out not only to targets of
influence but also to potential allies with the goal of strengthening their networks.
The analysis also reveals that the motivations behind adopting security
frames are more complex than appreciated by the securitization literature in two
ways: (i) a security frame does not have to be tailored toward states or security
organizations, it can also be crafted to get the attention and the cooperation of
non-state actors; and (ii) a security frame might appeal to an audience not
necessarily because of the security threat it voices but because of the non-security
concerns it silences.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The Puzzle
“Ebola is a growing threat to regional and global security.”1
Barack Obama, President of the United States
“Many of us used to think of AIDS as a health issue. We were wrong…nothing
we have seen is a greater challenge to the peace and stability of African societies
than the epidemic of AIDS…we face a major development crisis, and more than
that, a security crisis.”2
James Wolfensohn, Former Head of the World Bank
“Among the future trends that will impact our national security is climate
change.”3
2014 Climate Change Adaptation Roadmap
“Sexual violence, when used or commissioned as a tactic of war in order to
deliberately target civilians or as a part of a widespread or systematic attack
against civilian populations, can significantly exacerbate situations of armed
conflict and may impede the restoration of international peace and security.”4
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1820
Statements such as those above suggest that a variety of very different problems
constitute “threats to national security.” The connection drawn between these concerns
and national security is not an organic one, but rather a construct. Yet, identifying these
issues as security threats was not necessarily the only way to highlight their
importance; moreover, not every problem gets portrayed as a security threat before
garnering international attention.

1

“Ebola is a ‘National Security Priority,’ Obama says,” CNN, 8 September 2014, available at
<http://edition.cnn.com/2014/09/07/politics/ebola-national-security-obama/>, accessed 10 October 2014.
2
Cited in Singer 2002.
3
US Department of Defense, 13 October 2014.
4
UNSC/RES/1820, 19 June 2008.
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Why do transnational advocacy campaigns on environmental, health, human
rights, or humanitarian causes sometimes (but not always) frame these problems as
security issues? This question is an important one because, despite numerous
observations about the use of security frames by transnational advocacy campaigns, we
know surprisingly little about the factors that shape advocates’ decisions to use security
frames for some campaigns and not the others. Additionally, a dearth of knowledge exists
concerning the conditions that translate such framing choices into advocacy success. Our
limited understanding of the dynamics of securitization leaves assumptions about the
utility of security frames untested, and also curtails the insights we have into securitized
campaigns’ advocacy strategies.
The conventional answer to this question comes from the securitization theory.
According to this literature security is not an objective reality5 but an articulated one
which means, when successfully executed, any issue can be framed as a security threat
through language.6 The studies that apply securitization theory to transnational advocacy
campaigns observe the success of a number of campaigns such as women, peace and
security7 and conflict diamonds8 and argue that advocates achieve their goals by using
security frames as states are more likely to take action when they perceive their security

5

Waever 1995.
Buzan et al. 1998.
7
Hudson 2010.
8
For instance Partnership Africa Canada (PAC), one of the leading non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) in the fight against conflict diamonds, describe the problem of conflict diamonds through the role
these diamonds play in financing civil wars. “During the 1990s and into the beginning of this century, rebel
armies in Angola, Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) exploited the alluvial
diamond fields of these countries in order to finance wars of insurgency… hundreds of thousands of people
died as a direct result of these wars, and many more died of indirect causes. Millions of people were
displaced, health and educational infrastructure was destroyed, and development was reversed.”
(“Diamonds, Death and Destruction: A History,” available at <http://www.pacweb.org/en/diamonds-deathand-destruction>, accessed 1 May 2014.)
6

2

to be threatened.9 Therefore, according to these studies, the reasons behind advocates’
attempts to securitize their campaigns are self-explanatory and are embedded in the
unquestionable primacy of security concerns on states’ agendas.
Nevertheless, the conventional wisdom leaves us with a puzzle. Despite the
straightforward logic that securitization literature sees behind various attempts to utilize
security frames, the studies within the transnational advocacy networks (TANs) literature
illustrate that many of the most successful advocacy campaigns ranging from the
International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL)10 and Female Genital Mutilation
(FGM) Campaign11 to Campaign for International Criminal Court12 were either nonsecuritized (i.e. did not use a security frame) or explicitly de-securitized (i.e. the issue
was deliberately brought out of the security frame). Such examples challenge the primacy
that securitization literature attaches to security frames. Moreover, as a number of studies
concluded, even though security frames have a positive impact in attracting states’
attention to an issue in the short-run, using security frames becomes an impediment in
front of properly addressing the problem at hand in the long-run as securitizing an issue
brings it out of the realm of politics and hence out of the reach of the civil actors.13 These

9

Hudson 2010.
ICBL owes its success to its ability to de-securitize the issue by downplaying the military utility of the
landmines and emphasizing the humanitarian consequences, instead (Price 1998; Hubert 2000).
11
No Peace without Justice uses a human rights frame and evaluates the UN General Assembly’s decision
to adopt a worldwide ban on female genital mutilation as a “paradigm shift in the fight against this
widespread and systematic human rights violation, committed against millions of girls and women in
Africa and around the world” (“Ban FGM Campaign,” available at <http://www.npwj.org/FGM/BANFGM-CAMPAIGN.html>, accessed 9 December 2014).
12
Coalition for the International Criminal Court uses a human rights frame and defines the purpose of the
campaign as “the global fight to end genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity through a
commitment to the core values of human rights and justice” (“Coalition for the ICC,” available at
http://www.wfm-igp.org/content/coalition-icc>, accessed 22 May 2014).
13
Such as the sidelining of the civil actors in dealing with HIV/AIDS (Elbe 2006) and changing dynamics
of international aid where the criteria for distribution changed from “need” to “lack of connection with
terrorist groups” (Woods 2005; Mawdsley 2007).
10

3

findings further problematize the securitization literature’s reasoning in explaining
advocates’ decisions to use security frames.
In this dissertation, I argue that “securitization” of social problems is not a
uniquely effective strategy for influencing states. Rather, it is my claim that using
security frames is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for transnational
advocacy campaigns’ success. On the contrary, I argue that security frames function like
any other frame and therefore, their connection to advocacy success is mediated by the
strategic environment within which the campaigns operate. I also argue that the
advocates’ motivations in using security frames are not necessarily a function of their
desire to appeal to security concerns of state actors (as argued by the literature).
Advocates’ decision to use security frames can also be a function of their desire to appeal
to non-security concerns of state and non-state actors who could both be targets of
influence or potential allies.
I build this study on the observation that the limited dialogue between
securitization, TANs and framing literatures is the source of our limited understanding of
the reasons behind advocates’ use of security frames.14 This study contributes to such
dialogue by treating securitization as an instance of framing and by comparatively testing
the claims made about securitization. The study conducts a systematic comparative
analysis of thirty-eight transnational advocacy campaigns to test whether the assumed
correlation between using security frames and reaching advocacy success would hold

14

This observation is built on a newly-developing literature that highlights the need to increase the dialogue
between framing and securitization literatures (Such as Watson 2011; 2012; Pinto 2014). For instance,
Watson problematizes the lack of such dialogue by stating that “scholars working within these frameworks
generally do not draw on the other body of literature to inform theoretical development or to accumulate
cases. This has resulted in the production of parallel literatures and the duplication of concepts,
terminology, and has hindered the development of theory” (Watson 2012, 279).

4

when analyzed comparatively. The study then takes a closer look by conducting a
comparative analysis of nine cases and an illustrative analysis of a securitized
(Conflict Diamonds) to address the similarities between securitization and other
framing as well as to shed light onto the inner dynamics of securitization.
My findings contribute to the analytical purchase of the securitization literature by
comparatively testing the under-analyzed assumptions developed by the literature and by
identifying the conditions under which these assumptions hold. My findings also speak to
the broader literature on TANs by contributing to the insights we have into the dynamics
of advocacy strategies and their role in successful norm-building.
Relevance of the Research Question
What triggers the research question is the discrepancy between the uniqueness
that the securitization literature attributes to the advocates’ use of security frames and
what we know about transnational advocacy campaigns in general. While the former
argues that securitization brings success by helping advocates appeal to states’ security
concerns, the latter teaches us that even though strategically packaging issues in
particular ways (framing) is an important component of advocacy success, such
connection is mediated by the political opportunity structure within which advocates
operate. Moreover, the existence of successful cases of non-securitized and de-securitized
campaigns sheds further doubt on the claims of the securitization studies. The
contradictory evidence does not disprove the argued connection between securitization
and advocacy success; rather, it illustrates the need for a more rigorous analysis in order
to understand the exact dynamics of securitization and its connection to advocacy
success.

5

Securitization is broadly defined as the “positioning through language of a
particular issue as an existential threat to security.”15 The prominence that securitization
literature attaches to security frames is built on the insights of traditional approaches to
international security and the idea that states’ primary interests are to conserve and
increase their power and security.16 Securitization literature is built on this argument and
accepts that states care about their security more than anything else. The literature
distinguishes itself from the traditional view by claiming that what states consider as
threats to their security is open to interpretation.17 Thus, according to the securitization
literature, anything can be framed as a security threat (when done properly).18
The goal behind securitizing issues is to prioritize them on political agendas. As
Sheehan explains, “to securitize an issue not previously deemed to be a security issue is
to challenge society to promote it higher in its scale of values and to commit greater
resources to solving the related problems.”19 Securitization is argued to lead to
“prioritizing some issues instead of others, the transformation of the political
communities that are supposed to be protected, the legitimizing of security practices and
the empowerment of actors that can contrast specific threats.”20 Thus, by framing issues
as security threats “elites may implement a wide range of extraordinary measures in
response to a growing number of issues and developments by drawing on the discourse
and practice of security.”21

15

Hudson 2010, 30.
Kennan 1985.
17
Such as Waever 1995; Buzan Waever, and Wilde 1998; Balzacq 2005.
18
Such as Ullman 1983; Wæver, Jahn, and Lemaitre 1987; Buzan 1991; Tickner 1992; Buzan et al. 1998;
Balzacq 2005.
19
Sheenan 2005, 52.
20
Trombetta 2011, 138.
21
Watson 2011, 4.
16
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While attributing a unique role to securitization in setting agendas, the
literature also acknowledges the negative implications of using security frames, as
such a move “takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames
the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics.”22 Thus,
securitizing an issue on the one hand prioritizes it on political agendas, and on the
other hand legitimizes the use of extraordinary measures in dealing with it, which
is not desirable from a democratic perspective.
The securitization literature focuses on the use of the security language by
the elite (the securitizing actor) who engages in such process with the goal of
legitimizing the use of extraordinary measures in the eyes of other elites and the
public (the audience).23 Those who apply the securitization literature to the study
of global politics suggest that transnational advocacy campaigns themselves can
utilize the security language in an attempt to get the state actors to prioritize an
issue on their agendas.24
Whether transnational advocacy campaigns use security frames matters
because, as sizeable literature illustrates, various non-state actors, among which
transnational advocacy campaigns play a significant role, have the ability to shape
global political agendas and force states and international organizations to address

22

Buzan et al. 1998, 23. For instance, in the case of environmental protection Barnett (2001, 83) discusses
how attempts to securitize environment “transform[ed] environmental problems into security issues” and
led to “the spreading of the national security paradigm and the enemy logic” even when the motivations
behind this transition were different.
23
Charrett 2009.
24
Securitization literature is argued to have a “state centric reading of security” (Floyd 2007) which has
been a source of criticisms raised against the literature as it is argued to be close to the “mainstream
approaches to security” (Smith 2005).

7

transnational problems.25 Some of the most important developments in global politics
were products of such advocacy efforts. For instance, ICBL26 and the Convention on
Cluster Munitions27 are vivid examples of how transnational advocacy campaigns can
trigger a world-wide action to incorporate various concerns into international law.
Transnational advocacy campaigns are groups of actors who share normative
concerns and work internationally with the goal of changing states’ and other actors’
behaviors.28 Even though transnational advocacy campaigns are guided by moral
principles, they are also strategic actors.29 They need to act strategically not only to
convince target actors to take action, but also to get ahead of other campaigns with
similarly worthy causes and get a share from very limited political and economic
resources that the global community is willing to spare.30
The need to juggle these dynamics across different stages of global agenda setting
and policy making forces transnational advocacy campaigns to engage in various
strategies, one of which is framing issues to make them more appealing to target actors’
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Such as epistemic communities (Haas 1992; Parson 2003); think-tanks (Stone 2001); and celebrities
(Cooper 2007; Huliaras and Tzifakis 2010).
26
“The ICBL provided support for national campaigns worldwide, and by May 1996 the ICBL consisted of
some six hundred NGO members from forty countries. As a direct result of their activities the issue
received widespread coverage in newspapers, magazines, radio, television, and even comic books.
Members of the campaign lobbied the editorial boards of major media outlets, and with no small success:
the New York Times, Washington Post, and Economist, among dozens of others, have endorsed the ban”
(Price 1998, 621).
27
“[T]he international acceptance of this treaty, which commits states to destroy their stockpiles of cluster
munitions within an eight year timeframe, represents a major accomplishment for the CMC [Cluster
Munition Coalition]” (Clarke 2008, 10).
28
Keck and Sikkink 1998a.
29
Keck and Sikkink (1999, 90) describeTANs as “simultaneously principled and strategic actors.”
Similarly Sell and Prakash (2004, 143) define advocacy networks as interest groups “driven by normative
ideals and material concerns.” For further discussion on various strategies employed by transnational actors
see such as Cooley and Ron 2002; Henderson 2002; Sell and Prakash 2004; Bob 2005; Hertel 2006;
Burnstein 2007; Bloodgood 2011.
30
As Cooley and Ron (2002, 6) state “the transnational sector” is characterized by “organizational
insecurity, competitive pressures, and fiscal uncertainty.”
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normative and material sensibilities.31 Framing can be defined as “the strategic
packaging of new ideas and interpretations,”32 and it is important not only because
it gives meaning to issues that have not been previously considered as worthy of
attention, but also because it determines which actors are included in the issue and
which ones are left in the margins.33
The studies that apply the insights of the securitization literature to the study of
transnational advocacy campaigns treat securitization as a unique process that is different
from other acts of framing. The studies show that the advocates themselves use security
frames in various issue areas ranging from women’s rights34 to illegal wildlife trade. 35
The logic that these studies argue in these attempts to securitize is straightforward: states
care about their security more than anything else; therefore, appealing to their security
concerns increases an advocacy campaign’s chances at success.36 For instance, attempts
on the part of both advocates and policymakers to emphasize the security implications of

31

As Keck and Sikkink (1999, 90) “…transnational advocacy networks ‘frame’ issues to make them
comprehensible to target audiences, to attract attention and encourage action, and to ‘fit’ with favourable
institutional venues.” Also see Khagram, Riker and Sikkink 2002.
32
Joachim 2007, 19. The idea that frames matter was born in sociology (Goffman 1974) and first applied
by the social movements literature within political science (such as Snow et al. 1986; Snow and Benford
1988; McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996).
33
Bob 2005; 2008; Carpenter 2005; 2007; Hudson 2010.
34
For instance Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) defines the importance of
women’s rights based on the contribution they would make to peace and suggests that “the exclusion of
women, women’s rights and gender remains a key impediment to the attainment of sustainable peace and
human security, and must not be ignored!” (“Gender, Peace and Security,” available at
<http://www.wilpfinternational.org/what-we-do/gender-peace-and-security/>, accessed 1 February 2015.)
35
World Wildlife Fund (WWF), for instance, draws a clear link between wildlife trade and national
security and asks the states to take immediate action as “the wildlife trade appears to fund terrorist cells in
unstable African countries – threatening national security – and that the industry often uses the same
networks and routes as other illegal trades, such as drug trafficking.” (“Illegal wildlife trade 'threatening
national security', says WWF,” The Guardian, available at
<http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2012/dec/12/wildlife-trafficking-national-security-wwf>,
accessed 1 December 2014.)
36
Securitization accomplishes this goal by “dramatizing” and “presenting” an issue as one of “supreme”
priority (Trombetta 2011, 138).
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women’s rights and gender inequality has paved the way to a UNSC Resolution37 which
in return became a “landmark step in raising awareness of the impact of armed conflict
on women and girls and acknowledging the vital role of women as agents in conflict
resolution and peacebuilding.”38
Despite the straightforward logic that the studies see in the advocates’ use of
of security frames, we know from a wide array of studies within the TANs literature that
literature that even though framing is an important component of successfully setting
setting agendas and initiating global policies, the connection between strategically
framing an issue and advocacy success is not a direct or an inevitable one. Rather, it
it depends on the strategic environment within which campaigns operate.39 These factors
factors range from the opportunities and limitations that the broader political context
context presents40 to the attributes of the issue at hand.41 Yet the uniqueness attached to
security frames overlooks these conditions and attempts to explain success based solely
on the presence of the security discourse.
Another problem that comes with treating securitization as a unique process rather
than as an instance of framing is the limited ability that these studies have in explaining
the advocates’ decision to use security frames in the face of the long-term implications of
doing so. Despite the level of importance attached to security frames in explaining
37

S/RES/1325, 31 October 2000. The Resolution “reaffirm[s] the important role of women in the
prevention and resolution of conflicts and in peace-building, and stress[es] the importance of their equal
participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security,
and the need to increase their role in decision-making with regard to conflict prevention and resolution”
(emphasis in the original).
38
Hudson 2009, 58.
39
Keck and Sikkink 1998a; Florini 1999; Higgot et al. 2000; Khagram et al. 2002; Cooley and Ron 2002;
Ferree et al. 2002; Price 2003; Bob 2005; Davies 2007; Bocşe 2011; Carpenter 2011; 2014; Carpenter et al.
2014.
40
For instance “symbolic events” such as meetings and disasters can provide “windows of opportunity” for
advocates to alter the agenda (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Ferree et al. 2002).
41
Problems that have certain qualities, such as ones that create physical damage, are more amenable to
advocacy work as it is easier to illustrate the damage (Keck and Sikkink 1998).
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advocacy success, the studies that evaluate the long-term policy implications of
securitization concede that securitization removes the needs and demands of the
vulnerable populations from the focus of the policy making and replaces them
security concerns of states. For instance, Elbe claims that securitization of
significantly narrowed the room for maneuver that civil organizations have in
to the issue.42 From the securitization literature’s perspective, as discussed above,
negative long-term implications are evaluated as inevitable downsides of
prioritizing an issue on the global agenda.43
The portrayal of negative long-term implications of using security frames
as an inevitable price to pay for getting your voice heard does not necessarily
hold. As TANs literature illustrates transnational advocacy campaigns can
succeed without using security frames or by effectively de-securitizing their
causes. For instance, the Child Soldiers campaign succeeded using human rights
and humanitarian frames44 and without resorting to a security frame despite the
security implications of the use of children for military purposes. The Maternal
Mortality campaign also thrived as a human rights and development issue and
found a place on the Millennium Development Goals45 alongside the HIV/AIDS
campaign which did adopt a security frame. Thus, if it is possible to achieve
success without using a security frame, we need to take a closer look at the
reasons behind advocates’ framing choices in order to understand why they
choose such a risky frame.
42

Elbe 2006.
Buzan et al. 1998.
44
Maslen 1998.
45
“The Right to Health,” available at <http://www.care.org/work/health/maternal-health>, accessed 1 May
2014.
43
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While claiming a connection between the use of security frames and successfully
getting the targets of influence to address an issue, securitization literature itself does not
claim that every attempt to securitize would succeed.46 Securitization literature
distinguishes between securitizing moves and successful securitization and identifies
“facilitating factors” that need to exist for such an attempt to succeed.47 Thus,
securitization literature accounts for unsuccessful attempts to securitize an issue and the
failure to prioritize an issue on a political agenda as a result of it. Yet the narrow focus of
the securitization literature limits its ability to account for (i) the issues that find a place
on the agenda without being securitized; (ii) the issues that get successfully securitized
but do not trigger political interest or lead to policy change; and (iii) the issues that find a
place on the agenda once they were de-securitized.
The successful examples of non-securitized and de-securitized campaigns,
combined with the lasting negative implications of using security frames, put the
straightforward logic that the conventional wisdom presents in explaining the reasons
behind securitization into question. Rather than disproving the connection between
securitization and advocacy success, the contradictory evidence highlights the need for a
rigorous analysis in testing the connection between securitization and success, as well as
in illustrating the reasons behind advocates’ decisions to use security frames.
46

Theoretically anybody can utilize the security frame but securitization literature argues that attempts to
securitize an issue (securitizing moves) would only succeed when security discourse is utilized by those
who have the capacity to influence the public’s opinion (Buzan et al. 1998).
47
According to the securitization literature the mere act of calling something a security threat does not
automatically translate the issue into one. The success of such an attempt is conditioned upon the
acceptance of the audience, i.e. the actors whose perceptions and actions that the securitizing actor (i.e. the
author) aims to change. As Buzan et al. discuss an “issue is securitized only if and when the audience
accepts it as such,” therefore, “securitization is not decided by the securitizer, but by the audience” (Buzan
et al. 1998; 25, 33). For instance, Salter uses the examples of abandoned American counterterrorism
programs (The Total Information Awareness Program, the Terrorist Futures Market and Terrorist
Information Protection System) to illustrate that how even in a fertile atmosphere (war on terror) a
securitizing move can be rejected by the audience (Salter 2011, 116).
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What is Missing from the Existing Studies and Why it is Important to Explore This
Question?
The existing studies fall short of answering these questions due to both
conceptual and methodological limitations. The dialogue between TANs, framing,
and securitization literatures is mostly a unidirectional one where the former two
utilize the insights of the securitization studies. The inadequate dialogue curtails
the securitization literature’s ability to test their assumptions about the uniqueness
of security frames and explain the dynamics of securitization.
The limited information flow is mainly a function of the way the literature
defines securitization. As Watson summarizes, “securitization theory presents
‘security’ as a unique discourse with a distinct logic and political effect.”48 Such
an approach limits the attempts to treat securitization as an instance of framing
and to identify the complex mechanisms involved in it. Yet, as Vultee discusses
by comparing Entman and Buzan et al’s arguments, “[f]rames help make clear
what kind of a problem a problem is, what sort of tools are used for dealing with
it, and which actors are protagonists.”49 If the main function of framing is “to
select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a
communicating text,”50 “securitization is a form of framing that highlights the
existential threat of an issue.”51
Treating securitization as a unique process rather than as an instance of
framing is problematic because it limits (i) these studies’ ability to appreciate
various dynamics that are at play in shaping advocates’ decisions to choose a
48

Watson 2012, 289.
Entman 2004.
50
Entman 1993, 53.
51
Buzan et al. 1998, 22-23; Vultee 2011, 79.
49
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security frame over other alternatives, (ii) the studies’ capacity to explain the conditions
under which such choices translate into advocacy success, and (iii) their ability to account
for successful examples of non-securitized or de-securitized campaigns.52
Treating securitization as a unique process also limits the insights that the
literature provides into the dynamics of securitization. The literature’s perception of
securitization as essentially an “intersubjective establishment of an existential threat with
a saliency sufficient to have substantial political effects”53 restricts the attempts to
systematically explain the conditions that surround the processes of securitization.
Moreover, the literature also argues that this intersubjective process occurs when a
securitizing actor (actor that utilizes the security language) convinces an audience (the
target actor) to tackle an existential threat through the need of immediate action.54 Yet the
literature does not detail out which particular audience that the frame is tailored towards55
and why exactly an audience should be persuaded by the claims put forward by the
securitizing actor (other than the importance that the audience is expected to attach to its
security concerns.)56 Such an analysis overlooks multiplicity of audiences and alternative
strategic reasons that an audience might have in accepting claims of security. Applying
the insights of the TANs and framing literatures would not devalue the contribution of the

52

For instance, in criticizing the lack of dialogue between framing and securitization literatures Watson
(2011, 4) uses the example of policies developed as a reaction to 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami and he
suggests that “unparalleled funding from both public and private sources” were mobilized as a result of
framing of the issue as a humanitarian crisis rather than as a security threat. Similarly, the examples of how
non-security frames are utilized in justifying the use of extraordinary measures (such as the use of
humanitarianism “to justify military interventions in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Angola, Mozambique,
Kosovo, East Timor, Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Zaire, Sudan, Côte
d’Ivoire, Iraq and Afghanistan”) (Watson 2011, 4; De Waal and Omaar, 1994; Wheeler, 2004; Roth, 2004)
show the limits of the securitization literature’s analytical purchase.
53
Buzan et al. 1998, 25.
54
Waever 1995.
55
For instance, the security language adopted by the Conflict Diamonds case initially had the diamond
industry as its target audience (Smillie 2002a).
56
Balzacq 2005; 2011.
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securitization literature; on the contrary, it would help the literature provide more
nuanced arguments about the inner dynamics of securitization.
Another limitation comes from the lack of comparative studies that
role of security frames in transnational advocacy campaigns. The literature is
composed of single case studies and edited volumes. These studies provide inknowledge on the history of different campaigns. For instance, Hudson’s detailed
on securitization of women’s rights issues not only tracks how the issue found a
the UNSC agenda, but also discusses the contribution such a venue change made
for the efforts of the advocates and the policy makers.57 Elbe and Vieira analyze
the securitization of HIV/AIDS and discuss both the opportunities58 and the
limitations59 that securitization presented for the advocates in addressing the needs
and rights of vulnerable populations. Cook,60 Huysmans,61 Sasse62 and Kinney63
present similar analyses for the securitization of human trafficking and
immigrants’ rights and mostly criticize the long-term implications of reframing
these issues as security threats. Despite the insights that these studies provide into
these specific cases, the lack of comparative analysis limits their ability to reliably
test the extent to which the outcome of the campaign they analyzed was a function
of the security frame.
57

Hudson 2010.
Vieira (2007) traces the role that securitization played in turning the fight with HIV/AIDS to an
“international norm.”
59
Elbe (2006) discusses how securitization of HIV/AIDS narrowed the room for maneuver for NGOs.
60
Cook (2010) analyzes the dilemmas that advocates face in promoting human rights for migrants within
securitized national agendas.
61
Huysmans (2006) analyzes the gradual securitization of migration, asylum and refugee issues in the
European Union in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks.
62
Sasse (2005, 673) analyzes the “security-right nexus” of minority and migrants issues and argues that
“minority and migration issues and their conceptual interlock have a clear security dimension, but that
these concerns are best addressed through rights-based policies.”
63
Kinney (2011) tracks the framing choices of the transnational advocacy campaigns against human
trafficking and analyzes how such choices shape these campaigns’ interactions with different actors.
58
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Edited volumes also suffer from similar limitations; they mostly focus on
providing parallel stories analyzed from a particular perspective rather than testing the
the validity of claims across cases. For instance, a relatively recent volume edited by
by Thierry Balzacq64 is an attempt to not only contribute to the securitization literature’s
literature’s theoretical clarity but it is also an attempt to show how securitization was
was experienced in different issue areas ranging from environment65 to HIV/AIDS.66 Yet,
HIV/AIDS.66 Yet, while the insights developed by the empirical chapters are utilized to
illustrate the mechanisms behind the creation and dissolution of security issues, they do
not systematically test these claims across issue areas. Thus, despite valuable insights
these studies provide, they fall short of testing the claims about the significance of
security frames across cases due to their narrow focus and their methodological
limitations. In order to fill this gap, studies that systematically compare securitized, nonsecuritized, and de-securitized examples of successful and unsuccessful advocacy
campaigns are needed.
Addressing these limitations is important for securitization, TANs and framing
literatures. First, we need to get a better sense of what function security frames perform
and under which conditions they correlate with advocacy success, as gaining these
insights would enhance the analytical purchase of the securitization literature. Second,
addressing these limitations is also important in expanding the reach of TANs and
framing literatures, as testing the arguments developed in these literatures by applying
them onto securitized examples of advocacy campaigns would provide an opportunity to
further support the insights gained through them. Third, gaining better perceptions into
64

Balzacq 2011.
Trombetta 2011.
66
Sjöstedt 2011.
65
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the dynamics of securitization have implications for advocates, as well. Keeping
the potential long-term implications in mind, it is important to test the extent to
which security frames correlate with advocacy success as overestimations about
such correlation can influence advocates’ framing choices.
Contribution of the Study
The original contribution that this study makes to the literature is a
function of both its theoretical approach and its methodological choices.
Analytically, by treating securitization as an instance of framing, the study
contributes to the literatures by identifying the questions that have been so far
overlooked as well as by providing better answers for the questions that have been
asked but not answered properly by the conventional wisdom. Methodologically,
by applying mix-methods that combine systematic comparison across cases with
an illustrative case study, this dissertation addresses previously under-tested
assumptions in the literatures and contributes to the dialogue between them.
The first contribution of this study is the illustration of the need to develop
more nuanced arguments within the securitization literature. As discussed above,
the main assumption that this study is built on is that the limited dialogue between
securitization literature on the one hand and framing and TANs literatures on the
other is the main reason behind our limited understanding of why advocacy
campaigns engage in securitization. Thus, by approaching securitization as an
instance of framing, the study applies the insights gained from framing and
transnational advocacy networks’ literatures onto securitization literature and
provides an opportunity to test the uniqueness attributed to security frames.
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By engaging in such an analysis, rather than challenging the main contribution of
the securitization literature, the study questions the tunnel-vision that these studies have
in evaluating the role and the importance of security frames. The negative cases that the
existing studies overlook limits not only the securitization literature’s ability to
understand why advocates do not choose security frames under certain conditions (or
choose to de-securitize), but also their ability to explain why securitization does not
always lead to success.
Treating securitization as an instance of framing further contributes to the
securitization literature by providing deeper insights into the dynamics that the
securitization literature has identified but fell short of adequately explaining. As
discussed above, the securitization literature identifies the role that securitizing actors and
the audience play in translating securitizing attempts to successful securitization. Yet, the
literature does not explain (i) different motivations that securitizing actors have; (ii) the
reasons behind audience’s acceptance of the claims put forward by securitizing actors;
and (iii) the conditions that make such process possible. Thus, this study contributes to
the securitization literature by providing more nuanced arguments about strategic
conditions that lead to the decisions to use security frames and the role these factors play
in translating framing choices into advocacy success.
By increasing the dialogue between securitization, TANs and framing literatures,
the study also contributes to the broader debates within the literature regarding the
dynamics of norm-building and the role that transnational advocacy campaigns play in it.
The insights gained into the dynamics of securitized advocacy campaigns further our
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knowledge on advocacy strategies and lend support to the validity of framing and TANs
literatures’ arguments by testing their applicability across different issue areas.
Methodologically, the study illustrates the importance of comparative analysis in
testing the assumptions that are taken for granted when conducting single-case studies.
The dynamics that are perceived to be self-evident when one positive case is examined do
not necessarily hold when tested across both negative and positive cases. By conducting
such an analysis this study further illustrates the importance of combining in-depth case
studies with comparative analyses in order to get better insights into the inner dynamics
of social processes.
The study also has implications for practitioners as well. Advocates are strategic
actors who search for ways to increase their chances at successfully getting the
international community to address an issue. Their perceptions about the factors that are
more likely to lead to success have a role to play in shaping their framing decisions.
Given the potential long-term negative implications of adopting security frames,
illustrating the extent to which security frames correlate with advocacy success can play a
role in shaping their framing choices. More broadly, by providing insights into dynamics
that translate advocates’ framing choices into advocacy success, the study also helps the
advocates to better understand the conditions of success and develop their strategies
accordingly.
How does This Study Go about Exploring the Research Question?
The study explores the research question by engaging in a three-stage
analysis presented in the following five chapters. Based on this analysis I argue
that both the motivations behind adopting security frames and the role that
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security frames play in leading to transnational advocacy success are more complicated
than appreciated by conventional wisdom. It is my claim that rather than being unique
and correlated to transnational advocacy success, as argued by the literature, security
frames operate like any other frame, and in order for such framing decisions to translate
into advocacy success they need to coexist with an enabling strategic environment.
As the first step of this study’s efforts to illustrate the validity of the arguments
stated above, the following chapter provides a detailed review of framing, TANs and
securitization literatures. The literature review serves several purposes: (i) it introduces
the field to which this study aims to contribute; (ii) defines the main concepts and
arguments that form the basis of this study; and (iii) pinpoints the limitations of the
existing studies and highlights the contribution that this study aims to make.
In the first stage of the empirical analysis presented in Chapter 3, the study aims
to address one of the important methodological shortcomings of the literature by
conducting a systematic comparison across thirty-eight cases of transnational advocacy
campaigns that took place in the aftermath of the Cold War. The chapter starts out by
introducing the methodology used in conducting this analysis along with a discussion on
the operationalization of the variables. A detailed discussion on how the data is collected,
coded and analyzed is presented, and followed by a discussion on the findings of the
comparative analysis.
The universe of cases analyzed in this chapter is compiled using the information
provided by the earlier attempts to list transnational advocacy campaigns67 and

67

The “Transnational Principled Advocacy Movements in the Post-Cold War Era (1990- )” dataset
presented by Joshua Busby in his book published in 2010 is used as a starting point in compiling the
universe of cases that this study analyzed. The dataset is not an exhaustive one yet it is utilized as a starting
point as it is the most extensive one available at this time. The original dataset includes thirty-six cases and
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complemented with original research to account for potential omissions and latest
developments.68 The cases are compared based on their framing preferences and
success levels at three different stages of global agenda setting and policy making.
multi-stage analysis is conducted because, as Finnemore and Sikkink discuss,
advocates’ attempts to create norms do not necessarily lead to a “norm cascade”
where “a critical mass of relevant state actors adopt the norm.”69 Therefore, in
order not to essentialize advocacy success and to account for different dynamics at
play, the study distinguishes between three stages of global agenda setting and
policy making (political commitment and policy implementation) in conducting
the comparative analysis.70

provide information on the main goals and the targets of the campaigns, the leading organizations,
campaign outcomes as well as time frame of the campaign (Busby 2010). Campaigns’ framing choices
were neither used as a selection criterion nor were one of the variables analyzed by the original dataset
which sets the foundation for this study’s effort to stay away from selection-bias.
68
Not all the cases included in the Busby’s dataset fit the purpose this study: four of the campaigns were
left out as either the advocacy efforts were too disperse to track (Marine Conservation) or the issue was
already on the agenda prior to the campaign and the campaign was geared toward reigniting the global
interest in the issue rather than placing it on the global agenda (Civilian Protection, Nuclear Nonproliferation and Refugees). The list of cases analyzed is then expanded to account for cases that did not
find a place in the original dataset either because they did not fit the purpose of Busby’s research or
because they gained momentum after the original dataset was compiled. Academic and non-academic
sources were analyzed to account for such cases. Academic sources are analyzed through a survey of major
academic databases in addition to the survey of major NGOs’ websites with the goal of tracing recent
campaigns. As a result of this analysis six cases were added to the list of cases to be analyzed for the
purpose of this study (Avian Influenza, Conflict Diamonds, Climate Refugees, Illegal Wildlife Trade,
Sexual Violence in Conflict, and Women, Peace and Security).
69
Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 895.
70
For the purpose of this study, agenda setting stage refers to the period that passes between the initiation
of the campaign and placing the issue on the global agenda. A campaign is considered to be successful at
the agenda setting stage if the issue triggers an action that indicates the acknowledgement of the issue on
the part of the target actors such as through United Nations General Assembly resolutions. Political
commitment stage refers to the period between the acknowledgement of the issue by the target actors and
publicly made commitments to address the issue. The commitment could range from signing of a treaty,
pledging of funds and agreeing to become a member of a related international organization. The study
evaluates a campaign as successful if major actors whose actions that the campaign aims to change make a
commitment. Policy implementation stage refers to the phase where actors are expected to follow through
with their publicly made commitments and success is evaluated based on the campaign’s ability to lead to
ratification of treaties, disbursement of pledged funds and initiation of domestic and legal changes. As I
discuss in detail in Chapter 3, it is not reasonable to expect every single target actor to be responsive to the
calls of a campaign and change their behavior accordingly. For that reason, in evaluating the success the
reaction and compliance on the part of the major target actors is used as the benchmark and campaigns are
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The comparative analysis aims to test the frequency at which security frames are
used and the extent to which such choices correlate with advocacy success.71 By
illustrating that securitization is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for success,
this analysis shows that the reasons provided by the literature in explaining the
motivations behind using security frames are not enough to account for such choices.
This is not to suggest that security frames are epiphenomenal; rather, it is to illustrate the
need for a closer examination of the dynamics behind securitization.
Based on these initial findings, at the second stage of the analysis, I conduct a
conduct a comparative case analysis and present it in Chapter 4. Nine cases are selected
selected among the thirty-eight cases analyzed in Chapter 3 and compared using a
combination of most-similar and most-different systems designs.72 The cases are selected
selected from four issue areas and the comparison aimed to reflect variation in both their

categorized as failed, successful and partially successful based on their ability to trigger action on the part
of these actors.
71
The universe of cases analyzed include: Anti-GMOs, Anti-smoking, Anti-structural Adjustment, AntiToxics, Anti-War Protests, Avian Influenza, Biodiversity, Child Labor, Child Soldiers, Climate Change,
Climate Refugees, Cluster Bombs, Conflict Diamonds, Dams, Demilitarization of Outer Space, Female
Genital Mutilation, HIV/AIDS, Human Trafficking, Humanitarian Intervention, Illegal Wildlife Trade,
Internally Displaced Persons, International Criminal Court, Jubilee 2000, Landmines, Make Poverty
History, Maternal Mortality, Privacy Protection, Rainforest Protection, Sexual Violence in Conflict, Small
Arms, Sweatshops, Torture, Transparency, Violence against Women, War Crimes Tribunals, Water
Conservation, Women’s Reproductive Rights, and Women, Peace and Security.
72
Most-similar systems design is a case selection and analysis method used to distill the influence of one
independent variable from alternative explanations by comparing cases that are as similar as possible in
every aspect except for the dependent variable (Pzreworski and Teune 1970; Gerring 2001; 2007; Landman
2003.) Most-different systems design is used to compare cases that are different from each other except for
the dependent variable (Pzreworski and Teune 1970; Gerring 2001; 2007). Most-similar systems design is
useful in testing tentative arguments distilled from single-case studies yet they raise questions about their
ability to distinguish impact of one single factor from alternative explanations (Gerring 2007; Dimitrov et
al. 2007.) Most-different systems design, on the other hand, is problematized as it leads to testing of too
many variables using only a limited number of cases (Tarrow 2010). In order to remedy for these
shortcomings, the study combines these approaches and the cases are selected based on the similarity in the
nature of the issue at hand and then they are paired based on the differences they have either in their use of
frames or in campaign outcomes.
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use of frames (securitized, de-securitized, non-securitized) and their levels of
success.73 The chapter compares eight cases in pairs and through this comparison
it highlights the similarities and differences between cases and provides an
account of the dynamics surrounding the framing processes for each of the case.
These accounts are followed by a discussion section that highlights the insights
gained across these comparative analyses. The chapter concludes by taking a
closer look at the Campaign for Internally Displaced Persons as the ninth case to
further illustrate the interplay between framing and the strategic environment in
the context of a non-securitized – less successful campaign.
The comparative case study that I present in Chapter 4 supports the
previous chapter by illustrating the interaction between the campaign’s strategic
environment, which guide the decisions to use different frames, and the factors
translate such choices into transnational advocacy success. Using the comparison
of more successful and less successful examples of securitized, non-securitized
and de-securitized cases of global agenda setting and policy making, I illustrate
that the motivations behind adopting security frames are more complex than
appreciated by the securitization literature in two ways: (i) a security frame does
not have to be tailored toward states or security organizations, it can also be
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The cases analyzed in this chapter are (i) health: HIV/AIDS (securitized, more successful) and Maternal
Mortality (non-securitized, more successful); (ii) humanitarian: Child Soldiers (non-securitized, more
successful); Sexual Violence in Conflict (securitized, less successful); and Internally Displaced Persons
(non-securitized, less successful) (iii) environment: Climate Change (securitized, more successful) and
Climate Refugees (securitized, less successful); (iv) arms control: Landmines (de-securitized, more
successful) and Small Arms (securitized, less successful). As the Campaign to End Sexual Violence in
Conflict Zones is an ongoing campaign it is difficult to evaluate the level of success that the campaign will
eventually reach. Yet, as it will be discussed in Chapter 4, the campaign has been struggling to trigger
political commitment. Thus, even though the campaign is indicated as “successful,” the level of success
reached so far is very limited and this limitation forms the basis of the comparison that this study
investigates.
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crafted to get the attention and cooperation of non-state actors; and (ii) a security frame
might be appealing to the audience not necessarily because of the security threat it voices
but because of the non-security concerns it silences (such as questioning of human rights
practices).
The arguments I develop based on the comparative case analysis also contributes
contributes to our understanding of the role of framing in norm-creation. The study lends
study lends support to the claims in the framing and TANs literatures and argues that the
strategic environment within which the advocacy campaigns operate shape advocates’
framing choices. In addition to the widely cited role of broader political context,74 the
study also finds the advocacy networks’ own dynamics and the advocates’ previous
experiences and fields of expertise to be important.
The study also provides new insights into how TANs function by highlighting the
complexity of advocates’ motivations in making their framing choices. The study argues
that advocates engage in multivocalization,75 which refers to the inclination of the
advocates to invoke multiple frames simultaneously to reach out not only to targets of
influence but also to potential allies with the goal of strengthening their networks.
The third stage of the analysis is composed of an illustrative case study that I
conducted on the Conflict Diamonds campaign and presented in Chapter 5. This case
study is where the insights gained in the previous chapters are analyzed more closely to
see how they operate and shape the decisions to use security frames. This chapter also
highlights the implications that such choices have for the success and the direction of the
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campaign. This analysis shows how insights gained through the analysis of nonsecuritized and de-securitized campaigns can be used to better explain the
securitized campaigns.
The chapter begins by providing justification for case selection, and
moves to introduce the campaign to the reader by highlighting the main actors and
the major turning points of the campaign. The rest of the chapter traces how the
campaign was framed at different stages of global agenda setting and policy
making, the dynamics surrounding these choices, and the implications of such
choices for the direction and the success of the campaign.
The analysis of the Conflict Diamonds Campaign I present in Chapter 5
provides an opportunity to test the arguments developed in Chapters 3 and 4 and
to further illustrate how the above identified dynamics have played out in the
Conflict Diamonds Campaign. The close analysis of the campaign that is
supported by interviews with the advocates involved in the campaign reveals that
security frames can be used by both state and non-state actors and the frames
could also be tailored toward state and non-state actors. The implications that the
security language has for the campaign depends on the author of the security
language (securitizing actor) and the appeal that security frames has for an
audience might be related to the audience’s non-security interests. Lastly, the
analysis also illustrates that the sustained use of security frames even when they
are no longer deemed as desirable by the advocates is a function of the
institutional structure and network dynamics rather than the uniqueness of the
security frame itself.
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Instead of challenging the securitization literature’s fundamental contribution to
our understanding of the security field, these arguments contribute to the analytical
purchase of the literature by providing more nuanced arguments through a more rigorous
analysis of the available evidence. In exploring these questions the study not only
theoretically and methodologically contributes to the literature but also provides insights
that can be utilized by advocates in making their framing choices.
The last chapter serves as a conclusion and provides a summary of the findings
and a discussion on the theoretical, methodological and policy implications of these
findings. The chapter also acknowledges the limitations of this dissertation, discusses the
measures taken in addressing them and identifies venues for further research.

26

CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction
As questions arise about the definition of security, increasing attention has been
paid to various aspects of the field of research. As Williams states these efforts have
forced the security field to, “consider questions surrounding the ‘broadening’ of its
agenda to include threats beyond the narrow rubric of state and military security, and to
confront the claim that this agenda must be ‘deepened’ to include the security concerns of
actors ranging from individuals and sub-state groups … to global concerns such as the
environment that have often been marginalized within a traditional state-centric and
military conception.”76
The securitization literature contributes to this debate by asking, “What really
makes something a security problem?”77 According to this literature, a threat to security
is an “outcome of a special process” rather than an “objective condition.”78 Thus, any
issue can potentially be portrayed and treated as a security threat. The reasoning that the
securitization literature provides in explaining the actors’ motivations in resorting to such
an effort is embedded into the very definition of securitization. As Buzan et al. argue,
security threats have a “special nature” that “… justifies the use of extraordinary
measures to handle them. The invocation of security has been the key to legitimizing the
use of force, but more generally it has opened the way for the state to mobilize, or to take
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special powers, to handle existential threats.”79 Yet, according to this literature, such a
portrayal comes with a price as once a state starts to see an issue as a threat to its security
it takes measures accordingly, which in return may end up hurting the very goal of
solving the problem at hand.80
Studies that aim to explore the dynamics of global politics utilize the
securitization literature’s insights and analyzed the extent to which securitization plays a
role in global politics, especially in shaping the transnational advocacy campaigns’
attempts to force the international community to address transnational social problems.
The increased use of security language in promoting issues ranging from women’s
rights81 to HIV/AIDS82 by the advocacy campaigns themselves encouraged the scholars
to analyze the reasons behind such choices. These studies argued that using security
frames are instrumental for advocacy campaigns’ efforts in creating global agendas and
initiating global policies as states are highly responsive to issues that they perceive as
security threats.83 Thus, the decision to use security frames by the advocates is almost
treated as self-explanatory. Yet, these efforts create a problem of essentializing the use of
security frames by building their analysis on the uniqueness that securitization literature
attributes to security frames. However, when approached from this perspective neither
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the extent to which security frames correlate with success nor the reasons behind
adopting such a frame get adequately tested.
While these studies provide insights into the successful examples of securitized
transnational advocacy campaigns they do not adequately answer the question of why
securitize. The reasons for adopting a security frames remain obscured because (i) as the
securitization literature itself acknowledges, securitization comes with long-term negative
costs; (ii) adopting security frames may not lead to success as evidenced by the failed
examples of securitized campaigns; and (iii) securitization may not be necessary for
success as exemplified by the successful examples of non-securitized and de-securitized
transnational advocacy campaigns. These potentially contradictory insights create a
puzzle that needs to be studied if we want to better explore why advocates engage in
securitization.
The existing studies fall short of adequately answering this question for
conceptual and methodological reasons. Conceptually, the uniqueness of security frames
and the uncontested position security concerns occupy on states’ agendas are embedded
in the very definition and logic of securitization literature and therefore, remain underanalyzed. In addition to this conceptual limitation, neither the securitization literature
itself nor studies that apply securitization literature’s insights to transnational advocacy
campaigns have so far conducted enough systematic research on when and how
securitization works and why it is not only sometimes used.
This dissertation addresses these shortcomings by treating securitization as an
instance of framing and thereby shedding light onto the strategic environment in which
TANs operate as well as their strategies in order to distill (i) the motivations that
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advocates have in using security frames; (ii) the conditions that translate the framing
choices into success; and (iii) the factors that shape security frames’ implications for the
advocacy campaign in the long-run.
Approaching securitization as an instance of framing and combining a systematic
comparison of successful and unsuccessful examples of securitized, non-securitized and
de-securitized cases with a closer analysis of a smaller number of campaigns allow me to
better explain why advocates use security frames. I conclude that the strategic
environment within which campaigns operate shape advocates’ decisions to use security
frames and their decisions are based on a more complex reasoning than explored by the
literature. As opposed to the state oriented approach of the conventional wisdom, actors’
decisions to use a security frame could be tailored towards non-state as well as state
actors, and framing choices can be aimed at appealing to non-security as well as security
concerns of the audience.
I assert that advocates tend to use a number of frames simultaneously even when
they securitize an issue to not only appeal to the targets of influence, but also to potential
allies with the goal of strengthening their networks. Relatedly, the acceptance of the
security frame by a target audience (potential allies or targets of influence) could be a
consequence of varying strategic and normative calculations on the part of the audience
rather than their security concerns. Lastly, the sustained use of security frames even when
they are no longer deemed desirable have so far been explained by existing studies as a
byproduct of the uniqueness of securitization; yet as I show through the comparative
analysis, the sustained use of frames is neither unique to security frames nor a function of
their peculiarities.
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This chapter reviews the literature to build the theoretical foundation that makes
this study’s research question (why transnational advocacy campaigns use security
frames?) valuable. The chapter starts by reviewing the contribution that securitization
literature makes to our understanding of the security field and provides a discussion of
the limitations of these insights. Securitization literature is important because it makes
this inquiry possible by acknowledging that issues can, through language, be turned into
security concerns. Yet, the uniqueness this literature attributes to security frames limits
the insights we gain into when and why such attempts succeed.
The second literature that makes the research question worthy of attention is the
one that illustrates that transnational advocacy campaigns matter. Transnational advocacy
campaigns literature is reviewed below to illustrate under which conditions and through
which strategies these campaigns can influence global politics. One of the most important
strategies at advocates’ disposal is identified as strategically framing issues to increase
their appeal to the audience. Yet, as the review of the literature illustrates, framing is a
complex and a contested process and it is important to highlight these dynamics as they
form the basis of this study’s attempt to explain securitization from a framing
perspective.
The chapter then goes on to review the studies that attempt to explain the
securitized transnational campaigns. These studies expand on the securitization literature
by illustrating that non-state actors can also be the authors of the security language and
they contribute to the TANs literature by investigating the securitized examples of
advocacy campaigns. Yet, these studies suffer from an inherent limitation that comes
from their treatment of securitization as a unique process rather than as act of framing. As
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discussed in the end of the chapter, there are significant insights to be gained by
approaching securitization from a framing perspective which is the basis of this study’s
contribution to the literature.
Securitization
Securitization can be defined as the, “positioning through language of a particular
issue as an existential threat to security.”84 The concept of securitization was championed
by the Copenhagen School and it is based on the premise that a security threat is not an
objective reality but rather a result of an interactive process where any issue can be
framed as such. However, not every attempt to securitize an issue succeeds and the
success depends on both the actors involved (the securitizing actor85 and the audience86)
and the venue that securitization takes place in.
While the securitization literature contributes to our understanding of the security
field, the intrinsic value the literature attaches to security frames shapes (and limits) the
insights that the literature provides into (i) the varying reasons that actors have in
resorting to a security discourse; (ii) the motivations that the audience have in accepting
their claims; and (iii) the conditions needed for such process to succeed. This section
describes both the contribution that the securitization literature makes to our
understanding of the security field, and its major limitations – which this study addresses
by challenging the uniqueness attributed to security frames.
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Defining Securitization and Its Contribution to Security Studies
Securitization literature both contributes to and challenges the traditional
understanding of security in international relations. On the one hand, it contributes to
traditional studies by acknowledging security concerns as states’ primary interests. On
the other hand, it challenges the traditional understanding by widening and deepening the
scope of what can be categorized as a security threat.
Securitization literature agrees with the traditional conceptions of security on the
idea that security concerns are the primary interests of nation states. In international
relations theory, security is traditionally interpreted as “war and the military capacity to
respond to external threats to the states.”87 The core of “national interest” is considered to
be the protection of “sovereignty and territoriality.”88 Replicating this perception,
securitization literature suggests that states react to security threats and therefore, that
appealing to security concerns is useful in placing an issue on states’ agendas.
The second point in which the securitization literature agrees with the traditional
understanding of security is the idea that the principle object of international security is
the state.89 In other words, existing studies accept that, historically, the state is the actor
whose security is to be protected. This perception distinguishes securitization literature
from other critical theories as these theories suggest that the object of security should be
the individual.90 However, securitization literature argues that this understanding of
security is neither natural nor inevitable. As Buzan and Waever state, “[w]hat is or is not
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prime in international security, including the state, depends on historical conditions.”91
Thus, while taking the state as the key actor whose security is to be protected, the
securitization literature does so without essentializing the primacy of nation-states.
While agreeing with the traditional approaches on states’ primacy in international
relations, securitization literature also diverges from this perspective in its understanding
of what constitutes a security threat. In the traditional understanding, “military threats
from states against other states” are considered to be the main security concerns.92
Securitization literature challenges this by expanding the scope of security threats to
include non-military threats originating from non-state actors.93 Securitization literature
suggests that the field of security needs
“broadening” of its agenda to include threats beyond the narrow rubric of state
and military security, and to confront the claim that this agenda must also be
“deepened” to include the security concerns of actors ranging from individuals
and sub-state groups (often now formulated under the rubric of “human security”)
to global concerns such as the environment that have often been marginalized
within a traditional state-centric and military conception.94
The earlier works within the Copenhagen School defined security as a speech
act.95 In the words of Waever, “it is by labeling something a security issue that it becomes
one.”96 Thus, according to this argument, regardless of the nature of the issue, anything
can be framed as a security threat; however, it is not a random act but rather a deliberate
choice that is aimed at a specific political goal.97 This particular speech act is performed
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with the goal of “produc[ing] hierarchical conditions in which security issues are
dramatized and presented as supreme priorities of the state or the actor in question.”98
Thus, the primary purpose of securitizing an issue is to prioritize it on an actor’s agenda.
The scholars who perceive securitization as a speech act do not suggest that the
mere act of calling an issue a security threat automatically turns it into one.99 As Buzan et
al. state, “the security speech act is not defined by the uttering the word security. What is
essential is the designation of an existential threat requiring emergency action or special
measures and the acceptance of that designation by a significant audience.”100 Any actor
can attempt to frame any issue as a security threat. These kinds of attempts are called
“securitizing moves”; however, an issue is considered to be successfully securitized only
“once an actor has convinced an audience of its legitimate need to go beyond otherwise
binding rules and regulations”.101 Therefore, in order for an issue to be categorized as a
security threat the audience needs to accept the legitimacy of such a claim and consent to
the use of non-political measures in addressing it.
While scholars have different takes on the exact processes through which
securitization occurs, there is more or less an agreement as to why securitization takes
place. The framing of various issues as security threats is attributed to the special role that
security occupies on states’ agendas. Scholars argue that security language has been
increasingly used as a tool for “prioritizing unconventional security issues.”102 This is
based on the premise that “everyone agrees that ‘security issues’ are important and
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deserving of national prominence and financial support.”103 As such, issues that have not
been previously categorized as security threats get appropriated into security frames. This
shift is argued to be exemplified with the rise of various concepts such as “food
security,”104 and “environmental security”105 as well as the increasing emphasis placed on
the security dimensions of non-security issues such as migration106 and health107 which
will be discussed in detail below.
Even though the earlier works within the securitization literature heavily relied on
the speech act theory,108 as the literature evolved, more emphasis started to be put on
explaining securitization as a process.109 The approaches that were based on speech act
theory required the utterance of the words “security” or “threat” to consider an issue to be
securitized.110 However, as the literature developed, the scholars moved away from this
perception and started to look for alternative indicators. For instance, Balzacq highlighted
the importance of “non-linguistic processes of securitization” and suggested that
securitization should also be traced in the policy tools and instruments.111 Such an
approach does not disregard the role of the discourse but rather it suggests that framing of
an issue as a security threat can take multiple forms. Following this approach, for
instance, in analyzing the securitization of asylum and immigration issues Huysmans
suggests that, “even when not directly spoken off as a threat, asylum can be rendered as a
security question by being institutionally and discursively integrated in policy
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frameworks that emphasize policing and defense.”112 Following this logic, Huysmans
suggests that European Union securitized the issues of immigration and asylum not by
explicitly calling them security threats but by focusing on policies that would defend host
countries from “collective dangerous force of migrants.”113
It is important to note that securitization literature has an explicitly stated
normative stance on framing issues as security threats. This normative stance can be
summarized as “less security, more politics!”114 Securitization literature suggests that
securitization is likely to create “security traps” where attempts to attract attention to an
issue by framing it as a security threat moves the policy outcome away from the
“underlying intentions.”115 As a result, while claiming that security frames are essential in
getting states to react to an issue, securitization literature also concentrates on providing
recommendations for de-securitization rather than treating securitization as a desirable or
a natural process.116
Limitations of the Securitization Literature
The distance that the literature has come in operationalizing securitization has not
been enough to defeat criticisms. Most importantly, the reliance of the earlier work on the
speech-act theory has made it difficult to understand the role that the audience plays in
the securitization process. As Balzacq criticizes, Waever’s earlier work posits
securitization as a “self-referential” practice where the mere act of calling something a
security threat is what triggers securitization.117 This perception is argued to contradict
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with the literature’s claim of securitization as an “intersubjective process” between the
securitizing-actor and the audience and limits the ability of the literature to explain under
what conditions and for what reasons an audience is more likely to accept the claims of
security.118
The later works attempted to compensate for this shortcoming by analyzing the
role that the audience has in securitization.119 The critics highlighted both the need to
acknowledge the agency that audience has120 and the need to account for the fact that
there might be “multiple audiences.”121 Yet the uniqueness that the literature attaches to
security concerns limits these studies’ scope and prevents them from taking audiences’
non-security concerns into consideration in explaining their willingness to accept the
claims of security (upon which this study aims to shed light).
The uniqueness that the literature attributes to security frames limits the
literature’s ability to explain the conditions under which attempts to securitize an issue
succeed. The earlier lack of interest in the context within which securitization occurs was
a function of the assumption that, when done successfully, securitization modifies the
context in which it takes place and in return makes the pre-existing conditions
irrelevant.122 Balzacq, in an attempt to account for this omission, argued that security
language resonates with the audience only if the securitizing actor is able to relate its
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claims to the “external reality.”123 Thus, the existence of a “perceptive environment” is a
necessary condition for the success of an attempt to securitize.124
While these studies contribute to the analytical purchase of the securitization
literature, they still operate within the assumption that security has its unique role and
dynamics in shaping actors’ perceptions, agendas, and actions. This predisposition then
limits their interest to the successful instances of securitization and makes them overlook
the cases where securitization could have been initiated but did not, or the cases where an
audience was convinced to pay attention to an unlikely issue without necessarily being
convinced about the security implications of it.
The securitization literature’s portrayal of the “securitizing actors” is also a point
of controversy. According to the literature, any issue can be framed as a security threat
yet not every actor has the capacity to successfully invoke a security language. As
Charrett discusses, “no one is excluded from attempts to articulate alternative
interpretations of security,” but as a result of the power structures within the field of
security, certain actors, typically state elites, hold an advantaged position over defining
security threats.”125 Such an approach is problematic because it leaves the non-state
actors’ role in framing security concerns out of the picture and limits the framing capacity
to the elites and presents a statist approach to security.126
As is discussed below, the attempts to use securitization theory in explaining
transnational advocacy campaigns’ success contribute to the securitization literature by
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acknowledging the non-state actors as “securitizing actors” and by treating states as the
“audience.” Yet, these studies are also based on the assumption that securitization has its
own logic and consequences, and therefore, their ability to explain the complex dynamics
surrounding the decisions to securitize remains limited. These limitations could, however,
be overcome by treating securitization as an instance of framing and applying the insights
developed by literature on framing and TANs to the study of securitized examples of
transnational advocacy campaigns.
Securitization as Framing and the Strategic Environment for TANs
The goal of this study is to explain why transnational advocacy campaigns use
security frames. The openness that the securitization literature brings to the field of
security makes this line of questioning possible. Yet, exploring this question requires us
to look beyond the arguments of the securitization literature and overcome the limitations
identified above.
The validity of this research question relies on two assumptions: (i) what
transnational advocacy campaigns do matters for global politics; (ii) framing is an
important part of what advocacy campaigns do and have an impact on their capacity to
shape global politics. Based on these assumptions this study argues that, as opposed to
what securitization theory implies, securitization is an act of framing that is bound by the
same dynamics that shape alternative framing choices.
This section reviews the literature to ground the above listed assumptions and
provides justification for both the assumptions and the research question. For that reason,
it is important to begin by illustrating that transnational advocacy campaigns matter for
global politics. Since not every advocacy campaign manages to influence global politics,
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it becomes important to understand the factors that shape their level of impact. Here, a
dual dynamic appears: transnational advocacy campaigns are bounded by the strategic
environment within which they operate and they in return engage in strategies to utilize
their strategic environment to their benefit. Framing is one of the most important
strategies but, as the TANs literature shows us, it is a contested process and the impact it
has on the success of an advocacy campaign is not automatic, but rather mediated by
other factors.
There is an increasing attention paid to the contribution that using security as a
strategic frame makes to the success of advocacy campaigns. In analyzing these cases,
the studies mostly operate based on the securitization literature’s premises and treat
securitization as a unique instance rather than a form of framing which is bound by the
same dynamics that surround other acts of framing. Not utilizing the insights of the
framing and TANs literatures curtails the analytical purchase of these studies which I aim
to address in this dissertation.
Transnational Advocacy Campaigns127
TANs are networks that involve “relevant actors working internationally on an
issue, who are bound together by shared values, a common discourse, and dense
exchanges of information and services.”128 TANs are argued to play a role in shaping
global politics along with a number of other actors such as epistemic communities,129
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intergovernmental organizations,130 celebrities,131 and think-tanks.132 These networks
engage in transnational campaigns with the goal of changing states’ and international
organizations’ behavior.133 To realize this change TANs “bring in new ideas, norms, and
discourses into policy debates; ... serve as sources of information and testimony; ... [and]
promote norm implementation, by pressuring target actors to adopt new policies, and by
monitoring compliance with international standards.”134
The increasing presence of transnational advocacy networks in global politics first
paved the way to a number of studies that focused on illustrating that these networks
matter. Starting with the groundbreaking work of Keck and Sikkink135 an important
literature was developed in explaining the role that transnational advocacy campaigns
play in shaping global politics.136 The role these actors play is argued to be based on their
ability to “multiply the channels of access to the international system”137 and to “disrupt
hierarchies” by shifting power relations among various actors.138
After initial work that focused on illustrating the importance of transnational
advocacy networks, the field shifted focus and started looking into different ways through
which these networks influence global politics and the factors that shape their
effectiveness.139 More recently, studies expanded their scope and started to question why
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advocacy networks choose certain issues to campaign on while leaving the others
behind.140
The mounting scholarly work has shown that transnational advocacy campaigns
have played a significant role in leading to international agreements ranging from the
Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (1997)141 to the Rome Treaty of the International
Criminal Court (2002).142 The literature also shows that the transnational advocacy
campaigns’ role is not limited to the creation of agendas and initiation of agreements but
extends to the monitoring role they play once the states commit to taking action. For
instance, the “Civil Society Coalition” has an institutionalized role within the Kimberley
Process which was established to keep the diamond industry clean from conflict
diamonds.143 Similarly, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines shifted their focus
once the treaty was signed and focused on monitoring the states’ compliance through
their regular reports.144
The literature establishes the role that transnational advocacy campaigns play in
changing how the international community perceives and chooses to address a
transnational problem. Yet, even the most successful examples transnational advocacy
campaigns do not necessarily lead to the elimination of the problem at hand. The road to
the complete elimination of a problem is a complex and a multi-stage one, and
140
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succeeding at one stage does not guarantee the same at the next one. Placing an issue on
the global agenda (making the targets actors recognize the problem) is a necessary step
for successfully solving it; however, agenda setting success does not guarantee that states
will act on the issue145 or follow through with their commitments.146
As Finnemore and Sikkink distinguish in their argument on “norm life-cycles,”
norm emergence (where the norm entrepreneurs try to persuade a critical number of
states to the importance of a norm) is different from “norm cascade” (where other states
are convinced to become norm followers). Only in the far end of this life-cycle the norms
are internalized by the states and the “completion of the “life-cycle” is not an inevitable
process.”147 Many issues advocated by the transnational campaigns have found a place on
the global agenda yet failed to initiate action on the part of the target actors or ensure
compliance. For instance, the advocacy campaign succeeded in getting the issue of
cluster munitions on the global agenda148 and led to political commitment (the
Convention on the Cluster Munitions) yet it failed to successfully change the target
actors’ behavior.149
Acknowledging the complexity of the stages that a transnational advocacy
campaign needs to go through to successfully solve a transnational social problem is
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rather easy. What is difficult to identify is what counts as success. Measuring success is
difficult as not every policy instrument is equally effective in shaping behavior; and it is
not possible to create a norm where every target actor, without exception, commits to the
norm that is being advocated and complies with its requirements without any divergence.
Therefore, finding an answer to the question of whose commitment and compliance
matters and how we know if they are complying is complicated. For instance, as Busby
discusses, “in policy terms, a non-binding agreement such as the 1992 UN Framework
Convention on Climate Change is very different from the 1997 binding Kyoto Protocol.
Nonetheless, in political terms, the non-participation of the United States in the Kyoto
Protocol makes the agreement less of a political success (though one could argue the
support of a majority of the world’s countries and major greenhouse emitters still
qualifies as a victory).”150 Thus, in measuring success of a political commitment one
needs to weigh both the nature of the agreed commitment and also its reach, which is
what this study bases its measure of political success on as I discuss in Chapter 3.
Measuring success is difficult also because even when the target actors initiate
domestic policies in line with the advocated norm151 whether these policies will succeed
in completely erasing the problem requires a very long time-lag as both the root-causes
and the implications of the problems run too deep to tackle in the short-term. Thus, a
more tangible measure of policy implementation success is “whether or not countries
important for implementation have accepted the policy that advocates are pursuing
through some domestic decision making process.”152
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The role that transnational advocacy campaigns play in shaping global politics
and the complex dynamics that determine their influence require us to take a closer look
at the strategic environment within which advocates operate and the strategies they
develop. This analysis is important in testing whether securitization really provides a
“magical formula” for success as argued by the securitization literature or whether
securitization operates like any other frame and bounded by the same dynamics.
Strategic Environment
The literature on transnational advocacy campaigns highlights two sets of factors
in explaining why some campaigns succeed while the others fail. The first set of factors is
regarding the structural and non-structural conditions and mechanisms that shape the
context in which advocates operate, whereas the second set of factors is about various
strategies and tools employed by the advocates in trying to maximize their influence.
Understanding the factors that affect advocacy campaigns’ success in shaping
global agendas and initiating policy responses requires us to first look at the structural
and non-structural conditions surrounding the advocacy efforts. Since the advocates do
not function within a political or an ideological vacuum, the constraints and the
opportunities that these structural and non-structural factors present need to be taken into
account.153 This subsection focuses on explaining the strategic environment within which
advocates operate while the following subsection focuses on exploring advocates’
strategies.
The factor that has been most cited by the literature in explaining advocacy
campaign effectiveness is the broader political context within which campaigns operate.
As Cooley and Ron argue, “the incentives and constraints produced by the transnational
153
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sector’s institutional environment”154 play a role in shaping both the extent to which and
also the strategies through which advocates work toward exerting their power.155 Yet,
neither the political context nor the impact it has on advocacy campaigns is static. While
certain characteristics of the broader political context (such as the political structure) are
more permanent, the others (such as symbolic events) are rather flexible. These factors
can either provide a fertile ground for advocacy campaigns or hinder their efforts.
The political structures are first crucial in shaping the playing field within which
campaigns operate. The more access points that advocacy campaigns have the better their
chances are in exerting their influence onto global politics.156 In that respect as Tarrow
and Smith highlight, operating within issue areas where there are established international
organizations and regimes are important in creating policy spaces for advocates to
organize and mobilize.157 For instance, Geddes, among others, illustrates the role of the
European Union’s (EU) institutional structure and claims it to be conducive to advocacy
efforts as it provides additional points of access for advocacy groups.158
In addition to the political structures, the dynamic components of broader
political contexts can also create a fertile ground, “windows of opportunity”159 for
advocates to utilize. For instance, “symbolic events” such as meetings and human-made
or natural disasters can provide windows of opportunity for advocates to further their
agendas160 as these events have the potential to “recast or challenge prevailing definitions
of the situation, thus changing perceptions of costs and benefits of policies and programs
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and the perception of injustice of the status quo.”161 For instance, in analyzing the success
of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), Shawki concludes that it was
the review process that the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) was
undergoing at the time that “allowed the ICBL access to the global public policy process
by creating a target and a focal point for activism surrounding landmines to frame the
landmine problem as a humanitarian crisis.”162 Similarly, studies that comparatively
analyze the successful campaigns that took place in 1990s suggest that “left-of center
governments coming to power throughout Western democracies” created a fertile ground
for a number of accomplishments such as International Criminal Court and the Kyoto
Protocol to take place.163
The broader context within which advocates operate could also function as an
obstacle in front of advocates’ efforts; economic constraints can be listed as one of these
limitations. As Haas, Andresen and Kanie explain, lack of stable financial resources
makes NGOs dependent on outside contributions such as those coming from
“foundations and foreign-aid agencies” as well as members’ contributions. Such reliance
functions as a limitation as “the NGOs are faced with incentives to differentiate
themselves for funders, and to constantly present themselves as offering a new agenda or
approach.”164
Similar to the way political structures function, the changing dynamics within the
broader political context can also create obstacles in front of the campaigning efforts. As
Humphreys contends, during the United Nations Conference on Environment and
161

Zald 1996, 268.
Shawki 2010, 393.
163
Price 2003, 593. Also see Keck and Sikkink 1998a; Florini 1999; Higgot et al. 2000; Khagram et al.
2002.
164
Haas, Andresen and Kanie 2014, 6.
162

48

Development (UNCED) Forest Negotiations the polarization between developed and
developing countries limited advocates’ ability to shape the agenda as the states were
focused on resolving the disagreements among each other. This division in return limited
the room for maneuver for the environmental activists.165
It is important to note that the changes within the political context are not
necessarily exogenous to advocacy campaigns. Advocates themselves through their
actions expand the opportunities that the political structures present to them. For instance
in their study, Clark, Friedman and Hochstetler trace NGO involvement in UN thematic
conferences on environment and human rights and observe that there have been
“significant advances in both the quantity and the quality of their [NGOs’]
participation.”166 The authors argue this change to be a consequence of the widening in
the NGOs’ repertoire of action which provided them with an increased number of access
points in their attempts to influence global policy making. Similarly in analyzing the
changes in the working of the International Whaling Commission, Skodvin and Andresen
argue that the moratorium decision of 1982 that banned whaling for commercial purposes
was a product of the environmental and animal rights NGOs’ ability to mobilize
support.167 Such success is not limited to environmental campaigns, either. Similarly

165

Humphreys 2006.
They state that “[l]ess than 300 NGOs attended the Stockholm Conference on the Environment [in
1972]. In 1992, 1,400 NGOs registered with the Rio conference, and 18,000 NGOs attended the parallel
NGO forum. Only 53 NGOs in consultative status sent representatives to the 1968 Tehran International
Conference on Human Rights, and four others attended at the invitation of the conference's Preparatory
Committee. For the 1993 Human Rights Conference in Vienna, a UN source lists 248 NGOs in consultative
status and 593 as participants. NGO reports estimated that 1,400 to 1,500 NGOs attended. At the 1975
Mexico City Conference for International Women's Year, 6,000 people attended the NGO forum, and 114
NGOs gained access to the official conference; at the 1985 closing conference of the UN Decade on
Women in Nairobi, 13,500 people registered for--and many more attended--the NGO forum, and 163
NGOs were accredited to the official meetings. Ten years later over 300,000 people attended the Beijing
NGO forum, doubling previous attendance records. But equally impressive, 3,000 accredited NGOs gained
access to the Fourth World Conference on Women.” (Clark et al. 1998, 5)
167
Skodvin and Andresen 2003.
166

49

securing a permanent observer status within the Kimberley Process changed the political
context significantly and provided the Conflict Diamonds Campaign an official and
permanent access point to exert their influence.168
In addition to the role that the broader political context plays in shaping the
success of advocacy efforts, the literature also highlights that the issues themselves have
specific ‘attributes’ (or characteristics) that make it easier or more difficult for advocates
to garner support. For instance, issues where there is an identifiable perpetrator and issues
where there is a short causal link between the act and the harm it creates are easier for the
campaigns to attract global actors’ attention.169 The same is also true for cases where the
damage caused can be quantified and illustrated through widely distributed reports.170
The advocacy efforts are also argued to have a better chance at succeeding if the harm
inflicted on the victims is a physical and therefore an observable one.171 For instance,
Keck and Sikkink argue that, “torture and disappearance have been more tractable than
some other human rights issues, and protesting torture of political prisoners more
effective than protesting torture of common criminals or capital punishment.”172 That is
because in the case of torture the damage is physical and in the case of political prisoners
the claim of innocence is easier to make. Following this logic, Stone argues that an
advocacy campaign has a better chance at succeeding if the problem is perceived to be
amenable to human action rather than unavoidable bad fortune.173
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As discussed below, the issue attributes are not set in stone, either. Not only the
nature of the issue changes over time but also the advocates engage in various strategies
to reframe the perceived attributes of the issue. The following subsection discusses
various strategies employed by the advocates to make the most out of the strategic
environment within which they operate and change them when necessary and possible.
Advocacy Strategies174
The literature on transnational advocacy campaigns has paid a significant amount
of attention to the strategies that transnational advocacy campaigns utilize in explaining
the varying degree of campaigns’ successes. These tools are critical in not only defining
campaigns’ power in global policy making but also distinguishing them from other
actors. Reviewing the tools that are available at the transnational advocacy campaigns’
disposal is crucial in appreciating the role and importance of framing for advocacy
campaigns as well as the complex dynamics surrounding their utilization.
While different networks have different tools at their disposal, the lack of military
and (most of the time) economic power distinguishes transnational advocacy campaigns
from states and corporations while the lack of violence in their methods separates them
from terrorist groups.175 In the absence of these traditional sources of power, advocates
are forced to engage in creative ways to realize their goals. The strategies that advocates
utilize in promoting their causes take multiple forms and they range from “framing issues
to win the hearts and minds of others to their cause; mobilising reliable information and
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expertise on an issue in ways conducive to influencing policy and norms; or naming and
shaming states for unethical practices.”176
What Keck and Sikkink refer to as “information politics” i.e. “collecting credible
information and deploying it strategically at carefully selected sites”177 is one of the
frequently used advocacy strategies. For instance, Ron et al. analyzed the Amnesty
International’s (AI) reporting of human rights abuses and concluded that “the group [AI]
produce[d] more written work on some countries than others to maximize advocacy
opportunities, shape international standards, promote greater awareness, and raise its
profile.”178 Successfully engaging in information politics on the one hand, includes
collecting and disseminating credible, verifiable and reliable information and on the other
hand, it requires the information to be presented in a timely and dramatic manner.179 In
order to utilize this function to its maximum, advocates not only collect and disseminate
testimonies but also support them with statistical and technical information they collect
themselves.180 As a successful example of this, Conflict Diamonds Campaign managed to
get the UNSC’s attention by reliably reporting the severity of the conflict diamonds
problem in Angola181 and Sierra Leone.182
The second strategy that advocacy networks utilize is “symbolic politics,” which
refers to advocates’ “ability to call upon symbols, actions or stories that make sense of a
situation or claim for an audience that is frequently far away.”183 For instance, sending
fake diamonds covered with fake blood to newspaper editors was one of the strategies
176
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employed by the conflict diamonds network in getting the media to pay attention to the
issue.184 International Campaign to Ban Landmines similarly put together shoe piles to
represent the lost limbs which turned out to be a very effective strategy in attracting
international attention to the issue.185 The anti-sweatshop campaign was also successful
in employing symbolic politics by “successfully linking Nike’s brand with the use of
sweatshop labor.”186
The third strategy is “leverage politics” or “boomerang strategy” which is “the
ability to call upon powerful actors to affect a situation where weaker members of a
network are unlikely to have influence.”187 Bocşe highlights this strategy by illustrating
how Hungarian campaigners pressured the Romanian government to help them convince
the Hungarian government to ban the use of cyanide.188 Similarly, Yanacopulos discusses
how some smaller NGOs utilized NGO Working Group on the World Bank to get their
voices heard by the World Bank.189
The fourth strategy is “accountability politics”190 and refers to the advocates’
ability to monitor target actors’ actions to make sure that they comply with their
previously made commitments by “naming and shaming” the violations. Advocates
utilize this strategy in various ways. For instance, ICBL puts countries onto lists based on
their landmine policies to keep the spotlight on those who perform badly.191 Advocates
also play important roles in ensuring compliance by conducting monitoring functions in a
number of issue areas ranging from World Bank funded development projects to child
184

Grant and Taylor 2004.
Price 1998; Clarke 2008.
186
Knight and Greenberg 2002; Ihlen, Bartlett and May 2011.
187
Keck and Sikkink 1998a; 1999, 95.
188
Bocşe 2011.
189
Yanacopulos 2005.
190
Keck and Sikkink 1998; 1999.
191
Short 1999; Clarke 2008.
185

53

labor regulations.192 Similarly, in analyzing the role of advocates in limiting statesponsored killings, DeMeritt finds a positive correlation to exist between NGO reporting
of violations and state practices.193
The frequency at which each of these strategies are utilized by the campaigns
change both based on their goals as well as based on the opportunities and constraints
that their strategic environment presents. Despite these variations, one very important
strategy that advocates employ throughout all stages of global agenda setting and policy
making and one that plays an important role in shaping campaigns’ capacity to utilize
opportunities is framing.
Framing as an Advocacy Strategy
Framing can be defined as “the strategic packaging of new ideas and
interpretations.”194 The idea that frames matter was born in sociology195 and it was first
applied to the social movements literature within political science.196 Framing is a
“processual phenomenon” through which meanings are constructed.197 This process is
“active in the sense that something is being done, and processual in the sense of a
dynamic, evolving process.”198
Frames are “interpretive schemata[s] that simplif[y] and condense the ‘world out
there’ by selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences,
and sequences of action within one’s present or past environment.”199 Thus, framing is

192

Pallas and Urpelainen 2012.
DeMeritt 2012. It is worth to note that some studies are critical of the connection between monitoring
and compliance (such as Hafner-Burton 2008; Hendrix and Wong 2013).
194
Joachim 2007, 19.
195
Goffman 1974.
196
Such as Snow et al. 1986; Snow and Benford 1988; and McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996.
197
Snow et al. 1986; Snow and Benford 1988; and Benford and Snow 2000.
198
Benford and Snow 2000, 614.
199
Snow and Benford 1992, 137.
193

54

not particular to collective actions, but it is also deemed necessary for individuals to
“locate, perceive, identify and label” the events they are experiencing.200 Nevertheless,
frames have a special role to play in collective actions, such as transnational advocacy
campaigns. Framing is important for advocacy campaigns not only because it gives
meaning to issues that have not been previously considered as worthy of attention, but
also because it determines which actors would gain power and which ones would be left
in the margins.201 In other words, framing is crucial not only because “it determines
whether and how issues get onto the political agenda” but also because they shape “how
issues are given meaning, operationalized, and adopted into the norm-building process
even before becoming part of the official agenda.”202
As framing was identified as one of the key advocacy strategies by the literature
very early on, a number of insights have been developed so far in explaining the
dynamics of framing, as well as framing’s role in leading to advocacy success.
Reviewing this literature is crucial in understanding why advocates use a particular frame
and how they choose it, as well as in forming a basis of comparison to use in testing the
extent to which security frames resemble to other instances of framing.
The most important insights pertaining to the purpose of this study is two-fold.
First, issues are framed not only based on moral concerns but also based on material
calculations and second, framing has implications not only for the audience but also for
the advocates themselves. The following subsections discuss the insights that the
literature provides about advocates’ normative and material motivations in tailoring their
framing preferences as well as the complex dynamics that surround these decisions. It is
200
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important to review these dynamics as treating securitization as an act of framing will
require this study to trace these dynamics within securitization processes.
How do Advocates Choose Their Frames and Why it Matters?
Almost no issue naturally falls into a “frame,” thus framing requires a conscious
and strategic act on the part of the actors that are involved in “packaging” of the issue.
Through framing, advocacy campaigns have the capacity to “highlight particular aspects
of a problem such as the driving causes and/or who has the responsibility to act, thereby
establishing the boundaries within which states must formulate their responses.”203 For
that reason, framing has both a normative and an instrumental function and it reflects
what advocates believe in, how they think they can get the others to react, and how they
can make the most out of their limited resources. To achieve these goals, advocates tailor
their frames not only for the targets of influence whose actions they aim to change, but
they also tailor the frames for potential allies with the goal of strengthening their efforts.
Yet, as the literature illustrates, none of these efforts, even when they succeed, guarantee
advocacy success. Nevertheless, rather than aiming to show the limits of framing, the
below presented review highlights the complex dynamics that needs to be taken into
consideration when analyzing advocates’ framing choices.
First, advocates engage in framing in order to appeal to targets actors’ normative
concerns.204 As Keck and Sikkink put it, an issue is more likely to be picked up and used
in norm creation if the way it is framed resonates with the already existing norms.205
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Such a resemblance increases issue entrepreneurs’ chances of grafting their concerns onto
the target actors’ agendas.206 For instance, in analyzing the International Campaign to
Ban Landmines, Price illustrates that the campaign’s success was a function of its ability
to graft the issue onto the existing norms against the use of weapons of mass destruction.
By emphasizing the indiscriminate nature of the harm that landmines cause, the
Campaign successfully turned what used to be considered as a conventional weapon with
no specific ill-repute into a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) to be eliminated.207
Similarly, by framing human trafficking as “modern day slavery,” the advocates worked
to trigger states’ sensibilities about slavery.208
While appealing to target actors’ normative concerns is one of the main goals of
framing, the compatibility of the suggested frames with the existing normative
perspectives also has the potential to work as an impediment. If the issue is grafted onto
an existing norm that has been on the agenda for a long-time, it might create the sense
that the issue has already been addressed sufficiently. For instance, the media coverage of
the “Amazon issue” peaked in 1980s and this created the perception that the issue was
already addressed and that it was “being tackled and resolved by the established legal and
governmental authorities.”209 This perception in turn worked as an impediment in front of
the mahogany campaign, the campaign that targeted to regulate the trade of mahogany –
a rare tree with high commercial value from Brazil to Britain, in early 1990s. It was only
when the advocates took the issue out of the environmental frame and placed it into the
human rights frame (protection of indigenous people) they succeeded in convincing the
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target actors that the issue was a “new and real threat to the Amazon” [emphasis in the
original].210
In certain occasions, especially when the existing normative stance of the
decision-makers is perceived to be counterproductive, the advocates deliberately choose
frames that aim to alter the perception of the decision makers rather than attaching their
cause onto the existing frames. One of the examples of successfully reframing an issue by
cutting its links with existing norms is the campaign to ban female genital mutilation.
When the campaign first started in 1970s the advocates used more neutral terms such as
“female circumcision, clitoridectomy, or infibulation”211 which did not trigger any major
reaction. This was argued to be mainly a consequence of the existing norms about male
circumcision. The campaign succeeded only when it reframed the issue as “female
genital mutilation” because “by reframing the practice, the network broke the linkage
with male circumcision (seen as a personal medical or cultural decision), implied a
linkage with the more feared procedure – castration – and reframed the issue as one of
violence against women. It thus resituated the problem as a human rights violation.”212
The strategic function of framing is not limited to its role in appealing to target
actors’ normative concerns. Advocates could also strategically adopt a frame to appeal to
target actors’ material concerns, as well. In other words, framing could also be a tool in
advocates’ hands in encouraging or coercing target actors to take action rather than
convincing them of the issue’s normative importance. Such coercion could happen when
advocates, by strategically packaging the problem, implicitly or explicitly “link the issue
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of concern to money, trade, or prestige.”213 Framing the sweatshops problem as a human
rights issue and linking it to the industry’s image to get them to react is an example of
such calculation.214
While most of the studies seek to explain advocates’ framing choices with their
pursuit of attracting targets of influence, some studies acknowledge that advocates’
framing choices are not necessarily tailored toward them. Advocates framing choices can
also be informed by their desire to attract potential allies to the campaign. As discussed
above, even though NGOs are generally categorized as “principled actors,” as a growing
literature illustrates, they are not only normative but also instrumental actors.215 Thus,
they engage in strategic acts to maximize their reach and influence over other actors. An
important component of such a strategy is to find a fertile ground that would provide a
“receptive ear” for the advocates’ concerns to be heard. Most of the time, advocates’
limited material capacities prevent them from having direct impact on targets of
influence. For this reason, they seek to get the attention of potential allies, actors with
political capital and material leverage. As a number of scholars pointed out, getting the
support of the “gatekeepers” is crucial for campaign success.216 Depending on the issue
as well as on the advocates’ goals, a number of actors might be pursued as potential
allies. These actors include states,217 international organizations,218 other NGOs as well as
the media.219
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Getting the allies “to take [the advocates’] side”220 is crucial for two reasons.
First, the political capital as well as other material sources that these actors have at their
disposal strengthens the material capacity of the advocates. The advocates engage in the
above discussed “boomerang strategy,” where they appeal to more powerful actors and
get them to put pressure on the targets of influence.221 In doing so the advocates engage
in a double-strategy where they “keep pressure on decision-makers at home while
simultaneously lobbying intergovernmental organisations’ and other states’ decisionmakers to put pressure on the state from the outside.”222 Second, getting the support of
allies is crucial as, in addition to material resources, these allies also possess non-material
resources such as institutional prestige which help the advocates legitimize their
frames.223
Despite the growing recognition of the role that gatekeepers play in shaping the
success of advocacy campaigns, a very limited number of studies have looked at
advocates’ framing choices from this perspective.224 Most notably, Clifford Bob looks
into how insurgent movements frame their causes to match them to the gatekeeper
organizations’ characteristics, and argues that these movements’ ability to “market”
themselves to the gatekeepers was crucial in garnering gatekeeper support.225 Yet, more
studies are needed to understand the dynamics of tailoring frames toward potential allies
– an area to which this study contributes.
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As discussed above, in choosing their frames advocates make strategic
calculations about the normative and material concerns to which target actors and
potential allies are most likely to be responsive. Yet, the advocates do not make these
choices solely based on their evaluation of the strategic environment. Advocates’ fields
of expertise and the information they have about campaigns that succeeded before them
can also factor into advocates’ calculations in making their framing choices. For instance,
Snyder argues that the advocates who took part in the ICBL learned from their
experiences and worked to replicate those frames for International Action Network on
Small Arms (IANSA).226
The above presented review illustrated that advocates have normative and
material calculations in choosing their frames. The review also further highlighted the
delicateness of these choices as it showed that “resonance” guarantees neither framing
nor advocacy success. Thus, the review discussed what motivates advocates’ framing
choices, yet, it did not explain the processes through which advocates choose a particular
frame over the others.
Dynamics of Framing
The ways in which issues are framed not only have implications for advocates’
ability to reach out to targets of influence and to potential allies but it also has
implications for advocates themselves. As Corell and Betsill argue, once an issue makes
it to the global agenda, issue frames shape the role that advocates play in the making of
the policies as they “creat[e] a demand for a particular type of information, thereby
privileging some actors and limiting which proposals delegates consider seriously.”227
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For that reason framing is essentially a contested process among the advocates and it
reflects the network dynamics.228 Yet, resolving this contestation early on is necessary if
a campaign wants to succeed. This subsection discusses the process of framing and
illustrates both the dynamics of contestation and its implications for the advocacy
campaigns.
The frames that advocacy campaigns use are “not a given, but rather a product of
the struggle over meaning and ideas that occur among movement actors and between
them and their antagonists.”229 On the one hand, framing is a source of competition
among different advocates who agree on the importance of the issue yet disagree either
on the reasons for its importance or on the actions that need to be taken in addressing the
problem. These divergences lead to different frames to be invoked by different
advocates.230 Resolving this contestation early on is important as not doing so has a
potential to damage the advocates’ ability to put together a strong campaign. For
instance, Ferrari observes in her comparative analysis of frames used by Catholic and
non-Catholic NGOs that the discrepancy in their framing preferences functions as a major
impediment in front of potential collaborative efforts and has a negative impact on their
effectiveness.231
A similar contestation is also observed between different actors within the antihuman trafficking movement. Building on earlier work on this movement,232 Hernandez
distinguishes between two framing approaches within the anti-human trafficking
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campaign. While the first frame approaches the issue of human trafficking as a “gendered
social problem,” the second approach frames the issue as a “direct result of structural
economic conditions that support the exploitation of vulnerable peoples.”233 The
contradicting approaches are important as they also offer contradicting solutions to the
problem. While the former suggests that the trafficking, especially sex trafficking, can be
tackled only if the demand is dismantled, the latter argues that the underlying economic
consequences that pushes people into the hands of traffickers need to be addressed if a
permanent solution to the problem is sought.234 A similar frame contestation also
occurred during the female genital mutilation campaign. In order to tackle the earlier lack
of interest to the campaign, some of the advocates wanted to replace “female
circumcision” with “female genital mutilation.” Yet such efforts initially faced resistance
from those who argued that such reframing would be a reflection of “cultural
imperialism” and would result in the imposition of Western norms on local cultures;
trying to resolve this disagreement cost the campaign valuable time.235
While frame contestation can occur between actors who agree on the need to
address the issue at hand but disagree on the methods and venues of doing so, such
contestation can also occur between those who want to bring the issue onto the global
agenda and those who want to keep it out of the spotlight. At this point the existence of
counter-frames becomes even more important when each side has contradictory goals.
For instance, as Shawki puts forward, one of the factors that limited the success of the
IANSA was the National Rifle Association’s (NRA) ability to frame the issue around
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“the right to bear arms” which contradicted the IANSA’s efforts to frame the issue as a
threat to human wellbeing.236
Target actors could also engage in counter-framing efforts to either stop a
campaign or to re-channel the campaign to a less damaging trajectory for their interests.
For instance, as a response to the “indigenous people’s rights” frame that the “Amazon
forests campaign” promoted, the Timber Trade Foundation started a public relations
campaign called Forests Forever: a campaign for wood where they aimed to reframe the
trade and use of timber as an “environmentally friendly” choice.237
While it is important to resolve frame contestation for the success of advocacy
campaigns, multivocalization is a different activity that should not be confused with
contestation. Multivocalization can be described as “the effort to speak simultaneously to
multiple audiences”238 and it is a strategic act on the part of the advocates to better their
chances of success. What distinguishes multivocalization is that it is a deliberate act on
the part of the advocates to be “strategically ambiguous in their framing in an effort to
say the same thing with different meaning for different groups.”239 For instance, Busby
suggests that the HIV/AIDS campaign has deliberately framed the issue as a “public
health issue, a human rights issue, a justice issue, a moral problem, an issue of
intellectual property rights, and a security problem.”240 Similarly, Merry argues that
human rights advocates engage in multivocalization when they are working to get states
to abide by the established rules and norms. As Merry explains the advocates do so
because on the one hand, they feel the need to appeal to the priorities of the international
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community, and on the other hand they feel the need to reframe their arguments to make
them acceptable for local communities.241
As seen from the above review of the literature, the way in which issues are
framed is crucial in determining transnational advocacy campaigns’ ability to place them
on political agendas, and deciding on a frame is a complex process. Yet, despite the
complexities identified by the TANs and framing literatures, those who analyze the
securitized examples of transnational advocacy campaigns treat them as unique instances.
The following review summarizes their arguments and shows how their insights can be
developed further by treating securitization as an instance of framing
Securitization as Framing
Why do transnational advocacy campaigns adopt security frames? Following the
arguments developed within the securitization literature, a number of studies analyzed the
adoption of security discourses by advocacy campaigns and made claims about their role
in attracting states’ attention and creating political change. Yet, these studies conducted
such analyses based on the assumption that security frames have unique characteristics
and implications that distinguish this type of framing from other instances of the activity.
As a result of this approach, while highlighting important insights about
successful examples of securitized campaigns, these studies fall short of appreciating the
complex motivations behind advocates’ use of security frames; the reasons that audience
has in accepting such claims; and the various impact that securitization could have on
both the direction and the success of a transnational advocacy campaign. This subsection
reviews the contributions that these studies provide into the role of securitization in
transnational advocacy campaigns; the limitations of these arguments and the insights to
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be gained by treating securitization as an instance of framing rather than a unique
process.
In analyzing the role of securitization in advocacy campaigns only a few scholars
perceive it to be natural development that is based on the factual connections between the
issue at hand and its security implications, whereas most of the studies evaluate
securitization as a strategic act on the part of the advocates. For instance, in analyzing the
securitization of environmental problems, some scholars suggest a causal link between
environmental problems and security threats.242 For these researchers the link drawn
between environmental problems and security is not a strategic one that was utilized to
prioritize environmental issues on the agenda, but rather a factual one. For instance,
Homer-Dixon suggests that “environmental change may contribute to conflicts as diverse
as war, terrorism, or diplomatic and trade disputes… it may have different causal roles: in
some cases, it may be a proximate and powerful cause; in others, it may only be a minor
and distant player in a tangled story that involves many political, economic and physical
factors.”243 Similarly the Acute Conflict Project that brought together forty researchers
from different continents concluded that “although environmental scarcities are often
hidden by immediate political, ethnic, or ideological factors, they are alreadycontributing to violent conflicts in many parts of the developing world.”244
If we were to analyze these studies’ approach from the TANs and framing
literatures’ perspective, securitization appears to be a reflection of the strategic
environment within which the campaign operates. In other words, the argued security
implications are reflections of the “issue attributes” that were discussed above rather than
242
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a strategic act on the part of the advocates. The agency of the actors here is limited to
utilizing the issue attributes in support of their efforts rather than strategically packaging
the issue.
Yet, most of the scholars believe that securitization of different issues is a result
of strategic calculations rather than a reflection of observable and undeniable connections
between the issue at hand and the security threats that it is argued to present. These
approaches imply agency for the “securitizing actors” (both state and non-state) and
acknowledge the strategic reasoning behind these framing choices. One of the issue areas
where we see such evaluation is the environmental issues.245 Most notably, the efforts to
bring climate change onto the forefront of the global agenda have raised heated debates
on the security implications of environmental issues. As a part of the efforts to attract
attention to climate change, the issue was first framed as an environmental issue but then
got securitized over time. As Scott suggests “the framing of climate change as a threat to
security, as opposed to solely an environmental or political challenge, is one example of
the recent broadening of the concept of security beyond the traditional realm of external
military threats to a State.”246 The perceived link between security and climate change
stems from the proposition that climate change creates failed and weak states. These
states, in return, are argued to function as “safe havens” for terrorists.247 Such an
approach treats securitization as a strategic act on the part of the actors and in that respect
replicates the basic logic of framing.
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As opposed to the implicit and explicit similarities between the arguments of
framing and securitization studies discussed above, the dialogue comes to a halt when the
studies go onto explain the reasons behind using security frames and the implications of
such uses for the success of advocacy campaigns both in the short and the long-run.
The studies informed by the insights of the securitization literature treat
securitization as a strategic act but almost as an inevitable one given the implications it
has. The unique role that security concerns are theorized to occupy on actors’ agendas is
treated to be enough of a reason to explain the advocates’ motivations in using security
frames and hence this approach distinguishes securitization from other strategic acts of
framing. As Hudson quotes from her interview with a UN official “… the political
establishment, not just the establishment, but political people who are in politics in
general… they respond, their lights go up when they hear security aspects… and so, then
what is left to strategizers… [is] to remind them… on the threat of security.”248
However, treating the motivations behind securitization as self-explanatory leaves
the insights that the framing literature provide (such as the role of the strategic
environment, issue attributes, network dynamics) out. Not incorporating this information
is an important omission because, as discussed above, not every advocacy campaign
resorts to security frames and, as it is discussed in the following chapters, not all
securitized campaigns succeed. Thus, expanding the analytical purchase of the claims
made about the reasons behind using security frames requires us to look at the broader
picture and comparatively analyze securitized cases with non-securitized ones in order to
appreciate the strategic motivations behind using them.
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The “not just another frame” approach implied in the securitization studies’
premises also finds its reflection in the literature’s evaluation of the long-term
implications of using security frames. The studies that analyze the implications of
securitizing advocacy campaigns illustrate the trade-off between the short-term
advantages of using security frames versus the long-term implications of such choices for
the content and the reach of the policy outcomes. The arguments about the long-term
negative implications of using security frames are explained away with the uniqueness
attributed to security frames by this literature. The securitization is argued to inevitably
lead to the removal of the issue from the realm of normal politics and legitimization of
extraordinary measures which is not a desired outcome from a democratic perspective.
Yet, essentializing the consequences of using security frames limits our ability to
appreciate varying implications that securitization might have for both the direction and
the success of a campaign.
The arguments about the long-term negative implications of securitization that are
based on the uniqueness of the security frames find their reflections in the studies ranging
from environment, migration and international aid to HIV/AIDS. For instance, Levy
suggests in analyzing the potential threats that environmental problems pose for the
USA’s security that:
ozone depletion and climate change are the only significant environmental
problems that currently pose a direct physical harm to U.S. interests. While both
problems can thus properly be considered as security problems, and both warrant
serious responses, it is not clear whether engaging in the first task facilitates the
second. Although many analysts accept in principle the connection between these
environmental risks and security, there is no evidence that this affects in any way
the kind of research they undertake or the kind of recommendations they make.
The equation does not appear to do any great good, and the ozone example
suggests that in some cases better results can be obtained without it.249
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Deudney has a similar approach and claims that securitization of environmental
issues are damaging both to national security and also to the environment. Deudney takes
a strong stance on the issue and suggests that:
Another motive for speaking of environmental degradation as a threat to natural
security is rhetorical: to make people respond to environmental threats with a
sense of urgency. But before harnessing the old horse of national security to pull
the heavy new environmental wagon, one must examine its temperament... Yet
the national security mentality engenders an enviable sense of urgency, and a
corresponding willingness to accept great personal sacrifice. Unfortunately, these
emotions may be difficult to sustain. Crises call for resolution, and the patience of
a mobilized populace is rarely long. A cycle of arousal and somnolence is unlikely
to establish permanent patterns of environmentally sound behavior, and “crash”
solutions are often bad ones.250
In analyzing the securitization of environmental issues neither of these authors questions
either the potential variation in the long-term implications of using security frames nor
the potential role of alternative reasons (other than securitization) in leading to these
negative outcomes (such as lack of public interest (audience’s priorities), lack of
international cooperation (network dynamics), the problems’ own dynamics that makes
the issue difficult to solve (issue attributes).
The studies that analyze the securitization of international development aid also
adopt a mostly uncritical approach to the implications of securitization. During 1990s,
international development aid was framed as a human rights and development concern,
yet as the literature contends, a drastic shift towards the adoption of a security frame took
place in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks.251 The appropriation of the issue
within a security frame is argued to have changed the nature of the international aid
where the recipients were decided not based on need but based on the security threats that
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countries are believed to present.252 In analyzing the securitization of development aid,
the literature criticizes the use of security language by calling it the “dark side” of aid 253
where “prepackaged democratic transitions often results in violence and deterioration of
the rule of law.”254 While these studies underscore into the implications of securitization
for those who are in need of international aid, treating the use of the security language as
self-explanatory in the post-September 11 political context limits the explanatory power
of this approach as not every issue has been securitized in this context. Thus, the strategic
environment within which campaigns operate inform advocates’ strategies and affect the
direction that campaigns take but, as the framing literature explains, these factors by
themselves do not dictate the success of an advocacy campaign.
Similar limitations also appear in the studies that analyze the securitization of
HIV/AIDS. When we look at the history of the HIV/AIDS campaign, we observe that the
campaign succeeded once it started using a combination of human rights and
development frames. The campaign resulted in the recognition of the fight against
HIV/AIDS as one of the six Millennium Development Goals. The use of security frames
came at the later stages of global policy making – after the issue found a place on the
global agenda. In 2000, UNSC held a meeting to discuss the threat that HIV/AIDS poses
to international security which concluded with a resolution stating that “if unchecked,
[HIV/AIDS] may pose a risk to stability and security.”255 Al Gore, in addressing the
meeting suggested that “the HIV/AIDS epidemic in sub-Saharan Africa is not just a
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humanitarian crisis. It is a security crisis because it threatens not just individual citizens,
but the very institutions that define and defend the character of a society.”256
When approached from the securitization literature’s perspective the reason
behind these actors’ adoption of the security language is to justify the use of
extraordinary measures in addressing the problem. It is true that, like any other instance
of framing, securitization shaped the direction of the campaign by emphasizing one
aspect of the issue over the others. This act of packaging the issue then, as also argued by
the framing and TANs literatures, informed the policies developed. Yet, as we see in the
case of the HIV/AIDS, the policies developed based on a security frame are not
necessarily the military ones. Recognizing this does not take away from the criticisms
waged against the implications of the policies developed. As Elbe argues, the recent shift
from a human rights frame to a security frame moved the issue away from civil society
groups (which traditionally stood at the center of the efforts to eradicate HIV/AIDS) to
state institutions and replaced the concerns about human rights with that of state
security.257 However, we benefit from an analysis of securitization through framing
because it highlights the varying policy implications that securitization might lead to.
In the above reviewed studies securitization is argued to be an undesirable process
as it is expected to lead to the use of extraordinary measures. Yet, not everybody agrees
with this assumption, for instance, Maertens argue that securitization of the
environmental issues could lead to a different type of de-politicization where the
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emphasis on the security implications of these issues open up more room for nonpoliticized scientific approaches to be heard.258
It is also important to note that not all studies suggest that the use of security
frames lead to development of undesired global policies. For instance, in the case of
women’s rights, Hudson suggests that the securitization of women’s rights issues paved
the way to the signing of UNSC Resolution 1325 which recognizes “the importance of
women in international peace and security, making women and women’s needs relevant
to negotiating peace agreements, planning refugee camps and peacekeeping operations,
reconstructing war torn societies, and ultimately making gender equality relevant to every
single Security Council action,”259and therefore securitization led to a positive outcome.
Approaching the issue from these studies’ perspective highlights two factors: (i)
security frames provide a unique opportunity to get states’ attention to an issue that they
would not otherwise be willing to address, and (ii) using security frames come with a
price to pay in the long-run. Comparing these insights with the above discussed
successful examples of non-securitized and de-securitized campaigns begs the question:
if a campaign can succeed without a security frame and if securitizing an issue comes
with a price, then why do advocates use such frames? Approaching securitization as an
instance of framing and utilizing the lessons gained through framing and TANs literatures
would help us explore these questions.
Attempts to Start a Dialogue between Securitization and Framing Literatures
The brief overview presented above illustrates that a number of case studies
applied the insights gained from securitization literature in their attempts to explain the
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role of security frames in leading to advocacy success. Nevertheless, these studies’
contributions remain limited as they conducted their analysis by treating securitization as
a unique process to be distinguished from other instances of framing. The studies that
analyzed securitization of advocacy campaigns mostly replicated the insights and the
premises of securitization literature onto their subject of analysis rather than combining
them with those of framing literature. This resulted in the treatment of securitization as a
distinct process rather than an instance of framing which in return led to under-analyzed
assumptions to be made about the importance and dynamics of securitization.
A small number of scholars started to take an issue with this approach and
problematized the limited dialogue between securitization and framing literatures. 260
Their main concern is the securitization literature’s portrayal of “security as a unique
discourse with a distinct logic and political effect.”261 This attributed uniqueness is a
reflection of the assumption that securitizing an issue brings it out of the realm of normal
politics and into the “realm of exception.”262 Yet, as critics highlight what constitutes
normal realm of politics is problematic as it is not a definitive arena.263 For that reason,
security, according to these critics, can be considered as another “master frame” that
leads to particular set of actions just like other master frames.264
Those who call for further collaboration between framing and securitization
literatures also argue that even though these two fields tend to keep their approaches
separate, significant commonalities exist between the two. As Entman puts it, framing is,
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“selecting some aspects of a perceived reality and making them more salient in a
communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal
interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation.”265 In that respect, as
Watson evaluates, securitization is an example of such process with a specific focus on
defining a problem as a security threat and it needs to be treated as such.266
This study builds on the lessons of this newly developing approach and conducts
its analysis by applying the insights gained from the framing literature to the study of
securitization of transnational advocacy campaigns. By adopting such an approach the
study aims to test whether the uniqueness attributed to security is a consequence of the
myopic focus of the securitization literature and, if that is the case, which factors can
better explain advocates’ decisions to use these frames.
Limitations of Using Securitization Theory in Explaining Advocacy Success
The literature has provided important insights into the inner dynamics of
transnational advocacy campaigns and the role they play in shaping global politics.
However, despite the recent attempts to create a dialogue between framing and
securitization literatures, in its current state, the literature suffers from conceptual and
methodological limitations in illustrating the role that security frames play in the success
of advocacy campaigns.
The limited dialogue between securitization, framing and TANs literatures curtails
the securitization literature’s ability to explain the motivations behind adopting a security
frame and the conditions that translate such choices into campaign success. In its current
state, the answer that the securitization literature provides for such an inquiry is relatively
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straight forward: actors resort to security frames in appealing to states’ agendas and such
an attempt brings success (given that the audience is convinced about the security
implications of the issue at hand) because states prioritize security concerns over
everything else. Yet as explained in detail above, the framing and TANs literatures
illustrate that: (i) advocates can have a number of motivations when framing an issue in a
particular way; (ii) advocates might have different audiences that they want to influence;
and (iii) states might be more receptive of different frames for varying reasons (such as
moral, economic, and political factors). Limitedness of studies that employ these insights
into the study of securitized transnational advocacy campaigns creates the risk of
overlooking these dynamics.
Similarly, these studies also run the risk of overlooking previously failed attempts
to securitize an issue. Lack of such insights can create the illusion that securitization of an
issue was inevitable or that securitization played a determining role in the success of a
campaign, which may not have been the case. For instance, Elbe presents a detailed
analysis of how HIV/AIDS has been recently securitized and discusses the implications
of such securitization.267 While Elbe’s study tells us a great deal about the impact that
security frames had at the policy implementation stage, it overlooks the previously failed
attempts to securitize HIV/AIDS. Similarly, in her discussion of women’s rights, Hudson
limits her analysis to what this study refers to as political commitment stage by focusing
on how women’s rights issues are framed as security threats and found their way to
UNSC resolutions.268 While Hudson’s study affords a detailed account of how and why
the issue was framed as a security threat at that particular stage, its limited focus on one
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stage curtails its ability to fully appreciate the framing efforts leading up to the political
commitment stage, as well as the implications of security frames in shaping the policies
developed after the UNSC Resolution.
The existing works on securitized examples of transnational advocacy campaigns
also suffer from methodological shortcomings. The studies in the literature are generally
composed of single-case studies269 or edited volumes.270 While case studies contribute to
our understanding of social phenomena,271 relying solely on case-study method limits the
“opportunities for systematically testing hypotheses.”272 The lack of comparative studies
presents a problem as it makes it difficult for us to observe “the dogs that didn’t bark.” In
other words, the lack of systematic comparison across cases limits our ability to identify
the cases where either attempts to securitize did not hold, or cases where securitized
campaigns fell short of claiming a place on the global agenda.
The lack of systematic comparison across cases also means that the campaigns
where success reached without resorting to a security frame get overlooked. This, in
return, results in the formulation of untested assumptions about both the frequency at
which security frames are used and the extent to which securitization positively correlates
with the success of transnational advocacy efforts. As discussed above, many campaigns
such as Female Genital Mutilation, Maternal Mortality, Child Labor and International
Criminal Court (ICC) have reached considerable levels of success in creating global
policies without resorting to a security frame. The lack of systematic comparison
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overlooks cases like these and creates a misleadingly positive perception about the extent
to which securitization matters.
It is important to address the shortcomings of the literature and understand
whether securitization matters for three main reasons. First, it is critical for our ability to
move the theoretical discussion forward. The widening and deepening of the field of
security has been both a significant and a risky direction to take. While this approach
allows us to appreciate the dynamic nature of the security field, it also runs the risk of
categorizing anything and everything as a security threat. This in turn, can potentially
eliminate the securitization literature’s analytical leverage and turn the concept of
security into an empty signifier.
Second, testing the positive assumptions made by the securitization literature
about the role that security frames play in bringing success to advocacy campaigns is
important in improving our understanding of advocacy campaigns; the advocates’
framing choices; and the dynamics that translate these choices into success.
Third, it is important to consider the question of “why securitize” because it has
real world implications. As the above presented discussion reveals, framing an issue in a
particular way shapes whether the issue gets attention and if it does, in which venues and
through which policies. Securitization “often does more than just potentially open the
political scene to groups from the extreme right, for example. It entails structural effects
by reconfiguring and ordering societies on the model of emergency and exception.”273
Therefore, in dealing with an issue that has a potential to create a lasting impact on how
we perceive and conduct politics, it is crucial to discern the nuances that are otherwise
disregarded.
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The Study’s Contribution to the Literature
The above review of the literature illustrates that applying the lessons of the
securitization literature has been useful for both the study of transnational advocacy
campaigns and also for the securitization literature itself. The former benefitted from the
detailed analysis of securitized advocacy campaigns, whereas the latter benefitted from
the application of the theory at the transnational level. Yet these studies’ contribution to
our understanding of why advocacy campaigns use security frames remain to be as
limited as the premises on which they establish their insights. These limitations prevent
the studies from questioning multiple dynamics that shape the decisions to use security
frames and varying implications such decisions have on the direction and the success
level of a campaign.
The conventional answer to this study’s research question is that security frames
are uniquely powerful in bringing success to transnational advocacy campaigns. Yet,
such an answer begs the question of why security frames are chosen only under certain
conditions and why not all securitized campaigns succeed. It is not possible to credibly
answer these questions by the existing studies as there are not enough comparative
studies to test their validity.
I explore these questions by treating securitization as an instance of framing and
by applying the insights and arguments developed in the TANs and framing literatures to
test those of securitization literature. The study puts the uniqueness attributed to security
frames into question. In doing so, rather than claiming security frames to be
epiphenomenal, the study illustrates the importance of developing a more nuanced
understanding of securitization by showing the similarities between how security frames
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and other frames function. On the one hand, such analysis provides a chance to
recalibrate the importance attached to security frames and better situate them within the
broader field of advocacy frames. Such an approach is especially important in
reevaluating the reasons behind the sustained use of security frames even when the frame
is no longer perceived to be desirable. On the other hand, the analysis betters our
understanding of securitization by deepening our knowledge about the dynamics and
motivations surrounding the decisions to adopt such frames.
The study’s contribution to the literature is not limited to the securitization
studies. The study also contributes to the framing and TANs literatures by expanding our
knowledge of how TANs function as well as by deepening our insights into the dynamics
of norm-building. The study presents evidence that highlights the role of complex set of
structural and non-structural factors in shaping not only the advocates’ framing choices
but also determining the level of impact that framing choices have on the success of
advocacy campaigns. In addition to these theoretical implications, the study also makes
methodological contributions and illustrates the importance of conducting more
systematic case comparisons to better explain the claims that single-case studies fall short
of adequately testing.
The study conducts its analysis in three stages and each stage helps this
dissertation make the above listed arguments from a different angle. The medium-n
comparison discussed in the following chapter challenges the claims about the
uniqueness of security frames and shows the importance of comparative analysis. The
comparative case study that follows further tests the role of security frames and also
provides insights into dynamics and mechanisms of framing. The in-depth analysis of the
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Conflict Diamonds campaign then presents a closer look at a securitized advocacy
campaign and allows us to test whether the insights gained from the literature (that are
also evidenced in Chapter Four) can be used in explaining the dynamics of securitized
advocacy campaigns.
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CHAPTER 3
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF TRANSNATIONAL ADVOCACY
CAMPAIGNS’ USE OF SECURITY FRAMES
Introduction
This study addresses the question of “why securitize” in three stages. In the first
stage, the study tests the assumption that suggests a correlation between the use of
security frames and successfully addressing a transnational problem. The second stage
engages in a comparative analysis of nine securitized, non-securitized and de-securitized
cases in order to better understand the factors that shape advocates’ framing choices and
how such choices translate into advocacy success. Based on the findings of the first two
stages, the third stage conducts a detailed analysis of a securitized case (Conflict
Diamonds) to reveal how the dynamics identified in the previous chapters play out in a
securitized campaign.
This chapter is dedicated to the first stage of the analysis and it engages in a
systematic comparison of thirty-eight cases of global advocacy campaigns to disclose
whether securitized campaigns are more likely to succeed than non-securitized ones.
In doing so, the chapter discusses the case selection, coding and the analysis of the data.
The findings challenge the importance and the uniqueness attributed to security frames in
three ways: first, the comparative analysis shows that advocacy campaigns do not resort
to security frames as frequently as implied by the literature. Second, even when security
language is adopted, evidence does not show a clear link between the adoption of a
security frame and success at any stage of global agenda setting or policy making. Thus,
as the next chapter will further elaborate, adopting a security frame is revealed to be
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neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for success. Lastly, the findings also
illustrate that the sustained use of frames in transitioning from the political commitment
stage to policy implementation stage is not unique to security frames and the impact it
has on policy making.
Case Selection
Defining a “case”
In compiling the comparative part of the study, the first order of business was to
define which campaigns would be counted as a “case” for the purpose of this study.
There are a countless number of transnational problems and consequently there are a
number of efforts – ranging from scattered to coordinated – to address them. However,
analyzing all of these issues together is neither practical nor analytically useful. Thus, I
have begun by elaborating the criteria on which the universe of cases was compiled.
The first criterion in defining the universe of cases was the time period during
which the advocacy efforts took place. The divided nature of the Cold War politics
confined the efforts to address transnational problems into limited geographies. For that
reason, to be able to talk about ‘global’ agenda setting and policy making, I have decided
to focus on agenda setting and policy making efforts that either started or were/are active
in the post-Cold War era.
The second criterion was regarding the nature of the efforts in addressing a
transnational problem. Since my goal in this study is to understand the effects of adopting
a security language for advocacy campaigns, I needed to focus on cases where we
observe a coordinated campaign. Transnational advocacy campaigns are not the only
actors that initiate global agenda setting and policy making. States themselves do take

83

initiatives in prioritizing transnational problems on their agendas and they sometimes
resort to security frames in doing so. For instance, the recent Ebola outbreak was quick to
become a priority on the global agenda and has also undergone a rapid process of
securitization, wherein a number of political leaders openly called it a threat to national
and international security.274 However, such agenda setting and policy making was not
initiated by cross-sectorial global advocacy efforts. Since the goal of the research is to
understand the impact that security frames have on global agenda setting and policy
making efforts, the Ebola issue is not counted as a case for the purpose of this study.
The third criterion was the level of initial success reached by the advocacy efforts.
There are a countless number of attempts to start transnational campaigns in addressing
various transnational problems. However, most of these efforts have not garnered enough
support to claim a place on the global agenda, and hence remained to be “non-issues.”275
Since the primary purpose of this study is to understand the link between the use of
security frames and success, rather than focusing on cases that failed from the start, I
chose to focus on cases that reached at least an initial level of success.276
Compiling the universe of cases
Having set the basic criteria for choosing the cases and given the scope and the
purposes of this study, Joshua Busby’s dataset was used as a starting point in determining
the universe of cases to be analyzed. Busby’s dataset (2010) is titled “Transnational
274

For instance, President Obama in his speech at the UN General Assembly stated that “[t]his [Ebola
crisis] is more than a health crisis... This is a growing threat to regional and global security. In Liberia,
Guinea and Sierra Leone, public health systems are near collapse. Economic growth is slowing
dramatically. If this epidemic is not stopped, this disease could cause a humanitarian catastrophe across the
region.” (“Ebola is a ‘National Security Priority,’ Obama says,” CNN, 8 September 2014, available at
<http://edition.cnn.com/2014/09/07/politics/ebola-national-security-obama/>, accessed 10 October 2014.)
275
Bob 2005; Carpenter 2007; 2014.
276
Here, the initial level of success is measured by the campaign’s ability to attract “gatekeepers’” attention
by getting them at least acknowledge the importance of the issue (evaluated based on references made to
the issue on the gatekeepers’ websites and publications).
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Principled Advocacy Movements in the Post-Cold War Era (1990 - )” and it is composed
of information regarding thirty-six transnational advocacy movements with varying
degrees of agenda setting and “political success.”277 The list of cases provided by Busby
(2010) is an extensive but not an exhaustive one.278 Nonetheless, it is still the most
systematic medium-N dataset available at this time.
The original dataset developed by Busby does not aim to identify or compare
advocacy frames used by “moral movements.” Rather it aims to present a list of all major
global advocacy campaigns conducted in the aftermath of the Cold War. Since frames
played no role in the composition of the original dataset, using it as the starting point
helps this study to stay away from a potential “selection bias.”
Since I used Busby’s dataset only as a starting point and since it did not provide
information on the frames used by the campaigns, I expanded the dataset in a number of
ways. As a first step, the dataset was used only as a starting point to compile a list of
cases to include in the study and not as the primary source of information on any of the
major indicators pertaining to this study’s analysis. Additionally, to ensure validity, the
original dataset was cross-checked to highlight any differences of opinion or
contradictory evidence that might exist in the literature.279 As the focus of Busby’s
dataset was not security frames in particular, or frames in general, I conducted an
extensive analysis of the available sources to identify and add any campaigns that (i)

277

The dataset provides information on the targets of the campaigns, their main goals, the leading
organizations involved, the time frames of the campaigns, and the campaign outcomes along with an
assessment of success or failure of the campaigns (Busby 2010).
278
The campaigns that solely targeted multinational corporations; campaigns that did not attract a certain
level of attention, i.e. non-issues, as well as cases where the advocacy efforts came to an end before 1990
were not included in the dataset.
279
In cases where difference of opinion or contradictory evidence was found, the reasons for inconsistency
were analyzed and executive decisions were made in choosing which data to include in the study.
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were left out of the original dataset as they did not fit the criteria used by Busby, or (ii)
gained momentum after the original dataset was compiled.
In an effort to track down the missing cases, I surveyed various academic sources
to identify the works written on transnational advocacy campaigns and securitization. I
surveyed Academic Search Premier, Social Science Citation Index, ProQuest Political
Science, Columbia International Affairs Online (CIAO), Project MUSE, Peace Research
Abstracts, LexisNexis Academic and Google Scholar databases searching for “campaign,”
“global,” “transnational advocacy/issue networks,” “framing,” “securitization,”
“security,” and “threat” separately as keywords. I then read through the identified
scholarly work and the works cited by them to track down understudied cases.
As is discussed in detail below, finding a place on the UN Security Council’s
agenda is one of the indicators of securitization used for the purpose of this study.
Therefore, to supplement the above explained survey, I have gone through the UN
Security Council Resolutions since 1990280 and looked for non-traditional security issues
that found a place on the Council’s agenda. When such instances are detected, I have
conducted a search on worldwide web to see if any campaign could be associated with
the issue at hand.
I have also gone through the websites of the NGOs who played a central role in
the campaigns analyzed by this study to ascertain whether there are any new issues where
the NGOs use a security language in explaining or advocating and that has not been
studied academically.281 When security language is identified, a closer reading of the

280

See “Security Council Resolutions,” available at <http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/>,
accessed 1 August 2014.
281
These NGOs are ActionAid; Amnesty International; Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC);
CARE International; Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation; Doctors without Borders; Friends of
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material was conducted to see (i) whether the context of the security language was
national/international security, and (ii) whether the issue has garnered enough support to
be counted as a “case” for the purpose of this study. In determining the level of support
that such campaigns received, I looked into (i) whether any other non-governmental or
governmental organization has picked the issue up or lent support to it or (ii) given that
an issue could be brought to global agenda by the efforts of only one NGO, whether the
issue has found a place on the UN agenda is used as a measure of agenda setting success,
as discussed in detail below. As a last measure, a web search was conducted using the
above listed keywords to double-check for any websites, news items, or reports that
might have gone unnoticed in conducting the prior searches.
As a result of the data collection process, six new cases that used a security frame
at least at one stage of global agenda setting and policy making were identified and added
to the universe of cases to be analyzed. These cases are Avian Influenza, Conflict
Diamonds, Climate Refugees, Illegal Wildlife Trade, Sexual Violence in Conflict, and
Women Peace and Security.
While Busby’s dataset constituted the pool of cases that this study used as a
starting point, not all of the cases in the dataset were included in this study. For the cases
to contribute to the purpose of this study it was essential that (i) frames that campaigns
used, and (ii) the success that the campaigns reached at different stages of global agenda
setting and policy making can be traced over time. Four of the cases listed in the original
dataset (Civilian Protection, Marine Conservation, Nuclear Non-Proliferation and

the Earth; Global Witness; GreenPeace; Human Rights Watch; International Center for Transitional Justice;
International Crisis Group; International Federation for Human Rights; Oxfam International; Partnership
Africa Canada; Save the Children International; Transparency International; World Wildlife Fund.
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Refugees) were left out after initial analysis as they do not fit into the criteria used by this
research.
The issue of Marine Conservation was left out as the initial research indicated that
the advocacy efforts surrounding the issue was too disperse to analyze the use of a
particular frame over another at any stage of global agenda setting and policy making.282
Civilian Protection,283 Nuclear Non-Proliferation284 and Refugees285 campaigns were
excluded from the analysis as these issues were already on the global agenda before the
campaigns under investigation have picked up. As opposed to other cases in the dataset,
these campaigns did not aim to bring the issues onto the global agenda but rather aimed
to rekindle the global interest in these issues and revitalize the efforts to develop policies
in addressing them.
Operationalizing the Variables
Once the universe of cases to be analyzed was determined, the next step was to
decide how to define the key concepts of securitization and success to test whether any
correlation exists between the two. To that end, I developed the data in two ways. I added
securitization as the independent variable and then I took a detailed look at the dependent
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The efforts to prioritize marine conservation (“preservation and protection of marine ecosystems” from
human-caused damages) on the global agenda came in waves and focused on different aspects of the issue
at different times. Some important accomplishments of these efforts took place during the Cold-War such
as the establishment of the International Whaling Commission in 1949 and Convention on Fishing and
Conservation of Living Resources of the High Seas that was signed in 1966 (See such as Andresen and
Skodvin 2008; Skodvin and Andresen 2003.)
283
The issue has already been on the global agenda since 1949 Geneva Convention (“Convention (IV)
relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. Geneva, 12 August 1949,” ICRC, available at
<https://www.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/380>, accessed 27 June 2014.)
284
The early stages of the non-proliferation efforts have been initiated by states and NGOs only came into
the picture starting with the Third Review Conference (See Muller 1994).
285
The NGO involvement in the issue of refugees has come after the 1951 Refugee Convention – which
marked the political commitment stage - and NGOs have been active at –what this study categorizes as –
the policy implementation stage and focused primarily on encouraging states to disburse funds in times of
crises (“The 1951 Refugee Convention,” UNHCR [United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees],
available at <http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49da0e466.html>, accessed 1 June 2013.)
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variable (i.e. success) and analyzed it separately for three stages of global policy making:
agenda setting, political commitment, and policy implementation.286
Coding the Independent Variable: Securitization
For the purpose of this study, an issue is identified as securitized when (i) the
issue is defined as a security threat/concern; (ii) the issue’s worthiness of international
attention is explained based on the security threat it presents; (iii) the campaign asks a
security organization (i.e. the UNSC) to take action; and/or (iv) military response is the
suggested course of action. Various documents such as reports, press releases, letters to
the editors, mission statements, and conference proposals were analyzed in coding the
securitization variable.
For every stage of global policy making, I analyzed the cases to see if security
frame was the dominant frame at that particular stage and if it was, then I identified when
and by whom it was introduced. 287 As discussed in the previous chapter, securitization
literature suggests that understanding a securitizing move requires us to understand at
least three factors: who the securitizing actor is,288 the venue in which the securitizing
move takes place and the audience289 - the actor(s) whose opinion that the securitizing
actor aims to shape. Following this insight, once the security rhetoric was identified, the
second step was to look at the “securitizing actor,” the actor or the actors who introduced
286

Busby does not provide separate data for political commitment and policy implementation stages in his
study. The original dataset provides data on what this study calls “political commitment” stage and does not
reflect on the extent to which the target actors followed through with their publicly made commitments in
solving the problem at hand. The information regarding “policy implementation” stage was collected by
this study and incorporated into the dataset.
287
It is understood that every campaign is composed of a variety of actors and each actor has its own
internal discussions and disagreements about how an issue should be defined. Therefore, unanimity among
actors’ views was not considered as the benchmark in deciding whether a frame is dominant or not. Instead,
a frame is considered dominant when the actors that are central to a campaign use the frame in defining the
issue.
288
For a detailed discussion on the role and function of securitizing actors see Vaguhn 2009.
289
See Buzan et al. 1998; Bourbeau 2006; Floyd 2007.
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and/or championed the security frame. The possibility that there could be more than one
set of actors who use different frames was taken into consideration and identified when
detected. As the third step the audience and the venue of the securitizing move were
identified. Venue refers to the place where the security frame was championed and the
audience refers to the actors whose behavior that the advocates aim to change (See Table
1).
When the dominant frame adopted at a particular stage was not a security one,
then, the dominant frame at that stage was identified. I acknowledged that (i) at any stage
there could be a combination of frames that is dominant (such as the use of human health
and environment frames at the political commitment stage of Anti-toxics campaigns);290
and (ii) at any stage we can see shifts between different frames (such as the shift that
HIV/AIDS campaign has experienced from health to human rights and then to
development frames at the agenda setting stage291). Such instances were noted when
observed.
It was also acknowledged that security frame might have been introduced at a
stage yet might have fallen short of becoming the dominant frame. These cases were also
noted with the idea that presence of a security frame, even if it is not the dominant one, is
important in understanding the processes through which securitizing moves take place.

290
291

See Szasz (1994) for a detailed discussion on the “environmental justice movement.”
Such as Busby 2010.
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Table 1: Sample Coding for Securitization
policy outcome
type of
author/
security dominant
campaign
security
securitizing
venue
frame frame
rhetoric
actor
"threat to
President Bill
international
Clinton and
AIDS
security security"
yes
ViceUNSC295
292
campaign
“threat to
President Al
national
Gore294
293
security”

audience/
target

states296

Coding the Dependent Variable: Success of Global Policy Making
Global policy making was divided into three stages for the purpose of this study.
The first stage is titled “agenda setting stage” and refers to the placing of the issue on the
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For a detailed account of how the issue of HIV/AIDS got securitized see International Crisis Group
2001; Elbe 2003, 2006; Prins 2004; Garrett 2005; McInnes 2006; Barnett and Prins 2006; Harris and Siplon
2007; McInnes and Rushton 2010; Ingram 2013.
293
For instance Al Gore stated that “No one can doubt the havoc wreaked and the toll exacted by
HIV/AIDS do threaten our security. The heart of the security agenda is protecting lives -- and we now
know that the number of people who will die of AIDS in the first decade of the 21st Century will rival the
number that died in all the wars in all the decades of the 20th Century” (United Nations Security Council
Opening Session, 10 January 2000). In his opening remarks at the UNSC meeting Al Gore also claimed
that “AIDS is a global aggressor that must be defeated... AIDS is one of the most devastating threats ever to
confront the world community.” (“UN Security Council Session on AIDS in Africa Remarks Prepared for
Delivery by Vice President Al Gore,” 10 January 2000, available at
<http://clinton4.nara.gov/textonly/WH/EOP/OVP/speeches/unaid_health.html>, accessed 12 February
2013.)
294
For instance, Clinton defined HIV/AIDS as “a threat to US national security because of its catastrophic
social consequences, particularly in the developing world” (CNN, 30 April 2000, available at
http://archives.cnn.com/2000/US/04/30/aids.threat.02/>, accessed 12 February 2013.)
295
The US has used its turn at the rotating presidency of the UNSC to hold the first ever Security Council
meeting on a health issue which marked the beginning of approaching the issue of HIV/AIDS from a
security perspective at the global level. (“Security Council Holds Debate on Impact of AIDS on Peace and
Security in Africa,” UN Press Release SC/6781, 10 January 2010, available at
<http://www.un.org/press/en/2000/20000110.sc6781.doc.html>, accessed 12 February 2012.)
296
In his speech at the UNSC’s special session on HIV/AIDS, Al Gore not only detailed out the steps that
the US has taken in addressing the issue but also declared the fight against HIV/AIDS a battle to be fought
through collaboration among states. “We here in this room – representing the billions of people of the
world -- we must become the promise of hope and of change. We must become the promise of life itself.
We have the knowledge, the compassion, and the means to make a difference. We must acknowledge our
moral duty and accept our great and grave responsibility to succeed.” (“UN Security Council Session on
AIDS in Africa Remarks Prepared for Delivery by Vice President Al Gore,” 10 January 2000, available at
<http://clinton4.nara.gov/textonly/WH/EOP/OVP/speeches/unaid_health.html>, accessed 12 February
2013.)
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global agenda by convincing the allies and the target actors to the significance of the
issue. The second stage is the “political commitment” stage. This stage refers to the level
of global policy making where target actors go beyond acknowledging the issue’s
importance and publicly commit to address it. The third stage is the “policy
implementation” stage and refers to the phase where target actors follow through with the
commitments they made and take tangible steps in addressing the problem.
Agenda Setting Success
The primary indicator I used for measuring success at the agenda setting stage
was UN General Assembly Resolutions. The issues that led to UNGA resolutions were
considered as salient on the global agenda as resolutions are “formal expressions of the
opinion or will of United Nations organs.”297 Resolutions require either simple majority
(for most of the issues) or qualified majority for “important issues” (such as the ones
concerning security and peace, and membership issues). For that reason, they are
considered to be better indicators of the saliency of an issue on the UN agenda than mere
discussions on the issue at the General Assembly (which does not require majority of the
states’ agreement). Moreover, since the resolutions are not binding, they make it possible
to distinguish between issues that only found a place on the agenda from the issues that
has led to political commitment and policy implementation.
After conducting this analysis I realized that this indicator alone was not enough
to understand all of the cases at hand as not all cases targeted the UN as its venue.
Notably, the cases that are mainly economic had smaller set of states whose behavior
they aimed to change and therefore, they pursued their campaigns in different venues

297

United Nations Dag Hammarskjöld Library, “UN Resolution,” available at
<http://research.un.org/en/docs/resolutions>, accessed 12 February 2013.
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(such as the G8). Therefore, I expanded the indicator to include all the resolutions taken
by the targeted venue given that the resolutions require the support of at least the majority
of the members.
Political Commitment Success
As discussed in the previous chapter, successfully putting an issue on the global
agenda does not guarantee that this success will translate into successfully convincing the
relevant actors to commit to solve the issue. Many issues promoted by transnational
advocacy campaigns find a place on the global agenda yet fail to initiate action on the
part of the target actors. International treaties become binding when they are ratified and
ratification is neither automatic nor obligatory.298 As Barrett articulates “writing a treaty
that tells parties to reduce their emissions is easy. Making countries want to participate in
such a treaty, and making participants want to comply with it, is much harder.”299
Therefore, it is important to analyze the connection between security frames and success
at political commitment and policy implementation stages separately from the connection
they have at the agenda setting stage.
For the purpose of this study, a campaign is considered to have successfully
created political commitment when the target actors take an action to declare their
commitment to addressing the issue. This commitment can be in various forms, including
but not limited to: pledging of funds; attending to the related international meetings and
conferences; endorsing a suggested meeting, resolution or treaty; agreeing to become a
member of the related international body; or signing an international treaty. Once the
level of success at this stage was identified, various documents such as treaties, protocols
298

Simmons 2010.
Barrett 2003: xiv. For more on different arguments in the literature on why states commit to
international treaties see such as Moravcsik 2000; Hathaway 2007; and Simmons 2009; 2010.
299
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and international institutions’ mission statements’ were analyzed in deciding whether
security frames were used or not using the criteria explained above.
Measuring success at political commitment stage proved to be more difficult as
different issues require different set of actions to be taken by the target actors. For
instance, some cases require mainly financial commitment yet others require the
establishment of a new institution, while others necessitates changes to be made to
domestic laws and regulations. Therefore, to account for these nuances, I chose to
approach “success” at this stage as a “sphere” rather than a single point to be reached
(See Table 2).
Table 2: Sample Coding – Success at Political Commitment Stage
attending to
related
preparing pledging international
campaign
reports
of funds meetings
and
conferences

endorsing
a
suggested
meeting,
resolution
or treaty

agreeing to
become a
signing an
member of the
international
related
treaty
international
body

AntiGMOs

mixed303

NA304

no300

NA301

yes302

300

mixed305

No specific report that was prepared by states prior to the political commitment stage can be associated
with meetings conducted at this stage.
301
The primary goal of the signed Protocol is “international agreement which aims to ensure the safe
handling, transport and use of living modified organisms (LMOs) resulting from modern biotechnology
that may have adverse effects on biological diversity, taking also into account risks to human health.”
(“The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety,” available at <http://bch.cbd.int/protocol>, accessed 18 May 2012.)
Pledging of funds by the states in dealing with the issue was not a priority for the campaign; hence, it is
indicated as NA (Not Applicable).
302
A series of meetings took place which led to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. (“History of the
Convention,” available at <http://www.cbd.int/history/>, accessed 18 May 2012.)
303
While the meetings and the signed Protocol has brought a number of states and non-state actors together,
it did not get endorsement from the main producers and traders of genetically modified organisms. (“Parties
to the Protocol and Signature and Ratification of the Supplementary Protocol,”
<http://bch.cbd.int/protocol/parties/>, accessed 18 May 2012.)
304
The signed protocol does not envision the creation of a new international body.
305
The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety was adopted in 2000, went into effect in 2003 yet not all related
parties have ratified the treaty such as the major producers the USA, Canada and Argentina. For a list of
signatory countries see “Parties to the Protocol and Signature and Ratification of the Supplementary
Protocol,” available at <http://bch.cbd.int/protocol/parties/>, accessed 18 May 2012.
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In analyzing the degree of success at the political commitment stage I chose to
take the actions identified by the advocates as the baseline and I compared it against the
actions taken by the target actors. This made it possible to account for the unique
characteristics of each issue without essentializing one form of international action as the
sole indicator of political commitment to a global problem.
In conducting this study, I acknowledged that even the most successful cases of
global policy making will not be able to get all the target actors to completely commit to
a cause and/or comply with the commitments they make. However, looking whether
majority of the actors in the system committed to the problem is also not a reliable
measure since commitment on the part of actors with lesser significance does not prove
success. That is to say, for instance, we cannot expect all the countries to sign the
Landmines Treaty before we call it a success yet we also cannot measure the
International Campaign to Ban on Landmines’ (ICBL) success based on the commitment
made by states that neither use nor stockpile landmines. Therefore, in measuring the
success of the campaigns, I analyzed the primary target actors’ commitment and
compliance. The cases where we observe an overall commitment or compliance while a
few target actors fall short of doing so is indicated as “partial success” in the dataset to
account for different levels of success that can be reached by different campaigns.
Policy Implementation Success
Target actors’ public commitments to address a transnational problem do not
necessarily translate into changes in their policies; therefore, it is essential to distinguish
political commitment from successful policy implementation in analyzing advocacy
campaigns’ success. As Risse and Ropp point out in their analysis of human rights norms,
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“… it is one thing to argue that there is a global human rights polity composed of
international regimes, organizations, and supportive advocacy coalitions. It is quite
another to claim that these global norms have made a real difference in the daily practices
of national governments.”306 This is primarily because, “even if a state believes that
signing a treaty is in its best interest, the political calculations associated with the
subsequent decision to comply with international agreements are distinct and
different.”307 Ratification of a treaty is generally considered as an important benchmark
of compliance but norms can also be internalized without or prior to ratification.308
For the purpose of this study, a campaign is considered to be successful in leading
to policy implementation when the target actors implement the policy that advocates
champion through some domestic/internal decision-making processes. This could range
from disbursement of pledged funds, ratification of treaties to initiation of domestic legal
or policy changes (See Table 3).
Table 3: Sample Coding – Success at Policy Implementation Stage

Campaign

disbursement of
pledged funds

Biodiversity

mixed309

306

initiation of
domestic legal or
policy changes
mixed310

Risse and Ropp 1999.
Haas 2000:45. It is also important to note that there are arguments in the literature which suggest that
states’ commitments and compliance are closely connected. The argument is that states “take into account
the likely costs and benefits of complying with a treaty when they decide whether to commit to a treaty.”
(Hathaway 2007, 590) (See also Downs, Rocke and Barsoom 1996; Von Stein 2005, 611) Therefore, while
these two stages are analyzed separately for the purpose of this study, it is noted that there are close
connections between the two.
308
Hathaway 2002; Simmons 2009.
309
The targets identified by the Convention on Biological Diversity have been only partially met. For
detailed account see “Millennium Ecosystem Assessment,” available at
<http://www.unep.org/maweb/en/index.aspx>, accessed 24 June 2013.
310
For country based analysis of policy change see “Country Profiles,” available at
<http://www.cbd.int/countries/>, accessed 24 June 2013.
307
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Progress reports, news items, press releases, public statements etc. were taken into
consideration in measuring success as well as securitization at the policy implementation
stage. While accessing these documents was not difficult, measuring success at the policy
implementation stage has proved to be the most difficult part of data collection and
coding. The reason for this difficulty is twofold: first, the number of actors whose
behavior that each campaign aims to change totals in the hundreds and analyzing policy
implementation requires this study to look into changes in each of these actors’
behaviors. This is too large of a task to undertake given the scope of the study; therefore,
I needed to rely on the existing literature, where available, in understanding whether any
changes can be observed in target actors’ behavior. To make sure that the information is
up to date, the findings of the literature were complemented with issue advocates’
accounts on progresses made as well as the news articles on the issue.
The second reason why it is difficult to measure success at the policy
implementation stage is due to the time-lag needed for such an analysis. That is to say,
most of these campaigns require target actors to undertake significant domestic policy
changes as well as to disburse significant amount of funds to comply with their
commitments. There is not enough time-lag in every issue for actors to follow through
with their commitments. Moreover, even when the target actors initiate the changes on
paper, most of the time there is not enough time-lag to compile data to verify these
commitments. Therefore, this study brings in an overall estimate of success at the policy
implementation stage by looking at disbursement of pledged funds and initiation of
domestic and legal changes.311
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This needs to be distinguished from the long-term commitment and behavioral change. Since there is not
enough time-lag for each campaign to analyze the latter, this study focuses on the former.
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Findings
Overall Findings
The purpose of this initial analysis of the data is to take a snapshot of the bigger
picture to understand whether the claims made in the literature regarding the positive
impact that using security frames makes on campaigns’ success are supported by the
evidence. This claim has two components to it. First, it argues that the actors perceive a
positive correlation between the use of security frames and successfully addressing a nonpriority issue.312 This perception in turn creates a tendency among the actors to resort to
security frames. Second, the argument suggests that the correlation between using a
security frame and reaching success is not just a perceived one but rather an observable
one on the ground.313 Thus, the conventional wisdom is that not only security frames are
frequently used but also there is a connection between resorting to such use and
successfully addressing a transnational problem.
In testing these claims, as a first step, I look at the frequency at which security
frames are used in comparison to other frames, as discussed in detail below. Then, I look
at each stage of global agenda setting and policy making separately in the following subsections to study whether any correlation can be observed between the use of security
frames and reaching success at these three different stages. This descriptive analysis is
built to function as a basis for a more detailed comparative analysis conducted in the
following chapter.
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This argument is embedded in the literature’s perception of security not as a defined arena but as a fluid
domain created by speech acts, initiated by securitizing actors on the perception that the audience would be
receptive to the claims of “existential threats.” (For a detailed discussion see Balzacq 2005)
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The initial analysis aims to test the frequency at which security frames are used.
Even though there are differences in the frequency with which security frames are used at
different stages of global agenda setting and policy making, it became clear that security
frames are not used as frequently as implied by the literature (See Table 4). The
comparative analysis reveals that five of the thirty-eight cases (13.2%) used a security
frame as one of their dominant frames at the agenda setting stage, while thirty-three of
the cases (86.8%) analyzed at this stage did not resort to a security frame in their attempts
to attract allies’ and target actors’ attention to their causes.
Table 4: Use of Security Frames at Different Stages of Global Policy Making

number of cases

political
agenda
commitment
setting stage
stage

policy
implementation
stage

security frame used

5 (13.2%)

8 (25%)

8 (28.6%)

33 (86.8%)

24 (75%)

20 (71.4%)

38 (100%)

32 (100%)

28 (100%)

no meaningful use of a
security frame
total

The results for the political commitment stage also reveal that even though there
is an increase in the frequency at which security frames are used, it is still not a
frequently made choice. Of the thirty-two cases that successfully reached to the political
commitment stage, eight cases (25%) have used a security frame as one of their dominant
frames. The research has not revealed any meaningful use of security frames in the
remaining twenty-four cases (75%).
The campaigns’ framing choices at the policy implementation stage hints an
increase in the frequency at which security frames are used but it is not strong enough to
claim a systematic tendency among actors toward adopting such a frame. Of the twenty99

eight cases that have successfully reached to the policy implementation stage, eight cases
(28.6%) used a security frame while the remaining twenty cases (71.4%) did not resort to
such use.
This comparative data reveals two insights: First, the findings signals that, as
opposed to the arguments made in the literature, no clear tendency can be observed
among advocates to adopt a security frame in their attempts to get the target actors to
prioritize and address an issue. Thus, the argument that global policy making is getting
increasingly securitized needs to be approached with caution. This is not to deny the
widening and the deepening of what security means and the evidence that shows how
different issues can be framed as security threats.314 However, I believe, this finding
nonetheless shows that adopting a security frame is not an inevitable process into which
every issue would eventually fall. As the comparative evidence above illustrates, majority
of the campaigns that worked on prioritizing a transnational problem on the global
agenda and create global action have done so without using a security frame.
Second, while the above discussed findings do not produce any evidence
regarding a systematic inclination to adopt a security frame, it nonetheless illustrates an
increased tendency to use a security frame as we advance in the stages of global agenda
setting and policy making. This finding makes it necessary to assess each of these stages
separately to reveal the potential reasons for and mechanisms of the increased inclination
to use security frames and their impact on success.
The following three subsections explore three main questions: (i) is there a
correlation between the use of security frames and success; (ii) are there any nuances in
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Such as the rise of concepts like “food security” (Cavalcanti 2005) and “environmental security”
(Deudney 1990; Kakonen 1994; and Litfin 1999).
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the role that security frames played and the contribution they made to different
campaigns; and (iii) could the campaigns have succeeded without using a security frame?
Agenda Setting Stage
In the agenda setting stage, I analyze the framing preferences and success levels
of thirty-eight transnational advocacy campaigns. The analysis reveals a lack of evidence
to support the claims of correlation between the use of security frames and success
reached at this level (See Table 5).

Agenda
setting

Table 5: Use of Security Frames and Success at Agenda Setting Stage
Success

Partial
success

Failure

Total

Security frame
used

4 (80%)

0 (0%)

1 (20%)

5 (100%)

No use of security
frames

23 (69.6%)

5 (15.2%)

5 (15.2%)

33 (100%)

An overall analysis illustrates that adopting a security frame does not guarantee
success at the agenda setting stage and similarly lack of such use does not lead to
systematic advocacy failure across cases. Of the five campaigns that used a security
frame at the agenda setting stage four of them reached success (80%) while one campaign
failed to do so (20%). Among the remaining thirty-three non-securitized cases, five of
them failed at succeeding at the agenda setting stage (15.2%) while five of the campaigns
reached partial success (15.2%) and the remaining twenty-three cases succeeded (69.6%)
at this stage. Thus, statistically no significant difference is observed between the
securitized cases and non-securitized cases in avoiding failure at this first stage (see
Table 6 for the detailed list of the cases).

101

Table 6: Success Level of Campaigns Based on Their Use of Security Frames: Agenda
Setting Stage

Non-Securitized

Securitized

Success

Agenda Setting Stage
Partial Success

Conflict Diamonds
War Crimes Tribunals
Women Peace and Security
Transparency

Failure

Illegal Wildlife Trade

AIDS Campaign
Anti-Smoking/Tobacco
Anti-Toxics
Avian Influenza
Biodiversity
Child Labor
Child Soldiers
Climate Change
Climate Refugees
Cluster Bombs
Anti-GMOs
Dams
Anti-War Protests
Human Trafficking
Female Genital Mutilation
Humanitarian Intervention
Privacy Protection
IDPs
Women’s Rep. Rights
International Criminal
Court
Jubilee 2000
Landmines
Maternal Mortality
Sexual Violence in Conflict
Small Arms
Sweatshops
Torture
Violence Against Women

Anti-IFI
Demil. Of Outer Space
Make Poverty History
Rainforest Preservation
Water Conservation

In the absence of clear evidence to support the claims of the conventional wisdom
it is necessary to take a closer look at the dynamics of advocates’ framing choices and the
strategic environments that surround them. As is briefly discussed in this chapter and
102

further developed in the following, the analysis of the securitized cases highlights two
important insights. Most importantly, the findings reveal that advocates tend to use
security frames in combination with other frames to expand their chances at reaching out
to as many potential allies and target actors as possible. Thus, even when securitization
correlates with success, by itself it does not prove that success was related to the
securitization of the campaign. The findings also reveal that the content of the security
language – how the “security threat” was framed – plays a role in the contribution that
security frames make to an advocacy campaign. Thus, as opposed to the conventional
wisdom, the use of security language does not necessarily take the form of portrayal of an
issue as an existential threat and depending on the particular language it involves,
securitization can lead to different policy outcomes.
As discussed in the previous chapter, transnational advocacy networks need to
attract a variety of actors’ attention and support to their cause in their attempts to placing
their issue on the global agenda. Doing so requires them to use frames strategically to
make them appeal to these actors’ interests and priorities.315 Since different actors are
amenable to different frames, campaigns frequently use a combination of frames in their
advocacy efforts. The findings illustrated that such combined use of frame, i.e.
multivocalization, is apparent for securitized cases as well (See Table 7).
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Keck and Sikkink 1998.
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Table 7: Framing Choices of Securitized Campaigns at the Agenda Setting Stage

Campaign

security

human
rights

Agenda Setting Stage
humanit environ develop
arian
ment
ment

animal
rights

Conflict
Diamonds
War Crimes
Tribunals
Women Peace
& Sec.

level of
success
Success
Success
Success

Transparency

Success

Illegal Wildlife
Trade

Failure

** Gray shaded cell indicate that the related frame is adopted by the campaign.
The closer analysis of the framing preferences of securitized campaign reveals
that, at the agenda setting stage, all of the securitized cases used the security frame in
combination with other frames. At the early stages of agenda setting stage, the
Transparency Campaign drew a link between corruption and its impact on development.
Transparency International, the global coalition against corruption, explained the problem
as “corruption has dire global consequences, trapping millions in poverty and misery and
breeding social, economic and political unrest… Corruption is both a cause of poverty,
and a barrier to overcoming it. It is one of the most serious obstacles to reducing
poverty.”316 In this context, security was portrayed as one of the consequences of
corruption and it was suggested that “corruption threatens domestic and international
security and the sustainability of natural resources.”317 Thus, while the security language
was adopted it was done as a supportive frame where the immediate consequence of lack
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“About Us,” available at <www.transparency.org/about_us>, accessed 8 May 2012.
Ibid.
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of transparency was portrayed as a developmental problem and security risks were
portrayed only as a potential by-product of such developmental problems.
Conflict Diamonds campaign also used a combination of human rights and
security frames at the early stages of the agenda setting stage. As it is discussed in detail
in Chapter 5, at this early stage, a security frame was utilized to attract the attention of the
UNSC318 and get their support to the issue while human rights frame was utilized to get
the industry to react by pinpointing the industry’s responsibility in the trade of illicit
diamonds and by threatening them with an industry-scale boycott.319
Similarly, the campaign for the establishment of War Crimes Tribunals used a
combination of human rights, humanitarian and security frames. The security frame
functioned as the supportive frame to draw links between existing perceptions and the
situation at hand, and in a way “grafted” the issue to the existing norms.320 The main
context in which the security frame was employed was the attempt to draw a link
between the consequences of the wars in Yugoslavia and Rwanda and the memory of the
World War II and the Holocaust. Nelaeva, for instance talks about the role of war images
in bringing the attention of the international community to the need to establish a
Tribunal: “Elie Wisel, a Holocaust survivor and Nobel prize winner, addressed Lawrence
Eagleburger (US Secretary of State) and Eagleburger in his “naming names speech” at
the Geneva Conference (December 16, 1992), mentioned that violations of United
Nations Security Council Resolutions and London agreements by the Serb authorities,
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Canada’s term as a non-permanent member of the UNSC created a receptive environment for such a
campaign to find a place on the Council’s agenda (Global Witness, Annual Report 2005.)
319
Smillie 2002a.
320
As discussed in Chapter 2, the norms are believed to have a better chance at gaining acceptance when
they “resonate” with the existing norms (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Payne
2001).
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“… is not only producing an intolerable and deteriorating situation outside the former
Yugoslavia, it is also beginning to threaten the framework of stability in the new
Europe.”321
Despite the strategic contribution that the security frame made to the campaign for
the establishment of War Crimes Tribunals, the success of the campaign cannot be
explained by the emphasis put on the security dimension of the issue. This can be traced
by looking at the output of the campaign. The resolution adopted by the UNSC in May
25, 1993 not only served as a basis for the establishment of the Court but also
emphasized the humanitarian dimension of the issue. UNSC Resolution 827 stated “grave
alarm at continuing reports of widespread and flagrant violation of international
humanitarian law occurring within the territory of the former Yugoslavia, and especially
in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, including reports of mass killings, massive,
organized and systematic detention and rape of women and the continuance of the
practice of “ethnic cleansing”, including for the acquisition and the holding of
territory.”322 Thus, it can be argued that in this instance, security frame served as a
catalyst that helped the campaign to advance their humanitarian and human rights
arguments by drawing a link between a well-remembered past security threat and the
issue at hand.
The Illegal Wildlife Trade is one of the campaigns that adopted a security frame
in combination with an animal rights frame, yet failed to succeed in getting the issue to
the global agenda. The security language was adopted by World Wildlife Fund (WWF)
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Nelavea 2011, 105.
Preamble, S.C.Res.827, U.N. Doc. S/RES./827
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and aimed to tap into the states’ perceptions about trafficking in general.323 According to
WWF’s report “Besides driving many endangered species towards extinction, illegal
wildlife trade strengthens criminal networks, undermines national security, and poses
increasing risks to global health.”324 Thus, rather than aiming to convince the states that
wildlife trade presents an “existential threat” for them, the campaign adopted such
language to use the states’ perception about trafficking as a way to convince the states to
take action. Yet, such efforts have proved to be insufficient to get the issue onto the
global agenda. This illustrates that using a security frame is not a sufficient condition for
achieving agenda setting success.
The security frame played a more dominant role in the Women, Peace and
Security Campaign as analyzed by a number of scholars who claimed that securitization
of women’s rights issues contributed to the cause.325 However, a closer analysis reveals
that categorizing this issue as just another example of securitization would overlook the
specific dynamics that security language had, and the contribution that using a security
language made to this campaign.
The type of security language used in other four campaigns analyzed at this stage
was similar in the sense that the issue at hand is perceived to be a threat to international
and national security, and hence in need of immediate international attention. However,
in the Women, Peace and Security campaign, women are not framed as a threat to
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For an example of such use see Office of the United States Trade Representative’s “Fact Sheet: Trade,
İllegal Wildlife Trafficking, and National Security,” available at <http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/pressoffice/fact-sheets/2014/June/Trade-Illegal-Wildlife-Trafficking-and-National-Security>, accessed 6
September 2014.
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“Illegal Wildlife Trade Threatens National Security, Says WWF Report,” available at
<http://wwf.panda.org/?207054/Illegal-wildlife-trade-threatens-national-security-says-WWF-report>,
accessed 6 September 2014.
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For a detailed analysis of the issue see Cohn 2004; Basu 2009; Tryggestad 2009; Hudson 2009; 2010;
Willett 2010; Pratt 2013; Miller et al. 2014.
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international security. Rather, women and their active participation in the peacemaking
and peacebuilding processes are portrayed as contributors to international peace and
security.326 This is evident in the NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security’s
description of their goal: “The NGOWG on Women, Peace and Security advocates for
the equal and full participation of women in all efforts to create and maintain
international peace and security... Sustainable peace depends on the full participation of
women in all decision-making to prevent violent conflict and to protect all civilians.”327
Thus, the contribution that adopting the security frame made to this campaign was not to
invoke an image of “existential threat” but rather to portray the inclusion of women as an
opportunity in tackling such threats.
The above analysis illustrates that security frames and the contribution they make
to campaigns take a number of forms that cannot be captured by broad and uncritical
approaches to securitization. However, in order to better understand the contribution that
security frames make to campaigns, we also need to analyze whether campaigns would
have succeeded without using security frames. As I discuss in detail in the next chapter
by comparing HIV/AIDS versus Maternal Mortality and Landmines versus Small Arms
campaigns, the best measure we have in engaging in such analysis is to compare the
securitized cases with non-securitized ones.
An analysis of campaigns with similar goals illustrates that there is no overarching
tendency among campaigns to adopt security frames at the agenda setting stage. While
the War Crimes Tribunals campaign resorted to a security frame, the campaign for the
creation of the International Criminal Court has not used a similar approach. As
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Hudson 2010.
“About Us,” available at <http://www.womenpeacesecurity.org/about/>, accessed 27 October 2014.
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exemplified in the statements of the Coalition for the International Criminal Court (the
NGO network that played a central role in the campaign), in explaining their goal and the
purpose of the campaign, the campaign used a human rights frame: “the global fight to
end genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity through a commitment to the
core values of human rights and justice.”328 Despite the lack of a security frame at the
agenda setting stage, the campaign for the International Criminal Court also succeeded
which illustrates that even though security language might have contributed to the War
Crimes Tribunals campaign, adopting a security frame is not a necessary condition for the
success of campaigns with similar goals.
What sheds further doubt on the prominence that the conventional wisdom
attaches to the use of security frames is the fact that some campaigns that can be
considered as likely candidates for using a security frame did not resort to such use. In
analyzing the framing choices of the campaigns at the agenda setting, we observe that
some of the cases that by nature are security issues chose not to use a security frame. For
instance, Small Arms campaign used a combination of human rights and humanitarian
frames in their attempts to attract international attention to their cause. The IANSA, the
campaign organization, defines themselves as
the global movement against gun violence, linking civil society organisations
working to stop the proliferation and misuse of small arms and light weapons.
IANSA supports efforts to make people safer by reducing demand for such
weapons, improving firearm regulation and strengthening controls on arms
transfers. Through research, advocacy and campaigning, IANSA members are
promoting local, national, regional and global measures to strengthen human
security...raising awareness among policymakers, the public and the media about
the global threat to human rights and human security caused by small arms.329
328

“Coalition for the ICC,” available at <http://www.wfm-igp.org/content/coalition-icc>, accessed 22 May
2014.
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Yet despite the security nature of the issue, the campaign has chosen to not use a security
frame, i.e. de-securitize the issue, and succeeded in bringing the issue on the global
agenda. Moreover, as is discussed in detail in the following chapter, the Small Arms
campaign was securitized at the political commitment stage, yet securitization brought
only a very recent and very limited success. This example also hints that using a security
frame is not a necessary condition for the success of a campaign.
The comparative analysis of the thirty-eight cases at the agenda setting stage
brought forward three main insights. First, the findings showed that no clear correlation
can be observed between the use of security frames and success reached at this level.
Second, a closer analysis of securitized cases illustrated that securitization is a complex
process which means that securitization might take different forms and might have
varying implications for different issues. Third, a closer comparison of securitized and
non-securitized cases illustrates that adopting a security language is neither a necessary
nor a sufficient condition for success.
Political Commitment Stage
Analysis of the framing choices of campaigns at the political commitment stage
reveal similar insights to those discussed at the agenda setting stage and shows that
securitization does not necessarily correlate with success at this stage, either. Despite the
increase in the number of cases that used a security frame in comparison to the agenda
setting stage, no increased likelihood was observed between the decision to use a security
frame and reaching success at the political commitment stage. Moreover, the in-depth
analysis of securitized cases provides further evidence that shed light onto the inner
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dynamics of adopting security frames, and various ways through which security frames
affect campaigns.

Political
commitment

Table 8: Success Level of Campaigns Based on Their Use of Security Frames: Political
Commitment Stage
Success

Partial
success

Failure

Total

Security frame
used

4 (50%)

3 (37.5%)

2 (12.5%)

8 (100%)

No use of security
frames

10 (41.6%)

13 (54.2%)

1 (4.2%)

24 (100%)

Only four of the eight securitized cases (50%) have reached success at the
political commitment stage (in comparison to 80% at the agenda setting stage) (See Table
8). HIV/AIDS campaign succeeded in placing the issue among the Millennium
Development Goals;330 and the Conflict Diamonds campaign led to the creation of a
certification mechanism, the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, 331 which brought
the major diamond producing and trading countries together successfully. Humanitarian
Intervention campaign has successfully led to a World Summit where states declared
their commitment to develop mechanisms in addressing “genocide, war crimes, ethnic
cleansing and crimes against humanity.”332 Women, Peace and Security campaign has
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“Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, Malaria and Other Diseases,” available at
<http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/aids.shtml>, accessed 22 December 2012.
331
“Kimberley Process,” available at <http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/>, accessed 24 November 2013.
332
The Outcome Document of the World Summit 2005 stated that: “Each individual State has the
responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against
humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through
appropriate and necessary means. We accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it. The
international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility
and support the United Nations in establishing an early warning capability.” (Article 138)
“The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate
diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the
Charter, to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against
humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner,
through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case
basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be
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convinced the UNSC to declare the Resolution 1325 which aimed to mainstream the
involvement of women in the peacemaking and conflict resolution processes (See Table
9).333
Three of the campaigns that used a security frame (International Criminal Court,
Small Arms and Sexual Violence in Conflict) (37.5%) have reached only partial success.
The campaign for the International Criminal Court has led to the creation of the court;
however, the campaign was not able to convince all of the major actors to take part in the
court. The Small Arms campaign has led to the Arms Trade Treaty which has recently
entered into force in December 2014. Yet this treaty constitutes only a partial success as
of 130 countries that signed the agreement so far only 63 has ratified.334 The campaign on
the Sexual Violence in Conflict has successfully got states to sign the “Declaration of
Commitment to End Sexual Violence in Conflict,” but no measurable accomplishment
has been observed after that.

inadequate and national authorities manifestly fail to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes,
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. We stress the need for the General Assembly to continue
consideration of the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and
crimes against humanity and its implications, bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and international
law. We also intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, to helping States build capacity to
protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and to
assisting those which are under stress before crises and conflicts break out.” (Article 139)
333
S.C.Res.1325, U.N. Doc S/RES/1325
334
“The Arms Trade Treaty,” available at <http://www.un.org/disarmament/ATT/>, accessed 12 January
2015.
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Table 9: Use of Security Frames and Success at Political Commitment Stage

Non-Securitized

Securitized

Success

Political Commitment Stage
Partial Success

AIDS Campaign
Conflict Diamonds
Humanitarian
Intervention
Women Peace and
Security

Anti-Smoking/Tobacco
Anti-Toxics
Avian Influenza
Biodiversity
Child Labor
Climate Change
Human Trafficking
Landmines
Violence Against
Women
War Crimes Tribunals

ICC
Sex. Violence in
Conflict335
Small Arms336

Anti-GMOs
Anti-War Protests
Child Soldiers
Cluster Bombs
Dams
Female Genital Mutilation
Jubilee 2000
Maternal Mortality
Privacy Protection
Sweatshops
Torture
Transparency
Women’s Rep. Rights

Failure

Climate Refugees

IDPs

The one remaining campaign (12.5%) failed at this stage (in comparison to 20% at
the agenda setting stage). As further analyzed in the following chapter, the Climate
Refugees campaign used a security frame but failed in convincing states to publicly
commit to taking action. The issue has made it to the agenda of a number of international
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The Global Summit to End Sexual Violence in Conflict has taken place very recently in June 2014.
Therefore, while this summit is a step toward political commitment success, it is a tentative one (“Global
Summit to End Sexual Violence in Conflict,” available at < https://www.gov.uk/government/topicalevents/sexual-violence-in-conflict>, 29 November 2014.)
336
The coding of the Small Arms campaign at the political commitment stage as “partial success” is also
tentative since the Arms Trade Treaty has entered into force only in December 24, 2014 (“The Arms Trade
Treaty,” available at <http://www.un.org/disarmament/ATT/>, accessed 12 January 2015.) As the limited
success that both Sexual Violence in Conflict and Small Arms campaigns have reached are very recent, it is
not possible to analyze these cases at the policy implementation stage. Therefore, they are left out of the
analysis presented in the following subsection.
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organizations but has not initiated political commitment yet.337 While the importance of
the issue has been recognized by the international community, no tangible steps have
been successfully taken so far to induce states to commit to take action.
Not only we do not observe systematic success across securitized cases at this
stage, we also do not observe an increase in the likelihood of failure among nonsecuritized or de-securitized campaigns. Ten of the twenty-four non-securitized cases
(41.6%) have succeeded in triggering high levels of political commitment, while thirteen
of the cases reached partial success (54.2%) and only one campaign (4.2%) has failed in
compelling the target actors to publicly commit to the issue.
Except for the Conflict Diamonds campaign which used security frame as its sole
dominant frame, the remaining campaigns have used security frames in combination with
other frames.338 As they are further discussed in Chapter 4, Sexual Violence in Conflict
and Small Arms campaigns combined humanitarian, human rights and security frames.
At this stage, the International Criminal Court, Climate Refugees and Women, Peace and
Security campaigns took similar approaches and combined security frame with a human
rights frame. The Humanitarian Intervention campaign on the other hand, combined the
security frame with a humanitarian frame. Lastly, the HIV/AIDS campaign combined
development, human rights and security frames. The way that these campaigns adopted
the security language into their frames shaped not only the content of the security
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Such as United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and United Nations Environment
Programme (UNEP).
338
As I present in Chapter 5, the detailed analysis of the Conflict Diamonds campaign illustrates that even
though security frame became the dominant frame at the political commitment stage, depending on the
actor who was using the security language (NGOs, industry or the states), the same language had very
different purposes and different implications. Thus, even in this campaign there was neither a single
coherent use of the security frame nor the militarization of the policy instruments which is what the
conventional wisdom would have expected to see.
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language, but also how and to what extent security language contributed to these
campaigns.
Table 10: Framing Choices of Securitized Campaigns at the Political Commitment Stage

Campaign

security

Political Commitment Stage
human humanit developm
rights
arian
ent

level of
success

AIDS

Success

Climate Refugees

Failure

Conflict Diamonds

Success

Humanitarian
Intervention
International Criminal
Court
Sexual Violence in
Conflict

Success
Partial
success
Partial
success
Partial
success

Small Arms
Women, Peace and
Security

Success

** Gray shaded cell indicate that the related frame is adopted by the campaign.
The close analysis of securitized campaigns illustrate that in most of the
campaigns that adopted a security frame at the political commitment stage, the
securitized language has not completely sidelined other frames. Rather, the security
frame functioned as a secondary frame that was used to support the arguments made
through humanitarian, human rights and environmental frames. For instance, the
Humanitarian Intervention campaign, while remaining primarily within the humanitarian
domain, has experienced a securitizing move. This was accomplished through the
involvement of the UNSC in the issue. This involvement is realized through the active
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involvement of the UNSC in supporting Responsibility to Protect (R2P).339 Thus, in this
case, the overall framing of the issue has not shifted but the issue got securitized through
the widening of the security agenda rather than the issue being redefined as an existential
threat.
In a similar manner, the UNSC’s involvement in the issue of ICC also indicated
the existence of a securitizing move at the political commitment stage of this issue. As
Busby suggests, “while the ICC is ostensibly a case in the human rights arena, the
potential prosecution of individuals for war crimes touches upon the security sphere,
elevating the ICC from low politics to high politics…”340 The UNSC has become actively
involved in the issue as a result of what is known as “Singapore Compromise” which
“allowed the Security Council to block ICC jurisdiction but not be required to authorize
every case.”341 Thus in this case, security language also functioned as a supportive frame
to boost already accumulating support by guaranteeing the support of an important ally
rather than as a strategy to change the perceptions of the target actors.
The issue of Sexual Violence in Conflict has also, so far, kept the main focus on
the human rights and humanitarian implications of the issue. They nonetheless, have
started to emphasize the threat that the issue presents for international security: “Sexual
violence in conflict poses a grave threat to international peace and security. It exacerbates
tension and violence and undermines stability.”342 The securitization of the issue is also
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For a detailed account of UNSC Resolutions referencing Responsibility to Protect see Global Centre for
Responsibility to Protect, “UN Security Council Resolutions Referencing R2P,” 23 April 2013, available at
<http://www.globalr2p.org/resources/335>, accessed 29 January 2014.
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evident in the fact that sexual violence in conflict has been brought to the UNSC
agenda343 which led to the signing of “Declaration of Commitment to End Sexual
Violence in Conflict.” Thus, while the process of securitization is evident at the political
commitment stage, the success reached in creating political commitment is a partial one
as not all related parties have taken part in the Declaration.
Women, Peace and Security is one of the campaigns that have sustained its
framing choices throughout all three stages of global agenda setting and policy making.
As it was the case at the agenda setting stage, the realization of women’s rights and the
further inclusion of women into peacemaking and conflict resolution processes are
framed as necessary conditions for reaching international peace and security rather than
being portrayed as a threat to security itself.344
As I show in the following chapter, in contrast to other securitized cases analyzed
at the political commitment stage, in the case of HIV/AIDS, the securitization was
experienced in a more direct way, wherein the issue was reframed as one that would
threaten states’ national security if remain unaddressed. The issue was announced to be a
“threat to international security” by the US Ambassador Richard Holbrook and Vice
President Al Gore345 and brought to the UNSC’s agenda as the first ever health issue to
find a place on the Council’s agenda. In this regard, HIV/AIDS is one of the examples
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where we see a clear link between the reframing of the issue as a security threat and
succeeding in triggering political commitment.346
In order to better understand the contribution that using a security frame makes to
an advocacy campaign, it is also useful to look at cases that got de-securitized at the
political commitment stage. Transparency campaign used development and security
approaches together at the agenda setting stage but it settled on a predominantly
development frame at the political commitment stage. This is exemplified in the
international organizations’ approaches to the issue following the campaign. One of the
successful outcomes of the campaign was the Extractive Industries Transparency
Initiative, which defines its goal as: “we share a belief that the prudent use of natural
resource wealth should be an important engine for sustainable economic growth that
contributes to sustainable development and poverty reduction, but if not managed
properly, can create negative economic and social impacts.”347 Thus, Transparency
campaign illustrates that succeeding even after de-securitizing an issue is possible.
The second campaign that moved away from a security frame was the War
Crimes Tribunal campaign. As was discussed earlier, at the agenda setting stage, security
language was used to support the human rights frame in getting states to accept the need
for such a Court. Once the court was established, the need for such use was no longer
apparent and the emphasis remained on the human rights frame from that point onward.
This is exemplified in the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’s
(ICTY) statement of its mandate “the key objective of the ICTY is to try those
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individuals most responsible for appalling acts such as murder, torture, rape,
enslavement, destruction of property and other crimes listed in the Tribunal's Statute. By
bringing perpetrators to trial, the ICTY aims to deter future crimes and render justice to
thousands of victims and their families.”348
The framing choices of these two campaigns at the political commitment stage
illustrate that once adopted, security frames do not necessarily dictate the rest of the
global policy making. This contradicts the conventional wisdom which suggests that once
successfully completed, securitization moves the issue outside of the realm of normal
politics. However, as the comparative analysis illustrates, as it is the case for other
frames, security frames can be adopted and dropped as needed. This is not to argue that
campaigns float among different frames freely and such a shift is always feasible. Rather,
that the examples shows that security frames function like any other frames, and when
the conditions and priorities call for it, a move away from the security frame is possible.
In addition to the insights that de-securitized cases bring forward, similar to the
agenda setting stage, the findings of the political commitment stage also illustrate that
there was not a cross-cutting inclination among similar issues to adopt security frames.
For instance, when the campaigns that focus on problems faced mainly by women are
compared, we do not see an overall securitization of the issue area. In fact, among the
seven campaigns that fit into this category: Female Genital Mutilation, Human
Trafficking, Maternal Mortality, Sexual Violence in Conflict, Violence against Women,
Women, Peace and Security, and Women’s Reproductive Rights, only two have adopted
security frames at the political commitment stage. Moreover, all of the seven cases listed
above have reached at least partial success at the political commitment stage. Thus, not
348
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only is there no systematic tendency to adopt a security frame, but also there is no
observable correlation between the decision to use a security frame and level of success
reached by these campaigns.
The comparative analysis of cases at the political commitment stage not only
supported the findings of the agenda setting stage but also revealed two more important
insights into the dynamics of securitization. First, the analysis of de-securitized cases
illustrate that once adopted, security frames are as likely to be dropped as other frames in
transitioning from agenda setting stage to political commitment stage and therefore,
security frames do not function any different than other frames. Second, the evidence also
showed that once adopted, security frames do not necessarily take over the main
arguments and the language of the campaign. Security frames might also be used
strategically with the limited purpose of supporting the existing frames.
Policy Implementation Stage
A detailed analysis of the policy implementation stage reveals that an increased
percentage of campaigns have experienced securitization at this stage. The securitizing
attempts have proved to be more successful in some of these cases in terms of convincing
the audience that the issue at hand presents a security threat, while the efforts in other
cases remained scattered and less successful in making a case for security implications of
the issue.
At the policy implementation stage, all of the cases analyzed in this study have
succeeded in achieving at least partial success in making the states follow through with
the commitments they have made to address the issue at hand. It is also observed that this
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success is almost always a partial one, as expected, given the difficulty of creating perfect
norm compliance.
While the percentage of cases that used a security frame increased at the policy
implementation stage, neither a systematic success across securitized cases nor a
systematic failure across non-securitized cases can be observed. Of the eight cases that
used a security frame, seven of them (87.5%) reached partial success while one campaign
has reached high level of success (12.5%). The remaining twenty cases did not use a
security frame and of these twenty cases one case reached high level of policy
implementation success (5%) while the remaining eighteen cases have reached partial
success (95%) (See Table 11).

Policy
implementation

Table 11: Success Level of Campaigns Based on Their Use of Security Frames: Policy
Implementation Stage
Success

Partial
success

Total

Security frame used

1 (12.5%)

7 (87.5%)

8 (100%)

No use of security
frames

1 (5%)

19 (95%)

20 (100%)
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Table 12: Framing Choices of Campaigns at the Policy Implementation Stage and
Success Levels

Non-Securitized

Securitized

Policy Implementation Stage
Success
Partial Success

Conflict Diamonds

AIDS Campaign
Avian Influenza
Climate Change
Human Trafficking
Humanitarian Intervention
International Criminal Court
Women Peace and Security

Landmines

Anti-GMOs
Anti-Smoking/Tobacco
Anti-Toxics
Anti-War Protests
Biodiversity
Child Labor
Child Soldiers
Cluster Bombs
Dams
Female Genital Mutilation
Jubilee 2000
Maternal Mortality
Privacy Protection
Sweatshops
Torture
Transparency
Violence Against Women
War Crimes Tribunals
Women’s Reproductive Rights

A closer analysis of the framing choices of securitized campaigns reveals
interesting lessons into the dynamics of framing and global policy making. The first
important insight is regarding how persistent the campaigns were in their use of security
frames across different stages of global agenda setting and policy making. As discussed
in the previous section, Transparency and War Crimes Tribunals campaigns were using
security frames at the agenda setting stage but they moved away from such use at the
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political commitment stage. However, consistency in framing is observed when the
campaigns’ use of security frames at the political commitment and policy implementation
stages are compared. That is to say, all of the cases that used a security frame at the
political commitment stage continued doing so at the policy implementation stage (See
Table 12 and Table 13).
Table 13: Framing Choices of Securitized Campaigns at the Policy Implementation Stage

Campaign

security

Policy Implementation Stage
human human enviro develo
Bio
rights itarian nment pment security

AIDS
Avian
Influenza
Climate
Change
Conflict
Diamonds

level of
success
Partial
success
Partial
success
Partial
success
Success

Human
Trafficking
Human.
Interven.

Partial
success
Partial
success
Partial
success
Partial
success

ICC
Women
Peace, Sec.

** Gray shaded cell indicate that the related frame is adopted by the campaign.
The securitization literature argues that the above discussed persistence is specific
to security frames. They argue that once an issue gets securitized, it tends to stay
securitized as securitizing an issue moves it out of the realm of normal politics and limits
the actors and policy options that can be used from that point onward.349 However, when
we analyze the use of frames across cases, we observe that the consistency in framing is
349
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not particular to the security frame. The data reveals that a drastic change in framing was
experienced only in the Avian Influenza case where there was a transition from a health
frame at the political commitment stage to the use of a combination of security and
biosecurity frames at the policy implementation stage. For the other cases, we observe
that all the cases that have succeeded at the political commitment stage have held onto
their existing frames and only add in new frames in a few instances.
An explanation that would better account for the above observation would be that
frames that are used at the political commitment stage define which international regime
the issue will get situated in and which actors shoulders the responsibility in addressing
the issue. In other words, the language used at the political commitment stage gets
embedded into the institutions and mechanisms developed in addressing the issue.
Therefore, given that the campaign succeeds at this stage, the framing choices shapes
what type of policies developed and which actors would be involved at the policy
implementation stage and these policies and institutions perpetuate the frame, in return.
This observation lends support to the arguments in the securitization literature that once
an issue is securitized, it tends to stay securitized. However, the findings also illustrate
that such persistence is not unique to the security frame. This, in turn, supports the
argument of this study that securitization is an instance of framing rather than a unique
process.
A close analysis of the securitized cases also illustrates that the implication of
adopting a security frame might vary across different stages of global agenda setting and
policy making. Thus, even when a campaign consistently uses a security frame, the
centrality of the security frame for the issue as well as the contribution that security
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frames make to the success of the campaign might vary. For instance, as analyzed in the
following chapter, when we look at the HIV/AIDS case we observe that the security
language was only complementary at the political commitment stage, supporting the
development and human rights frames that mainly shaped the policy efforts. However,
when we came to the policy implementation stage we observe that the security frame has
decreased the prominence of development and human rights frames and became the core
frame through which policy makers approach the issue.350
Similarly, as discussed in Chapter 5, when we assess at the Conflict Diamonds
case we also observe that the prominence of the security language has changed over time.
While security language was predominant at the political commitment stage, it has later
become a source of criticism at the policy implementation stage. The advocates of the
issue still use a security frame when dealing with conflict diamonds issue; yet, they do so
with an increasing discontent.351
Conclusion
The comparative analysis of thirty-eight transnational advocacy campaigns at
three different stages of global agenda setting and policy making has revealed four sets of
insights into security frames and their contribution to the success of transnational
advocacy campaigns.
First, not only that security frames were not used as frequently as suggested by the
literature but also no positive correlation between the use of security frames and success
at any stage of global agenda setting and policy making was observed. Similarly, there
350
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was no systematic failure across cases that did not adopt a security frame or cases that
moved away from a security frame. Relatedly, there was no clearly increasing tendency
among cases to adopt security frames over time, either. Thus, the arguments in the
literature about the positive correlation between using a security frame and success were
not supported by the evidence at hand.
Second, brief comparisons of successful and non-successful examples of
securitized and non-securitized cases illustrated that security frames are neither a
necessary nor a sufficient condition for reaching success at any stage of global agenda
setting and policy making.
Third, the comparative analysis also revealed that once securitized at the political
commitment stage, the campaigns tend to remain securitized at the policy implementation
stage. However, a closer analysis also revealed that not only securitized cases but also
non-securitized cases tend to stick to their framing choices in transitioning to policy
implementation stages. Thus, the findings illustrated that security frames function the
same way the other frames do rather than being an exception. This finding in turn stresses
the importance of comparative studies in order not to overestimate the role and
importance of security frames.
The fourth insight that the comparative analysis provides is that campaigns tend to
multivocalize their issues. That is to say, advocates simultaneously invoke multiple
frames. Therefore, securitization of an issue does not necessarily mean that the security
frame automatically sidelines other frames and lead to the removal of the issue from the
normal realm of politics which is what the securitization literature argues would happen.
The impact that the security frame has on the direction that a campaign takes in terms of
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both success and the types of policies it initiates depends on how securitization interacts
with other frames used by the campaign and the exact content of the security language
(whether the issue is framed as a threat to international security as it is the case with
HIV/AIDS or it is framed as a condition for avoiding conflict and insecurity as it is the
case for Women, Peace and Security).
The descriptive information that the medium-n analysis produced has revealed
insights that challenged the arguments made in the literature about the connection
between security frames and success. However, such an analysis is not sufficient enough
to reveal the dynamics behind adopting security frames and the nature and extent of the
influence such frames have on campaigns. The following chapter conducts a close
comparative analysis of nine cases to further substantiate the arguments made in this
chapter, and to reveal the varying implications of adopting security frames and the
reasons behind them.
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CHAPTER 4
COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY
Introduction
The previous chapter presented a comparison of thirty-eight cases of global
agenda setting and policy making to test two assumptions derived from the literature: (i)
framing a transnational problem as a security threat increases the chances of getting states
to address the problem, and as a function of that, (ii) there is a tendency among
campaigners to “securitize” issues that are not traditionally considered to be security
threats. The analysis presented in the previous chapter challenged both of these
assumptions by revealing that the number of global advocacy campaigns that adopted a
security frame is limited, and that no correlation exists between the adoption of security
frames and the success reached at any stage of global agenda setting or policy making.
While this type of analysis helps us question the “uniqueness” attributed to the
security frames in the literature, understanding the mechanisms that lead to the adoption
of these frames – as well as the consequences of such choices – requires further analysis.
For this reason, at this second stage of the analysis, I compare nine campaigns to
understand both the advocacy campaigns’ decisions to securitize (and de-securitize)
issues (in particular) and campaigns’ framing choices (in general), as well as the factors
that shape such decisions’ contribution to success.
The cases are selected using a combination of most similar and most different
systems designs. The logic of the most similar systems design is to compare cases that are
similar in as many aspects as possible and differ on the dependent variable, so that the
effect of the independent variable under investigation can be distilled from other possible
128

factors.352 Most different systems design, on the other hand, compares cases that vary in
almost every aspect except for the outcome (the dependent variable).353 Thus, in this type
of approach, “variation on the independent variable is prized, while the variation on the
outcome is eschewed.” 354
Both of these methods have their strengths and weaknesses. Most similar systems
design is useful in supporting the tentative findings achieved through single case
studies,355 yet criticized due to the difficulty in discerning the impact of one single factor
from the others.356 Most different systems design is helpful in analyzing a variety of cases
together, but it is, “prone to the “many variables-too few cases” criticism that has been
leveled at small-N studies in general.”357
The cases analyzed in this chapter are categorized based on the similarity in the
nature of the problem they are addressing, and then are paired based on the differences
they possess – either in their use of frames or in their outcomes. The decision to combine
the most similar and most different systems designs was based on Dimitrov et al.’s
argument that when we solely focus on “common causes of a common outcome,” we run
the risk of “identifying as necessary conditions ones that are also ubiquitous.”358 Thus,
focusing solely on cases that adopted a security frame and succeeded limits our capacity
to understand the extent to which security frames contributed to this success.359 To
remedy this problem, this chapter compares (i) cases that succeeded without using a
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security frame with those that adopted a security frame and, (ii) cases that failed despite
the use of security frames with successful ones as “[i]nvestigating … “negative cases”
can help build more complete explanations of why some problems trigger international
policy responses whereas others do not.”360
Based on these considerations, nine cases were chosen from four issue areas:
health, humanitarian, environment and arms control (See Table 14). HIV/AIDS and
Maternal Mortality campaigns are compared to each other as (i) they are both, by nature,
health issues and (ii) the policy outcome of both campaigns are similar (placing of both
issues on Millennium Development Goals). These campaigns nonetheless, differ in their
use of frames. The HIV/AIDS campaign has adopted a security frame while the Maternal
Mortality campaign has not resorted to such a use.
The Climate Change and Climate Refugees campaigns both focus on problems
induced by an environmental problem, and the comparison of these two campaigns
illustrates that adopting a security frame is not a sufficient condition for success; security
frames were adopted by both issues yet one succeeded in agenda setting and policy
making (climate change) while the other failed at the political commitment stage (climate
refugees).
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Table 14: Comparison of Cases on the Securitization – Success Nexus
More successful

Less successful

Climate Refugees
Climate Change
Securitized
Small Arms
HIV/AIDS
Sexual Violence in Conflict

Landmines
Non-securitized

Maternal Mortality

Internally Displaced Persons

Child Soldiers

Campaigns on Environmentally Induced Problems
Health Campaigns
Humanitarian Campaigns
Arms Control Campaigns

The Child Soldiers and Sexual Violence in Conflict campaigns are paired as they
both focus on the protection of vulnerable groups in conflicts. Despite the common
ground between these two campaigns, they vary in both their framing choices as well as
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their success levels: the non-securitized Child Soldiers campaign succeeded while the
securitized Sexual Violence in Conflict campaign has so far reached limited success.
Landmines and Small Arms campaigns are compared as examples of arms control
campaigns. The analysis illustrates that success might lay with de-securitization of a
traditional security concern, as the Landmines campaign succeeded using a humanitarian
frame while the Small Arms campaign reached a very limited success even though they
adopted a security frame.
The Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) campaign is then analyzed as an example
of non-securitized, less successful campaign to trace whether the dynamics that are
identified as important in shaping securitized campaigns’ level of success also play a role
in non-securitized campaigns. While the goal of this study is not to explain nonsecuritized campaigns, illustrating the similarities contributes to this study’s argument
that securitized campaigns are bound by the same dynamics as non-securitized ones.
For each of the cases, a historical account of the campaign is presented. This
account not only provides an assessment of success for each stage of global agenda
setting and policy making, but also discusses the framing choices of the campaigns and
factors pertaining to such choices. The chapter also presents an analysis that combines
and discusses the findings gained from comparative case study analysis. The IDPs
campaign is presented in the end to further illustrate that non-securitized campaigns are
bound by the same dynamics as securitized ones.
If the securitization literature were to be correct, this comparison of nine cases
should reveal the following findings. First, there should be a tendency among advocates
to adopt security frames when such a choice is available. Second, in cases where security
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frames are adopted, such a choice should correspond to increasing levels of success.
Third, the decision to adopt a security frame should be guided by advocates’ expectations
that the frame will help them appeal to the targets of influence.
However, contrary to these expectations, the analysis of these nine campaigns
lends further support to the arguments made in the previous chapter, and shows that
adopting a security frame is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for achieving
success at any stage of global agenda setting and policy making.
In addition to supporting the arguments put forward in the previous chapter, this
chapter also provides three insights into the factors that affect advocates’ framing choices
and implications of such decisions for success. The findings illustrate that campaigns
tend to use multiple frames in order to (i) reach out to as many potential allies as possible
to widen their network, and (ii) create an opportunity to graft the issue onto as many
diverse norms as possible to increase their chances of success. However, in order for
multivocalization to contribute to advocates’ efforts, it needs to be a coordinated effort
rather than a sign of frame contestation within the campaign.
The findings also illustrate that the advocates’ decision to adopt a particular frame
over the other tends to reflect (i) advocates’ fields of expertise and their previous
experiences, as well as (ii) the opportunities and constraints that the current political
atmosphere presents. Lastly, the findings support the arguments advanced by the TANs
and framing literatures that, while strategic framing of issues is essential for the success
of transnational advocacy campaigns, success will not be possible if framing (including
securitization) does not coincide with a conducive strategic environment (such as the
short causal link, clear physical damage, concentrated network).
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Health Campaigns
The campaigns on HIV/AIDS and Maternal Mortality share three common
characteristics. They are both health issues at their core; both campaigns reached similar
levels of success at the agenda setting and political commitment stages; and they both
reached partial success in ensuring that the states follow through with their publicly made
commitments. The main difference between HIV/AIDS and Maternal Mortality
campaigns is the frames they chose to use in promoting their cause. While the HIV/AIDS
campaign adopted a security frame starting at the political commitment stage, the
Maternal Mortality campaign stayed away from such use.
The similar level of success that both campaigns reached despite differences in
their framing choices illustrates that using a security frame is not a necessary condition
for a transnational advocacy campaign to succeed. Thus, while the close analysis of
HIV/AIDS campaign illustrate that adopting a security language can contribute to the
efforts to solve a global problem, the analysis of the Maternal Mortality campaign
illustrates that the success cannot solely be attributed to the adoption of such a language.
The comparison demonstrates that the actors’ framing choices are shaped by the
opportunities and challenges that their strategic environment presents to them.
Nevertheless, the analysis also presents that advocates, through multivocalization, can
alter their strategic environment by expanding their reach and getting their concerns
heard by a diverse set of allies, as well as by increasing their ability to graft their issue
onto as many different norms as possible.
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HIV/AIDS Campaign
HIV/AIDS campaign is one of the success stories of global agenda setting and
policy making. This success was not a natural or inevitable one since not all health issues
trigger same level of attention. On the contrary, some health problems that are equally or
even more threatening to global health receive less attention.361 As Shiffman evaluates
“for instance, in the early 2000s HIV/AIDS received more than one-third of all major
donor funding for health, despite representing only around 5% of the mortality and
morbidity burden in low- and middle- income countries… Meanwhile, other
communicable diseases, such as pneumonia and diarrheal diseases, that kill millions of
people each year and for which cost-effective interventions exist, attract minimal donor
resources.”362
The success of the HIV/AIDS campaign cannot be explained by the severity or
the scope of the problem; therefore, it is important to look at the conditions that paved the
way to this success. The case studies conducted on the issue, while noting the long-term
moral implications, claim that securitization of the issue contributed to this success.363
However, as both the below presented historical account and the comparison with the
Maternal Mortality campaign illustrate, the HIV/AIDS campaign realized much of its
success without using a security frame. The later decision to securitize the issue was not
inevitable, but rather a consequence of the strategic environment that the campaign was
operating in, and how the advocates chose to react to it.
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HIV/AIDS is an interesting case in terms of issue framing, as the advocates and
policy makers have tried a wide range of frames throughout the campaign with varying
levels of success. The issue became framed as “a public health problem, a development
issue, a humanitarian crisis, a human rights issue and a threat to security” 364 at different
stages of global agenda setting and policy making. Prins summarizes this shift in his
2004 article by stating that, “HIV/AIDS has been medically visible, both in
microbiological research and soon after with treatments, for nearly 30 years; researched
epidemiologically for 25; recognized as an issue in domestic political economy for a
decade and as a potential security driver and an issue in global political economy (the
principal concerns of this article) for only about five years.”365
When it was first discovered, HIV/AIDS was framed as a health issue yet such
approach did not bring success to the campaign, as this frame was not able to illustrate
the direct harm that the disease inflicted on “innocent” civilians. The belief in 1980s that
HIV/AIDS affected mainly homosexuals and drug users stigmatized the disease and
resulted in “medicalization” of the issue. Moreover, it resulted in a loss of valuable time
that could have been devoted to the development of preventive research.366 While a
number of NGOs and support groups had been already at work, their efforts to attract
global attention to the issue remained largely unsuccessful.367 This lack of success was
apparent in the fact that, “WHO was clearly the natural UN ‘home’ for work on AIDS
with its mandate on maintaining global health. Cases had been reported to WHO annually

364

Prins 2004; Harris and Siplon 2007; Shiffman 2009.
Prins 2004, 932.
366
Prins 2004; Knight 2008.
367
Knight 2008.
365

136

since 1981 but only one person in the organization was working in the area of sexually
transmitted infections in the early 1980s.”368
The strategic framing of the issue, however, translated into success only when the
political context made both the potential allies and target actors receptive of the
arguments advanced by the advocates. International attention turned toward
developments in Africa due to the changing dynamics of world politics with the end of
the Cold War.369 This in turn helped the advocates’ efforts to attract global attention to
the issue by emphasizing the development and human rights implications for Africa.
The actors taking advantage of the newly rising opportunities within the political
context focused on multivocalization. The use of multiple frames at this stage was most
fruitful in attracting a number of potential allies from different issue areas to start paying
attention to the issue. This success became evident in the establishment of the Joint
United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) with the co-sponsorship of eleven
gatekeepers from different networks.370
Despite the failed attempts to securitize the issue during 1990s,371 the security
frame started to be used in transitioning to the political commitment stage, with the
purpose of appealing to more donors and potential allies by further emphasizing the
urgency of the issue. The security frame was introduced through the involvement of the
UNSC into the issue. In 2000, UNSC held a special debate on “the impact of AIDS on
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peace and Security in Africa” and declared Resolution 1308 where they defined
HIV/AIDS as a “threat to international security.”372 In this Resolution, the issue was also
framed as having a “growing impact on social instability and emergency situations.”373
The involvement of the UNSC into the issue was especially crucial, as it was the first
time in the Council’s history that a health issue was considered as a security threat.
The involvement of the UNSC is an indication of an attempt to securitize the
issue. However, in order to understand whether the adoption of security language has
made any difference on the ground, it is important to look at how this new frame was
perceived by other actors within the campaign. For instance, in reacting to the Resolution,
the former Executive Director of UNAIDS stated that, “When we look at the history of
the fight against AIDS, there is no doubt that resolution 1308 (2000) is a milestone in the
response to the epidemic. By underscoring the fact that the spread of HIV/AIDS, if
unchecked, may pose a risk to stability and security, the Security Council… has
transformed how the world views AIDS.”374 This statement illustrates that the attempts to
securitize the issue resonated with the audience and thus it was successful.
As a result of a decade long efforts to address the issue of HIV/AIDS, the
campaign succeeded in influencing the states to publicly commit to addressing
HIV/AIDS. This success is exemplified in the listing of the issue as one of the six
Millennium Development Goals. The Millennium Development Declaration pledged by
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2015 to have “halted, and begun to reverse, the spread of HIV/AIDS, the scourge of
malaria and other major diseases that afflict humanity.”375
Becoming a part of the Millennium Development Goals was not an automatic or
an inevitable step on the path of the HIV/AIDS campaign; rather the ongoing buzz
around the MDG encouraged the actors to emphasize the development frame at the time.
HIV/AIDS was not among the previously negotiated targets but yet found its way into the
list through the emphasis put on the issue by the former-Secretary General Kofi Annan
who emphasized the development implications of HIV/AIDS in his We the Peoples
speech that he gave prior to the declaration of Millennium Development Goals.376
The forum at which HIV/AIDS was ensured political commitment illustrates that,
while playing a critical role in creating political commitment, the security frame has not
completely eclipsed the issue. Rather, the security frame functioned in combination with
a development frame. This combination is also exemplified in Annan’s We the Peoples
speech. Annan defined HIV/AIDS as both an impediment in front of development and a
potential source of global crisis. He stated that, “… I wish here to focus on a specific
health crisis that threatens to reverse a generation of accomplishment in human
development, and which is rapidly becoming a social crisis on a global scale: the spread
of HIV/AIDS.”377
After securing a place on MDGs, the next important step of the political
commitment stage was the Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS which was adopted
by the United Nations General Assembly in the Special Session held in June 2001. This
375
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Declaration also embodied a combination of security, human rights and development
frames and has been serving as the benchmark against which the accomplishments made
in realizing the HIV/AIDS related MDGs are measured. The Declaration defined
HIV/AIDS as “one of the most formidable challenges to human life and dignity, as well
as to the effective enjoyment of human rights.”378 The Declaration also argued that the
current state of HIV/AIDS presents a “state of emergency” especially in sub-Saharan
Africa and also “recognize[ed] that poverty, underdevelopment and illiteracy are among
the principle contributing factors to the spread of HIV/AIDS, and noting with grave
concern that HIV/AIDS is compounding poverty and is now reversing or impeding
development in many countries.”379
The security language that was initially adopted to get the support of the potential
allies later experienced a change in its function and centrality within the campaign. This
change was due to the involvement of new security actors in the debate, which changed
the intra-network dynamics by bringing in a number of security organizations as well as
security scholars into the conversation.380 Eventually, the link between HIV/AIDS and
security was normalized such an extent that the Director of Central Intelligence Agency
went as far to state that “[t]he national security dimension of the virus is plain… ‘‘[i]t can
undermine economic growth, exacerbate social tensions, diminish military preparedness,
create huge social welfare costs, and further weaken already beleaguered states.”381

378

Annan 2001.
Annan 2001.
380
For more discussion on the national and international security implications of HIV/AIDS see PriceSmith 1998; 2001; 2002; Harker 2001; Heinecken 2001; Yeager and Kingma 2001; Ostergard 2002; Singer
2002; Sarin 2003; Elbe 2003; 2006; Prins 2004.
381
Anderson 2003.
379

140

While the development frame is still being used, the security frame started to be
the main frame that shaped states’ policies in addressing the issue. For instance, Britain
considered, “implementing compulsory HIV screening for prospective immigrants amid
alleged worries that HIV-positive foreigners are traveling to the United Kingdom to seek
treatment.”382 Some argue that the emphasis on the security dimension of the issue makes
a positive contribution as framing HIV/AIDS as a security threat “strengthens the call for
serious action against the menace of AIDS.”383 Others, however, adopt a more critical
approach to the implications of securitization and suggest that, “[i]f well-intentioned
people seek to rally support among western governments for anti-AIDS efforts in Africa,
portraying disease as a security issue may be exactly the wrong strategy to employ.” 384
Thus, putting the normative implications of using a security frame aside, it can be
argued that security frame has gradually claimed a central role in the global agenda
setting and policy making surrounding the issue of HIV/AIDS, and has positively
contributed to the efforts to address the issue – especially at the political implementation
stage. However, the security frame has never been the only dominant frame in addressing
the issue, and the increasing importance attached to it was both a function of the strategic
environment as well as the dynamics within the network.
Maternal Mortality Campaign
Maternal mortality is a major health problem that affects the entire world yet it
has gone unnoticed for a long time even though it claims around 800 lives every day.385
Despite the problem’s long history, it was only in mid-1980s that the issue started to
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attract international attention, initially that of health practitioners and advocates, and later
of human rights and developments advocates; this attention led to a campaign that
resulted in its recognition as one of the Millennium Development Goals. Despite its
similarity with the HIV/AIDS campaign in terms of campaign success, as opposed to the
HIV/AIDS campaign, the Maternal Mortality campaign did not use a security frame. This
choice illustrates that using a security frame is a not necessary condition for success.
Initially the issue was framed as a health concern and it first attracted the
international health officials’ attention in 1985, as a result of an article published in
Lancet. The article was titled “Maternal mortality – a neglected tragedy. Where is the M
in MCH [Maternal and Child Health]?”386 The increased interest in the topic led to an
international meeting in Kenya in 1987 where the Global Safe Motherhood Initiative was
launched. The goal of the Initiative was to decrease the global maternal deaths by 50% by
2000 – a goal that they failed to realize.387 Despite the failure of the early initiatives in
solving the problem they succeeded in placing the issue on the global agenda. The InterAgency Group for Safe Motherhood was formed and led to a series of conferences,
sponsored by the UN, throughout 1990s.388
In the earlier stages of global agenda setting, the Maternal Mortality campaign has
combined human rights, development and health frames together with the purpose of
reaching out to a number of potential allies, and has also inserted the issue onto a number
of existing international institutions’ agendas. This approach can be traced to how the
main actors in the campaign chose to define and portray the issue. For instance,
Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE), one of the leading NGOs in
386
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the field, argues that “maternal mortality is nothing short of an epidemic” and
summarizes their perception of the issue as “CARE believes that access to quality sexual,
reproductive and maternal health is both a fundamental human right and a critical
development issue. Improving sexual, reproductive and maternal health is therefore
central to our commitment to gender equality and to reducing global poverty.”389
Maternal health is also argued to be a part of the “right to the highest attainable standard
of health” which is recognized as a human right by the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.390 Similar to the CARE’s approach, the White
Ribbon Alliance, which was established in 1999 as a coalition of NGOs and donors, also
combines health and human rights frames in their advocacy efforts.391 While their slogan
has a straightforward health frame: “Healthy Mothers, Health World”,392 they
nonetheless, define safe birth as a women’s right.393
The emphasis on the development consequences of the issue has proven to be
especially useful in taking advantage of the opportunities presented by the strategic
environment at the time; this emphasis also resulted in the placement of the issue on the
list of Millennium Development Goals. At the Millennium Summit in 2000, the states
committed to reducing maternal mortality by three quarters by the year 2015. While the
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target is likely to be missed, significant achievements have been made since the goals
were set.394
Once the campaign succeeded in getting states to commit to address the problem
of maternal mortality, existing networks were joined by new ones in working towards
compelling states to follow through with their commitments, and implement the policies
they agreed upon. Of the newly established cross-sectorial networks, Campaign on
Accelerated Reduction of Maternal, Newborn and Child Mortality in Africa (CARMMA)
has gained a central role in the process. Established by the African Union’s initiative,
CARMMA brought African states and non-state actors across the globe together 395 and
focused on creating coordination across African countries to reduce maternal deaths in
Africa.
This new effort to compel states to implement the policies they publicly
committed to uses a combination of human rights and development frames. The
campaign portrays women as an indispensable component of African development396 and
defines access to maternal care as a right.397 Despite the fact that maternal mortality has
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not been reduced to the targeted levels yet, CARMMA has reached notable success in
mainstreaming the prevention of maternal mortality into African states’ policies. 398
The sustained use of human rights and development frames by both existing
advocates within the campaign as well as by the newly developed mechanisms was not an
inevitable process. Specifically, the growing tendency to draw links between women’s
rights issues and the security implications of them, as discussed in the previous
chapter,399 could have also spread to the maternal mortality issue. Yet such a shift has not
been experienced, which further supports the arguments of this study. This also illustrates
that not only securitization is not a necessary condition for advocacy success, but that the
tendency to utilize it does not exist across campaigns on similar issues.
Campaigns on Environmentally Induced Problems
The comparison of Climate Change and Climate Refugees campaigns furthers our
understanding of the role of security frames, and the limits of the contribution they make
to the success of advocacy campaigns. Both campaigns analyzed in this subsection focus
on addressing climate change induced problems and they both eventually adopted a
securitized definition of climate change. Despite these similarities, the Climate Change
campaign reached to the policy implementation stage and achieved at least partial
success, while Climate Refugees campaign has fallen short of generating political
commitment so far. The comparison of these campaigns illustrates that adopting a
security frame is not a sufficient condition for success. Moreover, this finding also
challenges the uniqueness attributed to the security frames in the literature.
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As is the case for any frame, while strategic framing of an issue is an important
component of success, it needs to coincide with a fertile strategic environment to translate
into goal achievement. The issue of climate change was successfully put on the global
agenda prior to the securitization of the issue. Even though the securitization of climate
change could be regarded as useful in keeping states focused on the issue, there is no
clear evidence that the adoption of such language resulted in better policy
implementation; moreover, the utilization of this language is not likely to produce such
results, since the issue, in its current form, lacks the necessary conditions for framing to
translate into success.
Despite the securitization of the climate refugees issue that mimicked the
securitization process that the climate change has undergone, the campaign on climate
refugees fell short of getting states to publicly commit to addressing the problem. The
findings highlighted that the obstacles that exist within the broader political context
prevented strategic framing from translating into success. However, a change in framing,
although it was toward securitization, did not bring success either, since the issue
attributes did not provide a fertile ground for such efforts.
Climate Change Campaign
The issue of climate change has been primarily approached as an environmental
issue throughout both the agenda setting and political commitment stages. “Melting
glaciers, stranded polar bears and disappearing islands” served as cornerstones of the
environmental frame that NGOs and epistemic communities used in “translat[ing]
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complex climate change phenomena into event-based, visualisable narratives.”400 The
problems faced in translating publicly made commitments to policy implementation
invoked a security frame at later stages. However, such a shift has not made any
significant contribution due to the problems associated with the nature of the issue at
hand.
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was established by the
UNEP and World Meteorological Organization and endorsed by the UNGA in 1988. At
the Rio Earth Summit in 1992, the governments agreed on the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change; the framework defined the main purpose of climate
change policy as an environmental one and stated the key objective as “stabilization of
greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous
anthropogenic interference with the climate system.”401
Upon the realization that the measures set by the Framework Convention were not
enough in tackling climate change, the Kyoto Protocol was adopted in 1997 and brought
forward legally binding targets for the developed countries to reduce their carbon gas
emission levels.402 The Protocol defined the problem of climate change primarily as an
environmental one with wide range of consequences. “Climate change is a complex
problem, which, although environmental in nature, has consequences for all spheres of
existence on our planet. It either impacts on-- or is impacted by-- global issues, including
poverty, economic development, population growth, sustainable development and
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resource management.”403 To date, 192 parties have signed the Kyoto protocol marking a
significant level of political commitment success. Thus, it can be argued that climate
change reached both agenda setting and political commitment success, and has done so
without resorting to a security language.
Over time, security language started to find more and more room in the framing of
the issue.404 This change was a function of the difficulty that the campaign faced in
translating political commitment success to successful policy implementation. The main
impediment in front of this transition was the problems faced in answering the question
of who should be responsible for shouldering the burden of taking far-reaching action.405
The Kyoto Protocol has pointed to the developed countries in answering this question, yet
other states – especially the USA – wanted the burden to be shared more equally. Their
dissatisfaction has led to their withdrawal from the Protocol.
Within this context security language was adopted not only to attract more
attention to the issue; it also targeted to change the perceptions about the responsibilities
that each actor should shoulder. This in return would have the potential to bring back the
actors who were hesitant due to the unequal burden believed to fall on their shoulders
within the existing framework. The security language was introduced by a number of
different actors.406 For instance:
In 2004 … British government’s chief scientist, Sir David King, suggested that
‘climate change is a far greater threat to the world’s stability than international
terrorism’… A group of eleven high-ranking, retired American admirals and
generals released a report in April 2007 arguing that climate change will act as a
403
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‘threat multiplier’ that makes existing concerns, such as water scarcity and food
insecurity, more complex and intractable and presents a tangible threat to
American national security interests.407
In the USA, CNA, a defense think tank, stated in their report titled National Security and
the Threat of Climate Change” that “global warming could help trigger widespread
political instability in poor regions and large refugee movements to the United States and
Europe.”408
The security frame became a part of the official discourse in 2007 when UNSC
held a debate on “climate, energy and security.”409 This language then, after intense
debate, found a reflection in the UNGA Resolution 63/281 which invited all the UN
organs “to intensify their efforts in considering and addressing climate change, including
its possible security implications.”410
Despite the increasing attempts to draw links between climate change and security
threats, the lack of a short causal link between the issue and its negative consequences,
combined with lack of data, prevented such an emphasis to make a clear contribution to
the development of successful policies. For instance, the United Nations Environment
Programme suggested that the conflict in Darfur is partially a result of climate change
induced environmental degradation.411 However, these connections were made without
any clear scientific evidence to support them: “…securitization of climate change is
supported for the most part by anecdotal research into developing regions where conflict
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has been triggered by chronic scarcity caused by environmental change, overconsumption of resources or the combination of both.”412 Even though this newly
developed explanation has become an accepted one, it did not result in changes in the
policies developed either in dealing with civil wars or tackling climate change.
As a result of dissatisfaction with Kyoto Protocol, in December 2012 the “Doha
Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol” was adopted. The Amendment introduced a new set
of commitments for the developed countries in reducing their greenhouse gas
emissions.413 However, it is still unclear how much success the new set of commitments
will bring in addressing the problem. Therefore, despite the gradual securitization of the
issue and the seemingly positive contribution that this move has made in attracting more
attention to the issue, there is no measurable contribution of such language to the
international community’s ability to address this issue.
Climate Refugees Campaign
The issue of climate refugees, first advanced as a human rights issue, has also
gone through a phase of securitization, albeit with very different implications. Despite the
fact that the securitization of the climate refugees was built on the securitization of
climate change – a newly developed but yet widely accepted frame – the adoption of such
language has not contributed to the attempts to prioritize the climate refugees issue on the
global agenda.
In the initial stages of global agenda setting, the issue of climate refugees was
framed as a human rights concern. The concept of “environmental refugees” was first
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introduced by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) in 1985 and defined
as “those people who have been forced to leave their traditional habitat, temporarily or
permanently, because of a marked environmental disruption (natural and/or triggered by
people) that jeopardized their existence and/or seriously affected the quality of their
life.”414 It was as early as 1980s that the United Nations Environmental Programme
estimated that 50 million people are at the risk of becoming environmental refugees.415
While the estimates vary, some researchers argue that “environmental refugees will soon
become the largest group of involuntary migrants.”416 Thus, during this early stage of the
agenda setting, the issue was framed as a human rights issue and the emphasis remained
on the toll that climate change would take on those who would have to migrate.
The framing choices of the advocates were informed by their desire to graft their
concern onto the existing norms on the protection of refugees, yet it took more than a
decade after the first published reports for the global agenda setting to reach success due
to the obstacles that the broader political context presented. The meeting organized by the
government of the Maldives in 2006 brought “the representatives of governments,
environmental and humanitarian organizations, and United Nations agencies” together
and played a critical role in bringing the issue of protection of climate refugees into the
center of the climate change debate.417 The Conference suggested the 1951 Geneva
Convention on the status of refugees to be amended to include climate refugees.418 Yet
the proposal faced resistance from industrialized countries due to the political and
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economic burden it would create on the countries at the receiving end of potential
migratory flows.419
The failure of the campaign was partially a consequence of the obstacles that exist
within the broader political context. While there is a relatively well-developed
international regime that focuses on the protection of refugees, the regime and institutions
are facing significant challenges in responding to the needs of increasing number of
refugees, even when climate refugees are kept out of the calculation. The United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees, which is at the center of international refugee regime,
deals with around 10 million refugees based on its mandate of providing protection for
those who face prosecution due to race, religion, political opinion or ethnicity.420
Therefore, the additional burden that the inclusion of a new category of refugees would
bring was an unwelcomed one for the key organizations.
In order to remedy this problem, as the campaign evolved, the issue of
environmental refugees got reframed and more emphasis started to be put on the security
threats that these migratory movements are believed to create (especially for the receiving
countries). The security frame got so prevalent that even International Organization for
Migration integrated the security frame into its rhetoric: “Migration, climate change and
the environment are interrelated. Just as environmental degradation and disasters can
cause migration, movement of people can also entail significant effects on surrounding
ecosystems. This complex nexus needs to be addressed in a holistic manner, taking into
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account other possible mediating factors including, inter alia, human security, human and
economic development, livelihood strategies and conflict.”421
The introduction of the security frame into the climate refugees debate has not
gone uncontested. The policy implications of adopting such a frame for the well-being of
the climate refugees have been at the center of these concerns. As Hartmann points out,
“climate refugees narrative can, through mobilising racist fears of a dangerous poor,
protect the interests of national security in the west, increasing rather than addressing
fundamental issues of social inequality.”422
Despite the securitization of the climate refugees issue and attempts to initiate
policy development by appealing to states’ security concerns, such efforts have not been
successful so far due to the difficulties in illustrating a short causal link between climate
change and the refugee flows it can create. Since certain types of environmental
problems such as volcanic explosions have been happening throughout the history, their
existence and the population movements they pave the way to cannot be attributed to
climate change. However, other forms of environmental problems such as droughts,
floods, and rising sea levels (or at least the frequency at which they happen) are
connected to climate change. Nevertheless, given the nature of these issues it is difficult
to provide aggregate and case-specific evidence to clearly pinpoint this link, which is
critical in convincing policy makers to take actions accordingly. Thus, while
securitization might have helped the efforts to prioritize the environmental consequences
of climate change on the global agenda, it did not perform a similar function in
prioritizing its impact on population movements.
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Humanitarian Campaigns
There have been a number of campaigns that have focused on tackling the
damages that war and conflict inflict on people, especially on vulnerable populations.
Despite the mounting efforts, as is the case for all transnational advocacy campaigns,
some of these campaigns succeeded in garnering attention while the others failed.423 In
order to understand the factors that led to success and the role of security frames in this
process, this subsection compares two relatively successful cases of advocacy campaigns
in this issue area: Child Soldiers and Sexual Violence in Conflict.
What guided the decision to compare these campaigns is the fact that, despite the
similarity in their primary concerns, these campaigns vary in their use of frames. On the
one hand, Child Soldiers campaign primarily used humanitarian and human rights frames
throughout all three stages of global agenda setting and policy making and only very
recently experienced attempts from the outside of the campaign to invoke a security
language. On the other hand, the Sexual Violence in Conflict campaign was quick to
adopt security language at the political commitment stage and attributed a more central
role to it.
Another factor that makes the framing choices of these campaigns interesting is
that even though the child soldiers issue is more amenable to a security frame due to the
potential military threat it presents, its campaign activists did not resort to a security
frame. The Sexual Violence in Conflict campaign, however, resorted to a security frame
even though the damage it inflicts on the bodily integrity of individuals is more apparent
(hence the campaign was more amenable to a humanitarian frame). The campaign
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ultimately resorted to a security frame. This distinction further illustrates the strategic
nature of securitization and that adopting it is not an inevitable choice.
The comparison of these two cases also provides insights into the reasons behind
advocates’ framing decisions, as well as the factors that affect campaigns’ success. Both
cases illustrate that advocates’ past experiences and areas of expertise as well as strategic
environment at the time of the campaign shape advocates’ framing choices; moreover,
they show that multivocalization is utilized strategically to widen the reach of the
campaign. Additionally, the analysis illustrates that the degree of compliance with the
norms on which the advocates are trying to graft the new issue affects the campaign’s
ability to reach success.
Child Soldiers Campaign
The issue of child soldiers first started to gain international attention in the 1980s
as a result of the momentum clustered around the issue of child’s rights. The minimum
age for recruiting soldiers was set as 15 by the Additional Protocols I and II to the
Geneva Conventions of 1949, and this norm has gone unchallenged for a while.424
However, the Convention on the Rights of the Child signed in 1989 defined a child as
“every human being below the age of 18 years unless, the law applicable to the child,
majority is attained earlier.” This disparity triggered reaction among activists and led to a
call for an Optional Protocol to be signed to increase the minimum recruitment age to 18.
The issue of child soldiers started to garner global attention in mid-1990s as a
human rights and humanitarian issue by seizing the opportunities within the political
context. The year 1994 was declared as the International Year of the Family, and this
provided a space for child’s rights to be prioritized on the global agenda. On that same
424
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year, Cohn and Goodwin-Gill published a ground-breaking report which allowed the
child soldiers issue to find a place within this broader framework. In their report, Cohn
and Goodwin-Gill explained the role of child soldiers in international law and illustrated
the ways in which the humanitarian law has fallen short of protecting these children.425
The next important step was the report prepared by Graça Machel to be presented
to the UNGA in 1996. In this report, the issue of child soldiers was approached from
human rights and humanitarian perspectives. The report listed child soldiering among the
negative impacts of armed conflict on children and therefore categorized it as something
to be prevented in order to promote and protect the rights of children.426 The report was
welcomed by the General Assembly and led to a resolution on the issue which marked
the success of the global agenda setting stage of the campaign.427 Following the report,
the UN Secretary General appointed a new Special Representative for Children and
Armed Conflict.428
The sporadic efforts that preceded the UNGA Resolution were concentrated
afterwards with the realization that while the political atmosphere was conducive for
garnering international attention to the issue, it will be a more difficult task to get states
to take action to address it. With this understanding, the Coalition to Stop the Use of
Child Soldiers (CSUCS) was launched in 1998.429 The Coalition followed suit and
adopted human rights and humanitarian frames from the very beginning. Stuart Maslen,
the coordinator of the Coalition at the time, reached out to the international community in
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an article published in 1998 by framing the issue from human rights and humanitarian
perspectives and stated that:
It is perhaps unsurprising that, when on active service, children fighting in armed
forces or armed groups face similar risks to their adult counterparts: death, injury
or dismemberment as a result of enemy military action; execution or
imprisonment for desertion or upon capture (notwithstanding the demands of
international humanitarian law), disease or malnutrition brought on by the rigours
of military life. But the direct consequences for children used as soldiers reach
deeper into the trough of atrocious misery to encompass an almost systemic
physical, sexual and mental abuse by other, older recruits amidst a frequent
disintegration of social and cultural norms.430
While the campaign chose to graft the issue onto the existing human rights and
humanitarian norms, it is important to note that such a choice was neither automatic nor
inevitable. Another alternative could have been to frame the issue as a child labor
problem and graft it onto the norms developed by the International Labor Organization431
which prohibit the use of children in dangerous occupations,432 yet advocates settled on a
human rights and humanitarian frame.433
A number of factors affected the framing choices of the advocacy campaign. The
first factor was related to the advocates’ prior experiences. As Snyder contends, “[b]y
early 1998, humanitarian and advocacy NGOs who played an active role in the Ottawa
Process on landmines were now looking for other issues which had stagnated within the
UN system and which might lend themselves to a similar formula. Child soldiers and the
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Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict seemed like an
obvious choice.”434 Thus, the previous success of the Landmines campaign encouraged
the advocates to adopt a similar framing strategy.
The framing choices of the campaign were also related to the strategic
environment as well as the existing norms onto which the issue can be layered. Both the
existing humanitarian norms as well as the unfinished discussion on child’s rights
provided the advocates an opportunity to “graft” the issue onto the humanitarian and
human rights frames. As Snyder puts it “especially following the study on the impact of
armed conflict on children by Ms Graça Machel in 1996, UN agencies such as UNHCR
and UNICEF have sought to develop institutional memory and consistency in their
programming.”435 These developments provided fertile ground for varying institutions to
be receptive of the pressure exerted by the advocates. These efforts, in return, resulted in
signing of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on
Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict in January 2000.
Even though security language has not been championed by any of the major
actors within the campaign (except for some attempts that came from outside of the
campaign at the policy implementation stage), there was an early involvement of the
UNSC through Resolution 1261.436 While adoption of the issue by a security organization
is an indicator of securitization, a closer analysis reveals different insights. When the
content of the Resolution is analyzed, it becomes clear that rather than describing child
soldiers as a threat to international security, the Resolution, noting the humanitarian
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law,437 “condemn[ed] the targeting of children in situations of armed conflict.”438 In this
instance, the Security Council’s involvement contributed to human rights and
humanitarian frames rather than introducing a security frame.
Despite the military and therefore security implications of child soldiering, the
only clear attempt to frame the issue as a security threat came at the policy
implementation stage. The attempt came from outside the campaign and did not resonate
with the campaign to that point. The use of child soldiers by non-state actors was one of
the main concerns both at the agenda setting and political commitment stages, yet such
emphasis was not formulated as a security threat until the policy implementation stage.
These outside attempts to securitize the child soldiers issue can be explained with the
political context of the post-9/11 world. Singer summarizes the situation from a “war on
terror” perspective and suggests that “[child soldiers] fight in places like Afghanistan,
Colombia, Congo, Iraq, Liberia, Myanmar, Sierra Leone, and Sudan and, with the new
‘war on terrorism,’ increasingly face off against the United States and other Western
armies. Indeed, at least five underage boys suspected of being Al Qaeda terrorists or
Taliban fighters have been imprisoned at the U.S. military prison on Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba.”439
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Despite these attempts to approach the issue from a security perspective, the
security language has not found its way into the campaign yet. This is evidenced by the
lack of security language in the current approach of the advocates. For instance, Child
Soldiers International describes the current state of the policy implementation stage by
stating that “Today close to two thirds of states recognise that banning under-18s from
military ranks is necessary to protect them from the risk of involvement in armed conflict
and to ensure their well-being, and that their other rights as children are respected.”440
Thus, the analysis of the Child Soldiers campaign illustrates that the campaign
reached success at agenda setting and political commitment stages by using human rights
and humanitarian frames. Both the political opportunity structure as well as the
advocates’ previous experiences shaped their framing choices. There were attempts to
reframe the issue within the “war on terror” framework, yet these efforts have neither
resonated with the main actors in the issue nor triggered any observable positive increase
in states’ compliance.
Sexual Violence in Conflict Campaign
While the use of sexual violence as a military instrument has been documented for
a long time,441 the issue has started to garner international attention only after the
atrocities experienced in Rwanda, Yugoslavia and Democratic Republic of Congo.442
These atrocities led to the recognition of sexual violence in conflict as a “crime against
humanity and war crime in international law” yet in the words of Jody Williams, who
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assumed a leading role in the creation of the campaign, “laws are lovely on paper. They
are irrelevant if they are not implemented and complied with.”443
In order to create change on the ground, and not just on paper, a group of
advocates got together and initiated a campaign with the support of like-minded states.
The goal of the campaign is to convert the perception about sexual violence in conflict as
an unfortunate military tactic to be punished as a crime once the conflict is over, but
rather to develop a norm that would eliminate the use of sexual violence as a military
instrument, all together.
Similar to the Child Soldiers campaign, the framing choices of the advocates at
the global agenda setting stage was partly a function of the previous experiences of the
actors involved in the network, and partly a function of advocates’ desire to appeal to as
many potential allies possible and to graft the issue onto the existing norms about sexual
violence outside conflict zones. The transnational advocacy movement that started the
campaign got together in 2011 at the Nobel Women’s Initiative. At this meeting, “130
women activists, security experts, academics, journalists, and corporate leaders from 30
countries gathered with Nobel Peace Laureates Jody Williams, Shirin Ebadi, and Mairead
Maguire.”444 These women brought in their own expertise and framed the issue primarily
from human rights and humanitarian perspectives. As it is explained in the Campaign’s
call for action, advocates framed wartime rape as a threat to “individuals and families,
entire communities and the fabric of society.”445
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The efforts proved to be successful and led to the Global Summit to End Sexual
Violence in Conflict in June 2014, which marked the transition from the agenda setting
stage to the political commitment stage. The language used at the Summit combined a
number of frames and defined the issue as a “public health and human rights concern, as
well as a matter of peace and security.”446 In the summary report it was stated that:
Sexual violence in conflict is a uniquely destructive act and method of war. It is
an outrage to all morality. Survivors who have gone through the trauma of an
attack too often also face rejection by their families and reprisals from their
communities. Moreover, sexual violence in conflict often flows from underlying
inequalities. Further, a society that believes in human rights for all human beings
and opportunities for all its citizens cannot know about the way rape is used as a
weapon of war and then simply ignore it. But it is not only our values that are at
stake. Sexual violence in conflict poses a grave threat to international peace and
security. It exacerbates tension and violence and undermines stability…447
Thus, at this stage, in addition to human rights and humanitarian frames, a security frame
was also utilized.
The purpose of introducing a security language to the issue was not to militarize
the topic by taking it outside the realm of politics, but rather to incorporate the issue onto
the peace-making and peace-building efforts. That the security language adopted at the
political commitment stage, on the one hand, defines sexual violence in conflict as a
threat to security; and on the other hand, lists the prevention of such acts as a
precondition for achieving lasting peace. “States have responsibility for breaches of
international law committed by their armed forces. Although it is and has been a feature
of most conflicts, it has only recently been discussed openly in international conflictprevention discourse. Yet it can undermine ceasefires, and prevent lasting reconciliation
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long after the last bullets have been fired. It affects not only women and girls, but also
men and boys…By undermining reconciliation, deepening grievances and devastating
communities, sexual violence feeds a cycle of conflict.”448
Despite these efforts and the introduction of a security frame, no significant
change has been observed on the ground so far449 due to the obstacles within the broader
political context as well as the attributes of the issue at hand. When evaluated from this
perspective, the issue of sexual violence in conflict constitutes an interesting example
because the scope and the severity of the issue have so far worked as an impediment to
advocates’ efforts to attract global attention to the issue rather than promoting it. That is
to say, because of “its prominence throughout history, sexual violence in warfare is often
dismissed as an ‘inevitable’ and unfortunate feature of conflict.”450 Thus, in this case, the
existing norms on both “code of conduct in warfare” and “sexual violence” have worked
against the campaign as the problems faced in compliance with these norms led to a
“fatigue,” and made sympathetic allies and target actors question the campaign’s
potential to create change.
As suggested by the literature and discussed in the previous chapter, the second
reason that limited the success of the efforts to bring the issue onto the forefront of the
global agenda is argued to be the lack of data that can be used in illustrating the scope
and the severity of the situation. While some estimates exist451 they vary significantly and
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the “scarcity of data from population-based surveys has fuelled certain misconceptions,
and limited policy and programmatic investments in conflict-related sexual violence.”452
Thus, Sexual Violence in Conflict is an example of a campaign that has not
reached success in creating political commitment and policy implementation despite
being framed as a security threat. The lack of compliance with the norms onto which the
issue was grafted played an important role in limiting the success. Combined with the
above-explained impediments, the analysis further showed that, in the absence of other
enabling factors, adopting a security frame is not a sufficient condition for success. This
illustrates the strategic nature of securitization and that no issue falls naturally into a
security frame, which further supports the study’s argument that securitization functions
like any other instance of framing.
Arms Control Campaigns
Above presented analyses looked into the campaigns on non-traditional security
issues to reveal whether transnational advocacy networks resorted to security frames and
how well such choices resonated with the level of success that campaigns reached.
However, in order to provide a fuller analysis, it is important to look into networks’
framing choices when advocating for issues that are traditionally categorized as security
concerns. Such an analysis is crucial in illustrating that mechanisms identified above are
also valid for the framing processes surrounding traditional security issues.
Campaigns that targeted the banning of landmines and limiting the use of small
arms are similar in terms of the nature of the issues at hand, as well as in terms of their
goals. Both of the campaigns are examples of transnational advocacy networks’ efforts to
find their ways into areas that are considered to be a part of security domain – which are
452
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traditionally outside of the TANs’ reach. Landmines have been mostly considered just
another type of conventional weapon with “no particular ill repute”453 and thus, in
content, very similar to small arms. Yet, despite these similarities the Landmines
campaign reached significant level of success while the Small Arms campaign has so far
reached a very limited one.
Comparing these cases presents additional insights into understanding the role and
importance of framing, as it illustrates how successful de-securitization might be crucial
for achieving success while remaining within a security frame could lead to failure. The
ICBL has effectively de-securitized the issue, i.e. moved the issue away from a national
security frame into a humanitarian one. IANSA has made a similar attempt at the agenda
setting stage but got pulled back into the security frame at the policy commitment stage.
As a result, the successfully de-securitized ICBL has become one of the most successful
examples of global agenda setting and policy making while the re-securitized IANSA has
failed to create any notable change on the ground.
The comparative analysis below illustrates four insights into advocates’ decisions
to use security frames. First, it demonstrates that, as it is the case for other issue areas, the
fact that an issue is traditionally considered within a security frame does not necessarily
dictates the framing choices of a transnational advocacy campaign. Second, desecuritizing traditional security issues could contribute to the success of a campaign by
providing a space wherein advocates can be credibly heard. Third, the comparison also
illustrates that framing choices can be tailored not only to attract the attention of targets
of influence but also to extend the reach of the network by appealing to potential allies.
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Lastly, the relative success of the ICBL reveals that in order for a campaign to
succeed, strategic framing needs to coexist with other enabling factors such as network
dynamics. For that reason, lack of fertile network dynamics as well as the existence of
counter norms and counter-campaigns prevented the Small Arms campaign from
reaching a similar level of success.
International Campaign to Ban Landmines
The ICBL was established in 1992 by the Vietnam Veterans of America
Foundation and Medico International; later joined by four other human rights
organizations, they formed the Campaign’s Steering Committee.454 The campaign
primarily used a humanitarian frame throughout all stages of global agenda setting and
policy making and argued that, “antipersonnel mines are indiscriminate and inhumane
weapons and therefore violate the basic elements of international humanitarian law”455
and hurt civilians.
The advocacy efforts of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines turned out
to be one of the most successful examples of global agenda setting and led to the signing
of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of
Anti-Personnel Mines and their Destruction in 1997 by 122 countries. The agreement is
considered to be “a stunning example of a new form of diplomacy” where NGOs, in
cooperation with states, have created a new norm.456
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Despite the fact that the campaign was primarily dealing with an arms control
issue, it did not use a security frame in its efforts to attract transnational attention and
initiate global policies addressing the issue. To the contrary, the campaign deliberately
stayed away from using a security frame (effectively by de-securitizing it) as it might
have weakened the campaign rather than strengthening it. As the following statement
illustrates this was a deliberate choice on the part of the campaign:
The ICBL … maintained its focus on civilian harms to distinguish APMs from
other weapon systems or war itself. Opposition to landmines was not to be
equated with opposition to warfare in general. The ICBL continually emphasized
the indiscriminate nature of APMs, while acknowledging that most other weapons
had clear military benefits. By tapping into universal norms about the need to
protect civilians and especially children, the ICBL emphasized how the harms of
landmines ought to overwhelm any consideration of their military utility.457
The strong and unified emphasis placed on the humanitarian frame can be
considered as one of the most important factors in the success that ICBL has reached at
the agenda setting stage; however, this was possible due to the network dynamics.458
Rather than acting as a coalition of NGOs with varying voices and framing priorities, the
Campaign acted with a “single, homogenous voice with a unitary position.”459 The
coordinator of the campaign at the time, Jody Williams was in charge of voicing the
position of the Campaign and she insisted on framing the issue as a humanitarian one by
emphasizing that landmines are “a humanitarian, not an arms control issue.”460
The humanitarian frame contributed to the Campaign’s efforts to get the states to
publicly commit to banning landmines in primarily three ways. First, the humanitarian
frame helped the campaign by illustrating the severity of the issue and marking the states
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as the source of the problem. As Keck and Sikkink put forward, a campaign is more
likely to succeed if it is able to identify a perpetrator and a short causal link between the
actions of that perpetrator and the damage it creates for “vulnerable or innocent
individuals.”461 This approach has been evident since the very first report published by
Asia Watch and Physicians for Human Rights in 1991 – which preceded the ICBL –
“[landmines] are blind weapons that cannot distinguish between the footfall of a soldier
or that of an old woman gathering firewood. They recognize no cease-fire, and long after
the fighting has stopped, they can maim or kill the children and grandchildren of the
soldiers who laid them.”462 With this type of a humanitarian frame, the campaign focused
on emphasizing the damage that landmines inflict on innocent civilians.
Images and data were used effectively to widen influence of the frame
championed by the campaign, and helped the campaign to reach out to a number of
potential allies. The primary statistics used by the advocates was that “landmines kill or
maim more than twenty-six thousand people per year of whom an estimated 80 percent
are civilian.”463 Data was used to illustrate that the problem is here to stay unless
appropriate steps were to be taken as there “may be 200 million landmines scattered in at
least sixty-four countries”464 and the severity of the situation can be “stabilized” only if
the world’s mine-clearing capacity has been increased by five-fold.465 Despite the later
criticisms about the validity of these statistics,466 the statistics were picked up and
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resulted in the endorsement of the humanitarian frame by major media outlets.467 As a
result, the Campaign was able not only to convince the international community to the
“indiscriminate cost of landmines” but also to pinpoint states as the perpetrators to be
held responsible for the damage caused.468
The use of the humanitarian frame also allowed the advocacy network to get
support from less-likely allies: states. In other words, by de-securitizing the issue, the
campaign prevented states from ignoring the issue by hiding behind their security
priorities. As Hubert argues, “once the issue was cast in humanitarian terms, it became
difficult for states to resist the logic of a ban.”469 This shift in states’ approach cannot be
attributed to the diminishing utility of landmines as exemplified by the stance that
relatively volatile states took on the issue.470 This shift rather could be explained by the
change in the cost-benefit calculations of the states as a result of the successful desecuritization of the issue by the campaign. As Price notes, “many states have decided not
that mines are not at all useful, but that their military utility is outweighed by their
humanitarian costs, thus introducing a moral calculus into the definition of national
interest.”471
Framing the issue as a humanitarian problem also enabled the advocates to draw
cognitive connections between their goal and the existing norms. As Finnemore and
Sikkink suggest, an attempt to create a new norm is evaluated by the actors based on how
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well they correspond to the existing norms.472 Thus, the issues that can be “grafted” onto
the existing norms have a better chance at succeeding in getting attention and creating
change.473 On the one hand, the campaign grafted the issue onto the existing norms
against the use of chemical and biological weapons. They framed the landmines as
“weapons of mass destruction in slow motion” which means that “they should be
perceived as being just indiscriminate and inhumane as chemical weapons.”474 On the
other hand, the issue was grafted onto the existing humanitarian law which forbids the
use of a particular type of an attack if it “may cause more harm to noncombatants than
necessary to fulfill the military objective.”475As a result of these efforts, the issue has
become a part of discussion on protecting civilians rather than being considered as just
another tool at militaries’ disposal.
Today, the campaign is in its policy implementation stage and so far has reached a
considerable level of success as a result of the signing and ratification of the treaty by 161
countries. However, implementation is not perfect and ICBL believes that there is still
room for improvement. Toward this end, the Coalition launched a campaign called
“Finish the Job” where they aim to universalize the norm compliance. At this stage, the
campaign still frames the issue as a threat to civilian protection and hence shows
consistency in their framing choices. The consistent emphasis on the protection of
civilians can be observed in their call for action: “Getting more states to join the Mine
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Ban Treaty is a key way to strengthen the norm of a total ban on antipersonnel mines and
contribute to saving more lives from the scourge of mines.” 476
Thus, the above presented analysis illustrates that an arms control issue can be desecuritized, and such a framing choice might contribute to the success of a campaign.
This stands in opposition to what one would have seen if the securitization literature were
to be correct about the prominence of security frames.
Small Arms Campaign
The Small Arms campaign started with the efforts of scholars and arms control
policy advocates in the first half of 1990s.477 The early publications not only raised
awareness about the issue but also brought various non-governmental actors that have
been working on the issue, in one way or another, together.478 In late 1997, twenty-three
such NGOs got together in Washington and founded the Preparatory Committee for a
Global Campaign on Small Arms and Light Weapons. After series of meetings the
International Action Network on Small Arms was officially formed in 1999 by the
involvement of more than 100 NGOs.479
Human rights and humanitarian frames were adopted early on by the Campaign.
The founding document of IANSA stated the Network’s objective as, “contribut[ing] to a
more just and violence-free world, sustainable peace, development, human security and
respect for human rights” through fighting with the “proliferation and misuse of small
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arms and light weapons.”480 As exemplified by the approach stated in the founding
documents, the Network framed the problem of small arms as a threat to the “human right
to live in a secure environment characterized by peace, dignity and humanity”481 and
thus, tried to de-securitize the issue.
The humanitarian and human rights language that the campaign adopted at the
agenda setting stage also became embedded in the symbolic politics that the campaign
has resorted to in triggering international attention. For instance, “network members often
raise[d] the fact that more than 40 Red Cross personnel were killed in the 1990s in
Chechnya and Rwanda alone. This is astonishing when you compare that number with
the 15 Red Cross volunteers who died in the line of duty between 1945 and 1990.”482
The efforts of the campaign also coincided with number of resolutions by the UN,
and which eventually led to the creation of the United Nations Panel of Experts on Small
Arms. As a result, the Campaign has succeeded in getting the issue on the UN’s agenda
and led to the UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in
All Its Aspects which was followed by a non-binding Programme of Action. The Arms
Trade Treaty has recently gone into effect, yet the level of success this treaty brings is
rather limited as only sixty-four out of hundred and thirty signatories have ratified the
treaty so far.
As the campaign moved from the agenda setting to political commitment stage, a
shift in the framing of the issue was also experienced. While the security frame was not
utilized at the agenda setting stage, it rose in prominence at the political commitment
stage. This shift in the framing of the issue is exemplified in the United Nations Office
480
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for Disarmament Affairs’ approach to the issue: “Illicit small arms have a negative
impact on security, contribute to the displacement of civilians, facilitate the violation of
human rights and hamper social and economic development.”483 However, despite what
the securitization literature would have expected to observe, such change did not bring
significant political commitment success.
It is important to note that the limited success of the campaign at the political
commitment stage cannot be attributed solely to the attempts to securitize the issue. A
number of structural and non-structural factors played a role in the relative failure of the
campaign. First, whereas the density and the diversity of the campaign network
contributed to the success of the Landmines campaign, decentralized structure of the
Small Arms campaign limited its strength.484 Second, the existence of pro-gun groups
was crucial. These counter-campaigning efforts not only were able to graft their
arguments on the norms on “right to bear arm” but also had better access to key
conference delegations during the negotiations.485
Comparative Analysis
The analysis I present in this chapter provides insights into both the role and
impact of security frames in particular and advocates’ framing choices and the factors
shaping these decisions, in general. The first set of insights support the arguments
developed in the previous chapter: The successful examples of non-securitized cases
(Maternal Mortality, Landmines and Child Soldiers) illustrated that using security frames
is not a necessary condition for success of a campaign while the failed examples of
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securitized cases (Climate Refugees and Sexual Violence in Conflict) illustrated that
using security frames is not a sufficient condition for success, either.
As the discussion on de-securitization of the Landmines campaign illustrated,
contrary to the arguments in the securitization literature, reframing a traditional security
concern as a humanitarian problem can help advocates’ efforts to prioritize the issue on
states’ political agendas. This is because de-securitizing the issue opens up a space for
advocates to have their voices heard, which would not have been possible if the issue
were to remain as a security concern.
The failed examples of securitized cases (Climate Refugees and Sexual Violence
in Conflict) challenged the uniqueness attributed to the security frames by the literature
and showed that security frames function like other discursive frames. Therefore, the
adoption of security frames is a result of a strategic calculation on the part of the
advocates rather than an inevitable process. Thus, like any other frame, security frames
contribute to the success of a campaign given that other relevant conditions described by
global agenda setting and framing literatures (such as suitable political atmosphere,
availability of data, short causal link, physical damage inflicted on innocent victims)
exist. As we see in the example of the Climate Refugees campaign, when other
conditions are missing, security frame cannot trigger success on its own.
In addition to supporting the arguments made in the previous chapter about the
limits of the role and the importance of security frames, this chapter presented three
lessons concerning framing processes in general. The findings provided insights into (i)
the conditions that are needed for strategic framing to translate into campaign success;
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(ii) motivations behind advocates’ framing choices, and (iii) conditions shaping such
choices.
Conditions for Success
While not disregarding the role and importance of framing in the success of
transnational advocacy campaigns, the comparative analysis illustrated that in order for
strategic framing of an issue to lead to success, it needs to coexist with a number of
factors. The findings showed that despite the uniqueness attributed to security frames, the
same is true for securitized campaigns as illustrated by the less successful examples of
securitized campaigns (Climate Refugees and Sexual Violence in Conflict).
The findings of the study lend support to the arguments in the literature that
emphasize the role of the strategic environment in explaining the success of an advocacy
campaign. As the literature points out, target actors’ as well as potential allies’
receptiveness of a campaign’s calls are “context dependent.”486 While advocates
strategically frame issues to capitalize on both structural and non-structural opportunities
at hand, lack of such conditions limit the possible positive outcomes of such efforts.
One of the frequently cited determinants of success is how well the proposed
norm resonates with the existing ones.487 In certain cases, strategic framing of issues help
campaigns successfully draws a link between their claims and the existing norms. This
can be observed in the case of the Landmines campaign, and the successful link they
drew between their call to ban landmines and existing norms on weapons of mass
destruction and protection of civilians in warfare. However, strategic framing does not
always accomplish this goal. This could be due to the existence of counter norms (as in
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the case of “right to bear arms” norm that the Small Arms campaign had to work against)
or due to the lack of adherence to the existing norms (as in the case of constant violation
of protection of civilians norms that worked against the efforts of the Sexual Violence in
Conflict campaign).
In this sense, the strategic environment within which the advocacy efforts take
place plays an important role. While the political context is beyond the control of the
campaign, it shapes both the potential allies’ and target actors’ priorities and their
receptiveness to the campaigns’ advocacy efforts.488 For instance, the momentum around
the child’s rights issues in 1980s provided a fertile ground for the campaign on Child
Soldiers to get started. Similarly, the changing political dynamics with the end of the
Cold War has led to an increased awareness about the problems in Africa and this in turn
provided an opportunity for advocates’ to successfully pitch the issue of HIV/AIDS as a
development problem.
Yet, the advocates’ hands are not tied in the face of less than optimal strategic
environments. Both the arguments in the literature and the evidence that this study
brought forward illustrated that not only structural but also non-structural factors play a
critical role in determining the level of success that a transnational advocacy campaign
reach. These factors “include strategy and agency, which have to do with the active
choices and efforts of movements as well as of the opponents and other players in the
conflict, and cultural factors that deal with the moral visions, cognitive understandings,
and emotions that exist prior to a movement but which are also transformed by it.”489
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One set of such characteristics is regarding the advocacy networks’ own
characteristics, i.e. intra-network dynamics.490 These characteristics include “the diversity
of a TAN, the number and diversity of its members and its ability to exchange
information.”491 For instance, the ICBL’s ability to bring in diverse set of actors together
and create a dense (yet diverse) network was important in the success of the Landmines
campaign, yet failure to create such dynamic within the network worked to the
disadvantage of the IANSA.492
Similarly, gatekeeper preferences were based on their perceptions of the issue;
their calculations about the contribution they can make to the issue; as well as the
benefits they could potentially draw from becoming a part of the campaign493 play a role
in determining a campaign’s level of success. For instance, the overwhelmed agenda of
gatekeepers within the international refugees regime prevented the gatekeepers from
prioritizing the climate refugees issue and lending support to the campaign.
Non-structural conditions also include case specific characteristics, i.e. issue
attributes. These attributes include the nature of the harm caused by the problem at hand
(whether it is physical and therefore easily identifiable)494 as well as the perceived
existence of harm inflicted on “innocent” civilians;495 existence of a short causal link
between the perpetuator and the victim;496 and whether the issue is culturally sensitive.497
While these issue attributes can be brought to light through strategic framing by the
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advocates, not all issues are equally amenable to such efforts. For instance, the physical
damage caused by landmines worked to the advantage of the Landmines Campaign,
whereas the fact that the causal link between climate change and migration is a long and
an indirect one. For that reason, despite the efforts by the advocates, it was difficult for
advocates to convince both gatekeepers and target actors to the urgency of the problem.
Frame multivocalization as networking
The above presented analysis illustrated that campaigns tend to combine multiple
frames at the same time for two purposes. They engage in multivocalization in order to
reach out to as many potential allies as possible and to widen their network. Using
different frames allows campaigns to circulate their arguments within different issue
networks and attract potential allies with varying interests. For instance, the initial
adoption of a security frame by the HIV/AIDS campaign did not aim to emphasize the
security implications of the issue, but rather attempted to get the UNSC’s as well as
donors’ support in prioritizing the issue as a development and human rights issue.
Similarly, combining human rights and health frames helped the Maternal Mortality
campaign to bring in a wide array of NGOs together in attempts to prioritize the issue.
The combined use of humanitarian and human rights frames by the Child Soldiers
campaign also allowed advocates to reach out to both the UNHCR, which operates within
the humanitarian network, and the UNICEF, which operates within the human rights
network, at the same time and guarantee their support.
The findings also illustrated that adoption of multiple frames could be aimed at
increasing the campaigns’ chances of grafting their issue onto as many norms as possible.
For instance, the Child Soldiers campaign has framed the issue both as a human rights
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and humanitarian issue in order to tap the issue onto both norms on child’s rights and
humanitarian norms developed with Geneva Conventions. Similarly, the use of
development and human rights frame together was crucial in bringing success to the
HIV/AIDS campaign as it put responsibility on the shoulders of actors within different
regimes after the failure of the initial campaign based on a health frame that only
managed to stimulate action on the part of WHO. The contribution that multivocalization
make to the HIV/AIDS campaign found its reflection in the structure of the UNAIDS
which was sponsored by a number of organizations from different issue networks.
These findings lend support to the arguments developed in the recent literature
regarding the role of intra-network dynamics in shaping decisions and actions of
advocacy networks.498 Thus, bringing in crucial allies and forming a strong coalition is
considered to be as important as the expectations about the target actors’ behaviors in
explaining advocacy networks’ decisions. As a part of this broader literature, it is argued
that “constructing” an issue for target actors is not enough in successfully addressing it,
advocacy networks also need to get support from “gatekeepers” – central organizations
within the networks.499 Therefore, appealing to these gatekeepers require campaigns to
strategically choose their frame accordingly as advocates’ ability to match their issue to
the potential allies’ mandate as well as their calculations regarding the consequences of
taking part in the campaign is crucial.500 This is crucial because the scope and severity of
the issue at hand fall short of explaining why advocates pick certain issues while
sidelining the others. Multivocalization can be an important tool in appealing to diverse
498
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set of gatekeepers and international regimes built on different norms. However, it is
important to distinguish multivocalization from frame contestation” within the network501
or disagreement over tactics502 as it was seen in the example of the Small Arms
Campaign such dynamics are counterproductive.503
The existing studies on securitized cases of transnational advocacy campaigns
attributed such framing choices to advocates’ desire to appeal to states’ primary concerns.
While the uniqueness attributed to security frames in this approach helped these studies
provide an explanation for the success of these particular campaigns, it fell short of
explaining campaigns that succeeded through de-securitization of the issue at hand. In
other words, while these studies were able to shed, albeit limited, light on the reasons for
“securitization” of human rights, humanitarian and health issues, they failed to account
for other framing processes such as “humanitarization” of security issues. As the
discussion on de-securitization of the Landmines campaign illustrated, contrary to the
arguments in the securitization literature, reframing a traditional security concern as a
humanitarian problem can help advocates’ efforts to prioritize the issue on states’
political agendas. As discussed above, de-securitization of the landmines issue
contributed to the campaign by opening up a space for advocates to have their voices
heard which would not have been possible if the issue were to remain as a security
concern.
Dynamics of Framing Choices
The literature on transnational advocacy networks suggests that “a mix of
normative and material interests influence how activists choose their normative reference
501
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points.”504 The analysis presented above supports this argument and highlights two
structural and non-structural such factors in explaining the dynamics that shape
advocates’ framing choices. These factors are the expertise and the experiences of the
advocates and the political context in which they operate.
First, the advocates’ personal experiences and fields of expertise inform their
framing decisions. This finding corresponds to the arguments in the literature about
“transnational social movement spillovers.”505 This argument suggests that “the ideas,
tactics, style, participants, and organizations of one movement often spill over its
boundaries to affect other social movements.”506 This is primarily because humans are
“cognitive misers” who resort to shortcuts in making decisions by relying on their former
experiences.507 Advocates’ fields of expertise lead to selective perception, and the
memory of previous successful and failed campaigns provide cognitive maps for the
advocates and inform their framing choices.
The analysis of the Child Soldiers campaign presented clear evidence for this
argument. As discussed above, the main organizations that played a central role in the
Landmines campaign later shifted their focus to the child soldiers issue and employed not
only the same advocacy tactics, but also the same discursive frames with the goal of
replicating the footsteps of the previous success. Similarly, some of the actors that took
part in the Landmines campaign later played a central role at the early stages of the
Campaign to End Sexual Violence in Conflict Zones. These actors not only brought in
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their own expertise but also their experiences with former campaigns which in return
informed their framing choices.
The strategic environment also affects advocates’ framing choices. Political
context is “the broader institutional context that provides opportunities for or imposes
constraints on NGOs engaged in framing processes.”508 Broader political contexts inform
advocates framing choices since these are actors “are not atomistic but social actors,
whose actions, perceptions, interests, identities and ideas are constituted by the
institutional context.”509 This impact becomes especially evident when significant
changes occur in the broader political context. As it was discussed in the case of Child
Soldiers and as it will be further elaborated in the next chapter in analyzing Conflict
Diamonds campaign, September 11 attacks and the “War on Terror” dynamics that
followed influenced the advocates’ framing choices.
At the same time, the shift in the conjecture could also be used strategically to
graft the issue onto newly rising awareness on the part of both potential allies and targets
of influence. For instance, the attempts to put Millennium Development Goals together
have encouraged the actors to emphasize the development consequences of both
HIV/AIDS and maternal mortality by respective campaigns. Thus, while the strategic
environment informs the strategic choices available to advocates, through their actions,
advocates can cultivate the strategic environment to their benefit.
Internally Displaced Persons
Internally displaced persons (IDPs) are “persons or groups of persons who have
been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in
508
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particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of
generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and
who have not crossed an internationally recognized state border.”510 As Ban Ki-moon
himself acknowledges, “displacement remains arguably the most significant humanitarian
challenge that we face.”511 Yet, while there is a well-developed international regime
addressing the needs and vulnerabilities of the refugees512 no such mechanism has been
developed for IDPs, despite the scope and the severity of the problem and the advocates’
efforts to gain attention.513
Although it is not the purpose of this dissertation to explain the variation in the
success of non-securitized cases, the case of the IDPs campaign further illustrates the
points identified above. When assessing the very limited success that the campaign for
IDPs has achieved, it becomes clear that a change in the strategic environment
contributed to the advocates’ efforts to place the issue on the global agenda. Yet, the
problems associated with the nature and the scope of the issue limited the advocates’
ability to turn this success into a significant level of political commitment. The
complexity of the issue also limited the advocates’ ability to strategically engage in
multivocalization, i.e. to strategically utilize human rights and humanitarian frames
together in order to strengthen their efforts.
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The 1990s witnessed both an increase in the number and scope of humanitarian
crises514 and also a “shift in how states understand sovereignty and the state’s relationship
with its own citizens.”515 Similar to the opportunity that the emphasis put on children’s
rights presented for the Child Soldiers Campaign, the increasing number of IDPs as well
as the increasing awareness of such instances constituted a breaking point for the
strategic environment in which advocates operate; this change allowed them to utilize this
perception of crisis as an opportunity to successful push the issue onto the global agenda.
Friends World Committee for Consultation, the World Council of Churches, and
the Refugee Policy Group made use of this fertile political environment and approached
the UNHCR and International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), using a UN
sponsored conference as an opportunity to draft a resolution to ask the Secretary-General
to prepare a report to analyze the scope of the problem.516 As a response to these efforts,
the UN Secretary-General appointed Francis Deng as the Representative of the SecretaryGeneral for Internally Displaced Persons. Yet, despite this long overdue success in
putting the issue onto the global agenda, the success remained limited to the “recognition
of the problem”517 and did not pave the way to the development of an effective
international mechanism in addressing the issue.
The opportunity that the strategic environment presented for the advocates altered
when it came to the political commitment stage. That is because as is acknowledged by
the literature518 and discussed in the previous chapters, getting states to recognize the
514
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problem is one thing, but garnering the political will to address it is another; as Ferris
contends, “The international humanitarian community struggled to find appropriate ways
of responding to a growing number of internally displaced individuals in the absence of
clear institutional mechanisms.”519 However, the lack of support from the states to
establish a new UN agency has curtailed the efforts to develop institutional mechanisms
for relief. As a result of this reluctance, a system of coordination was established wherein
Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) was given the task of coordinating inter-agency
efforts and the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
(OCHA) was given the responsibility to support ERC in these efforts. 520 The most
productive output of such effort at the global scale is the non-binding Guiding Principles
on Internal Displacement. The Guiding Principles encourage the NGOs, UN agencies and
states to promote the principles and encourage states to apply them. Yet, the application
of the principle is voluntary 521 and the implementation has remained “largely ad hoc and
driven more by personalities and convictions of individuals on ground than by an
institutional, system-wide agenda.”522
This limited success triggered an attempt to reform the system in 2004, called the
“humanitarian reform,” wherein a “cluster approach” that aimed to better identify the
responsibilities of different organizations to “ensure a more predictable, consistent, and
accountable response across crises.”523 These reform attempts have placed the issue into
the humanitarian regime but in doing so it left the environmentally or development
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induced displacement out of the equation, as they are considered to fall into the human
rights regime. Thus, an attempt to strengthen the framing of the issue as a humanitarian
concern proved to be counterproductive for the efforts to address the needs of particular
types of IDPs. As is discussed below, the reform also fell short of leading to the
development of a proper mechanism in addressing conflict induced displacement.
The fact that IDPs remain within the borders of their own country is sometimes
considered to be the reason behind the limited success that the advocates have so far
reached in getting states to take responsibility in addressing the population’s needs. Yet,
such reasoning is not enough to explain the very limited success that the campaign has
reached so far. As the examples analyzed in the previous chapter illustrate, transnational
advocacy campaigns can contribute to shaping states’ responsibilities toward their own
citizens, as well as to the international human rights regime, as observed in the successful
cases of Child Labor, Child Soldiers and Women’s Reproductive Rights campaigns.
The fact that the issue has implications for both human rights and humanitarian
regimes can also not explain the limited success of the campaign. As seen in the War
Crimes Tribunals example, a campaign can successfully engage in human rights and
humanitarian frames simultaneously, and successfully use the combination to attract as
many potential allies as possible (and to put as much pressure on the target actors as
possible).
Rather the IDPs case suggests that the complexity of the issue presents the
greatest challenge to the advocacy efforts. The fact that a wide array of causes can lead to
displacement limits the campaign’s ability to adopt a focused framing strategy that would
get their message across. The reasons for displacement range from “conflict, generalised
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violence, human rights violations and natural hazard-induced disasters”524 as well as
development projects.525 The international community’s approach and sensitivity to the
issue varies depending on the source of the displacement: “The media is generally good
at reporting displacement due to conflict, but natural disasters displaced three times as
many people as war in 2013… The natural disasters that displace people can be huge,
such as the tsunami that hit Indonesia, India, Sri Lanka and other countries in 2004, and
typhoon Haiyan that hit the Philippines in 2013. However, many are smaller and more
localised, never reaching the newspapers. As a result, the damage caused to lives goes
unrecorded.”526 This complexity limits the coordination among those who focus on
environmentally induced IDPs and those who focus on conflict induced IDPs, as the
former is more amenable to the human rights regime and the latter falls into the
humanitarian regime.
The issue of conflict induced internal displacement is at the cross-roads of many
humanitarian problems, which means that the issue is touched upon through various
instruments developed for other humanitarian concerns. Such complexity not only led to
a false sense that the issue has “already been taken care of”527 but it also created a fertile
ground for the states to defend their reluctance in establishing a new organization
dedicated solely to this issue. In other words, the perception that the “existing
international humanitarian and human rights law and analogous refugee law did provide

524

“Global Figures,” available at < http://www.internal-displacement.org/global-figures>, accessed 10
March 2015.
525
Muggah 2003.
526
“Displacement and Natural Disasters,” available at <http://www.soroptimistinternational.org/16-daysof-activism-2014/post/745-16-days---day-six-displacement>, accessed 12 March 2015.
527
As discussed in Chapter 2 in the context of the “Amazon issue” if an issue considered to resonate to
closely to an existing norm then it runs the risk of creating a misleading sense that the issue has already
been addressed by the existing mechanisms (Zhouri 2000).

187

substantial coverage for the internally displaced”528 contributed to reluctance of the states
in creating a new institutional mechanism to address the vulnerabilities specific to IDPs.
Yet this perception does not reflect the reality on the ground: as Cohen notes, “For
example, although there is a general norm prohibiting cruel and inhuman treatment, there
is no explicit prohibition against the forcible return of IDPs to places of danger. Or a
general norm may cover essential medical care, but the special needs of internally
displaced women in the areas of reproductive and psychological health care needed to be
spelled out. Moreover, the law was silent when it came to restitution of property lost as a
consequence of displacement during conflict or on the need of IDPs for personal
identification and documentation.”529
The so-called humanitarian reform was not successful in addressing this problem.
As Ferris discusses, the reform rather led to the mainstreaming of the IDPs into
humanitarian concerns where “[i]ncreasingly, international humanitarians talk about the
protection of civilians, vulnerable groups, and affected populations rather than about
internally displaced persons. Instead of developing programs to meet the particular needs
of those uprooted from their communities, many are “mainstreaming” them into general
protection and assistance programs.”530 As we observed in the case of the Sexual
Violence in Conflict campaign, the fatigue that the international community has due to
the inability of the existing norms to properly address similar problems had a negative
impact on the advocates’ efforts to trigger political commitment.
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While the framing of the issue in humanitarian terms has not brought the desired
results, framing the issue as a human rights problem, as done especially by those who
focus on environmentally induced displacement,531 also has its own strategic
shortcomings.532 The efforts to prioritize the issue of climate change induced
displacement, very similar to the securitized Climate Refugees Campaign, suffer from the
difficulty of illustrating a short causal link between the cause (climate change) and the
harm (displacement).533 Those who focus on advocating for the needs of persons
displaced by natural disasters suffer from illustrating that the issue is amenable to human
action;534a problem that the Sexual Violence in Conflict campaign also suffered in their
fight against the perception that sexual violence is an inevitable part of conflict.
The strategic environment becomes even more problematic for the advocates due
to the legal status of the IDPs. IDPs are still, technically, entitled to same rights as other
citizens of the same country. Yet, “in reality, the fact of displacement can increase their
vulnerability to human rights violations, including rape, exploitation and forced
recruitment, and also their needs, including for shelter, replacement documentation and
restitution of property.”535 Moreover, IDPs’ vulnerability increases as they “may also
face administrative, institutional and procedural obstacles to achieving their rights. IDPs
who have lost their documentation, for example, may not be able to take part in elections,
they may be turned away from hospitals and/or schools.” Despite these realities, the
531
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difficulty in illustrating the direct impact that displacement has on individuals’ capacity
to enjoy their rights limits the usefulness of the human rights frame in successfully
leading to political commitment.
The historical accounts of the successful examples of advocacy campaigns
demonstrated the advocates’ ability to shape global politics through strategically framing
their issues. The stories also illustrated that the success of such efforts depends on the
strategic environment within which campaign has to operate. In cases where the
advocates are able to use the strategic environment to their advantage, as in the cases of
Landmines, Child Soldiers, HIV/AIDS and Maternal Mortality, campaigns succeed. Yet,
in cases where the campaign cannot overcome the limitations that the strategic
environment present to them, such as the counterproductive network dynamics in the case
of the Small Arms campaign and the nature of the issue in the case of the IDPs, the
campaigns are bound to fail. As this comparative analysis illustrates, this variance is true
for securitized campaigns, as well.
Rather than underestimating the agency that the advocates have in shaping global
agenda setting and policy making, these results highlight the importance of analyzing the
bigger picture in understanding the motivations behind advocates’ framing choices, and
the conditions that are needed for such choices to translate into advocacy success. The indepth analysis of the Conflict Diamonds Campaign I present in the following chapter
takes a closer look at the interaction between the campaigns’ strategic environments and
their framing preferences in the context of a securitized campaign. With this analysis I
aim to develop a better understanding of the dynamics of securitization, and further
illustrate the lessons that treating securitization as an instance of framing offers.
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CHAPTER 5
IS THAT BLOOD ON YOUR DIAMOND?: POLITICS OF FRAMING
CONFLICT DIAMONDS
Introduction
In 1999, model Naomi Campbell made headlines for wearing a 190.27 carat
diamond necklace promoting Graff Diamonds’ Millennium Collection.536 On August 5,
2010 she was featured in newspapers once again with diamonds, but this time the
headlines were about her testimony at the War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague; where,
Charles Taylor, the former president of Liberia, was on trial for receiving “diamonds
from Sierra Leone rebels in exchange for weapons during that country’s 1992-2002 civil
war.”537 While stating that she had no former information on Liberia or Charles Taylor,
she admitted receiving “dirty looking diamonds” after meeting him at a dinner party
organized by Nelson Mandela.538
Why did the problem of trade in illicit diamonds turn into “conflict diamonds”
and become reframed as a security threat? Until the end of 1990s, diamonds were framed
as symbols of eternal love and devotion, and enjoyed a carefully crafted image of being
“a girl’s best friend”. Within a few years’ time diamonds got reframed as a security threat
and their image was replaced by one that portrays diamonds as “a rebel’s best friend.”539
A multi-stakeholder campaign that targeted both the industry and the states was the main
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force behind the rapid change both in the perception of the consumers and in the structure
and functioning of diamond extraction and trade. Yet this success neither came overnight
nor without controversy. The most controversial aspect of the campaign was to reach a
consensus on which diamonds to categorize as “dirty.” Limiting the definition of “dirty
diamonds” to those that finance rebel groups against legitimate governments (and
therefore tying the problem to the security of states) was not an inevitable result but a
consequence of a complex set of dynamics within the campaign.
In the beginning of the campaign the advocates simultaneously used a human
rights frame that they tailored to attract the attention of the industry and a security frame
to appeal to the Security Council as an ally. Eventually the human rights frame was
sidelined when the security frame was taken over by the industry who wanted to strip
itself of any direct responsibility, and the states who wanted to keep their own practices
outside the scope of the campaign. Thus, contrary to what the conventional wisdom
would suggest, (i) both the author and the target of the security frame were states and
non-state actors, and (ii) the appeal that security frames had for the target actors and the
allies was related to these actors’ non-security concerns. Analyzing the processes behind
these framing choices provides an opportunity to get a better understanding of not only
the dynamics of securitization but also the mechanisms surrounding the framing
processes. With this purpose, this chapter provides an illustrative historical analysis of
Conflict Diamonds campaign to test the extent to which the mechanisms identified in the
previous chapters find a reflection in this securitized campaign.
The reason for choosing conflict diamonds as the focus of this illustrative case
study is three-fold. First, one of the main goals of conducting this case study is to shed
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light onto the dynamics of adopting a particular frame over another as well as to reveal
the varying consequences of such decisions. A security frame was used by the Conflict
Diamonds campaign throughout all stages of global agenda setting and policy making.
Such sustained use presents an opportunity to trace different motivations that the
advocates had in making their framing choices at different stages and the varying impact
that such choices had on the campaign.
Second, the Conflict Diamonds campaign has been a multi-stakeholder effort. Not
only NGOs but also the diamond industry, states and international organizations have
gotten involved in the issue both as allies and as targets of influence; as a result the
authorship of the security frame has changed hands throughout the campaign. Therefore,
the conflict diamonds campaign provides an opportunity to test the impact of changing
network dynamics in analyzing the varying motivations behind different actors’ framing
choices, as well as consequences of such changes.
Third, the Conflict Diamonds case is an issue that has been widely analyzed and
hence, it is an issue where a lot of historical data is available.540 However, despite the
number of studies written on the Conflict Diamonds issue, almost none of these studies
analyzed the issue from a securitization perspective. In the existing studies, the link
between diamonds and the presence of conflicts in diamond-extracting countries is
perceived as enough of a reason for the issue to be framed as a security concern.
However, as discussed above, the framing of an issue by a campaign in a particular way
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is neither an automatic nor an inevitable process.541 Therefore, a close analysis of the
Conflict Diamonds case provides an opportunity to enhance our case-specific knowledge
by elaborating on an understudied aspect of the issue, in particular, as well as our
understanding of dynamics of framing, in general.
The illustrative case study is conducted with the understanding that the
generalizability of the insights gained would be limited without conducting a more
detailed comparative case study. Nevertheless, this study provides insights into the
reasons for and the consequences of adopting security frames, in particular and
mechanisms surrounding advocates’ framing choices, in general.
The findings illustrate that the reasons behind adopting a security frame are more
complex than acknowledged by the literature. The literature argues that states are more
likely to respond to issues if they were to perceive them as threats to national security.542
Thus, adopting a security frame is assumed to be tailoring the appeal toward states.543 Yet
the analysis of the conflict diamonds case illustrates that the initial adoption of the
security language as the main frame did not target the states, but rather non-state actors,
i.e. the industry. This was a function of the fact that the industry was not willing to
shoulder the potential financial burden of a large-scale boycott that the human rights
implications embedded in “blood diamonds” frame might create. For that reason, while it
was the human rights implications of the issue that forced the industry to react, the
industry strategically worked to securitize the problem in order to neutralize the issue.
The industry’s strategy to promote a security frame also resonated with states as they
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were not willing to put their human rights practices under spotlight, either. Thus, the
findings illustrate that different actors’ receptiveness to a security frame does not have to
be a function of what that frame prioritizes on the agenda (security threats). It could also
be a function of what that frame keeps out of the agenda (human rights violations).
The findings also support the arguments made in the previous chapters about
multivocalization. The analysis of framing choices at the agenda setting stage reveals that
the campaign utilized human rights and security frames simultaneously. The former was
used to reach out to other NGOs to strengthen the coalition, to appeal to the broader
public, and to attract the attention of the main targets of influence of this stage, i.e. the
industry. The latter was, on the other hand, used to reach out to the UNSC as a potential
ally. Thus, not only did the campaign utilize multiple frames at once, but they did so to
strengthen their coalition as well as to attract target actors’ attention.
Tracing the changing trends in using the concepts of “blood diamonds” and
“conflict diamonds” over time reveals that the campaign’s tendency to use one concept
over the other was primarily shaped (i) by the network dynamics, i.e. actors’ relative
power within the network at that particular stage of the campaign, and (ii) by the broader
political context. In early stages of the campaign, NGOs had the upper-hand within the
campaign and they utilized human rights and security frames almost interchangeably to
reach out to as many potential allies and targets of influence as possible. Their motivation
was to create a sense of urgency in addressing the human rights consequences of the
problem at hand. The political context also played an enabling role as the ongoing civil
wars in Africa (and the sanctions developed in addressing them) created a background on
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which the arguments could be built; additionally, the Canadian presence in the UNSC at
the time provided a receptive ear for the campaign to reach out to UNSC as an ally.
The early success of the core NGOs in attracting global attention to the issue on
the one hand, brought both governmental and private actors on board, but it on the other
hand, gradually decreased the relative power and influence that these NGOs had in
framing the issue in the later stages of the campaign. When it came to the political
commitment stage, the diamond industry and states started to have more power in
framing the debate. Both of these actors opted for the concept of “conflict diamonds” for
varying reasons: industry preferred such a use in order to prevent a large-scale boycott of
the diamond sector while states preferred this concept in order to make sure that the
policies developed will only target rebels’ handling of diamonds and not theirs. This
limited definition was crucial for them as the states were not willing to sign onto an
agreement that would put their human rights practices into question. The September 11
terrorist attacks that took place during the negotiations also contributed to the
securitization of the issue, by emphasizing the link between terrorism and illicit diamond
trade. At this stage, the NGOs followed suit and settled on a security frame to guarantee
targets actors’ commitment, but they occasionally used the concept of “blood diamonds”
as a “stick” to ensure the continued cooperation of the states and the industry.
The relative power of the states and the industry within the network continued at
the policy implementation stage, as did their insistence on the strict use of “conflict
diamonds” concept (which at this point became embedded in the institutional structure of
the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme). Despite the almost solidified use of
“conflict diamonds,” changes within the political context encouraged NGOs to use the
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concept of “blood diamonds” more frequently. First, the fact that most of the diamondfueled civil wars in Africa came to an end made states’ wrongdoings in handling diamond
extraction and trade more visible. Second, this realization was coupled with growing
dissatisfaction with KPCS’s inability to react to violations of the rules by member states.
This in turn encouraged NGOs to resort back to the “blood diamonds” concept to change
the conversation to one where more emphasis is put on human rights consequences of the
issue.
The findings also lend support to some of the existing arguments in the literature
about the implications of adopting a security frame, while challenging contrary findings.
As extant literature suggests, while adopting a security frame might be useful in the
success of an advocacy campaign in the short-run, it tends to result in the sidelining of
human rights concerns in the long-run.544 This effect is evidenced by the rising criticisms
about the KP as well as the advocates’ attempts to de-securitize the issue. Nevertheless,
the evidence suggests that the continued use of the security frame is neither a function of
the unique place that security concerns occupy on states’ agendas, nor the removal of the
issue from the realm of normal politics that is argued to come with securitization. The
network dynamics partially explain why a strict definition of conflict diamonds is still
network’s preferred frame on which to operate, despite increasing criticisms. The role of
institutionalization of the security frame at the political commitment stage is also proved
to be essential in understanding such continued use. Thus, the persistence in using a
security frame does not have to be based on advocates’ perceptions about the benefits that
this particular frame provides or the unique role that such frame has in the eyes of the
states; it could also be a function of institutional constraints.
544
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Multiple sources were utilized in analyzing the reasons behind advocates’ framing
choices as well as how and why the content of the frame and its implications have
changed over time. The historical account of the campaign was traced using both primary
and secondary sources. As a first step, secondary sources - academic publications,
working papers, conference papers and newspaper articles - were surveyed by applying
the database research methods described in Chapter 3.545 This information was used in
identifying the main actors within the campaign and compiling a map of actors whose
framing preferences need to be analyzed for the purpose of this study.
Once the historical account and the core campaign network were identified,
primary sources were utilized in getting insights into advocates’ framing choices
throughout the campaign. Most of the key issue entrepreneurs have been engaging in
prolific reporting since the early stages of the campaign. Additionally, the industry
(through their own publications and advertisement campaigns) and the states (through
politicians’ and diplomats’ speeches, press releases, government documents) have been
vocal about their stance on the diamond trade. A survey of these documents was crucial
not only in compiling a historical account of the issue but also in tracing the framing
choices of different actors and how these preferences have evolved over time.
The research was then supplemented with six interviews conducted with
individuals who participated in the campaign at various stages and on behalf of different
actors.546 The interviews were conducted with the understanding that the insights gained
through them can only be limited to the perceptions and recollections of the actors
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interviewed. Nevertheless, these interviews were crucial in gaining better insights into the
motivations behind advocates’ framing choices.
This chapter consists of five sections. The first section provides an historical
account of the Conflict Diamonds campaign, identifies the main actors involved, and
highlights the main events that took place throughout the campaign. The following three
sections traces how the framing of the issue has evolved over time by taking a particular
look at how the concepts of “blood diamonds” and “conflict diamonds” were used
differently at three stages global agenda setting and policy making. Both the actors’
motivations in making their framing preferences as well as the factors that shaped and
constrained these choices are discussed. The fifth section summarizes and discusses the
findings of this chapter.
The History of Conflict Diamonds Campaign and the Kimberley Process (KP)
History of Diamonds
The “resource curse” theory, which suggests that the abundance of a natural
resource could hinder political stability and economic development, is frequently used in
explaining civil wars, especially in Africa.547 In that respect, diamonds are theorized to
play a role in civil wars in Sierra Leone, Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo
“in fueling the conflict as various parties funded their war efforts through mining
activities.”548 What made the situation worse was the fact that the diamond industry has
been traditionally in the hands of a “closely-knit family enterprises” that “operated
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largely on a cash basis, without formal contracts or auditable paper trails” which made
the efforts to regulate the industry futile.549
However, diamonds do not necessarily or inevitably lead to conflict. Despite the
contribution that diamonds are believed to make in fueling civil wars, they are not the
main reasons behind the civil wars. Instead, “poor governance and the creation of a
socially excluded underclass” can be listed as the underlying conditions for Africa’s civil
wars.550 Moreover, diamonds do not always fuel conflicts, either. For instance, in Sierra
Leone, “for a long period of time, until the beginning of the civil war in 1991, diamonds
played an important role in the country’s national development agenda and were a
significant feature of the local economies and societies where they were mined.”551
Similarly, in Botswana, sixty percent of the government’s total tax revenue comes from
the diamond mines and “diamonds have resulted in Botswana having higher economic
growth rates than any other African country in the over the past thirty years.” [emphasis
in the original].552
Rebels’ adoption of diamond trade as a revenue generator in a number of African
countries changed the implications of diamonds for both diamond extracting and trading
countries. The trade in “conflict diamonds” was first benefited by the National Union for
the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA).553 The civil war in Angola that started in
1992 claimed the lives of more than 500,000 people and UNITA fueled its efforts to
overthrow the government by controlling the major diamond mining areas of Angola
549
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through which they managed to generate about $3.7 billion in the course of seven
years.554 The Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone was quick to follow and
they adopted a similar strategy with notable help from the “Liberia’s warlord president,
Charles Taylor.” The practice then spread to Democratic Republic of Congo, Guinea,
Liberia and Côte d’lvoire.555
The diamond trade’s fall into the hands of rebels in a number of countries
throughout the 1990s led to dire humanitarian consequences. As Partnership Africa
Canada (PAC) – one of the leading NGOs in the conflict diamonds issue – pointed out
“[a]s much as 15% of the world’s $10 billion annual rough diamond production fell into
the category of conflict diamonds in the late 1990s. Hundreds of thousands of people died
as a direct result of these wars, and many more died of indirect causes. Millions of people
were displaced for half a generation, health and educational infrastructures were
destroyed, development was reversed.”556
Despite the ongoing civil wars in Africa and the fuzzy nature of the diamonds
industry, neither diamonds nor the connection they had with the conflicts in Africa found
a place on the international community’s agenda for a long time. As Christian Dietrich
puts it clearly in his paper written as a part of the Diamonds and Human Security Project:
“The governments of industrialized countries paid no attention to readily available and
startling information: that the volume of diamonds reaching international markets from
countries such as Angola, the DRC and the CAR was significantly higher than what these
countries officially exported; that hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of diamonds
were appearing on international markets every year, and nobody could say where on earth
554

Smillie 2002a, 13.
PAC 2006, 2.
556
PAC 2006, 2.
555

201

they came from. Angola officially exported US$740 million in diamonds in 2000, the
DRC US$240 million and the CAR [Central African Republic] US$60 million, but their
combined output was closer to US$2 billion.”557
History of the Campaign
It was only at the end of the 1990s that the issue started to get international
attention as a result of numerous efforts by a handful of actors (See Figure 1). While it
was the UNSC that first discussed the idea of regulating diamond trade as a way of
tackling civil wars, it was a group of NGOs that framed the issue and brought the idea of
regulating the entire diamond industry onto the global agenda. The UNSC was quick to
lend support as an ally and the industry, the primary target in the early stages of the
campaign, quickly, albeit unwillingly, reacted to the campaign.
In 1998, in the face of civil war in Angola, the UNSC put in force an international
embargo on Angolan diamonds that were not certified by the Angolan government.558
However, UNSC was not primarily interested in the connection between diamonds and
conflicts in general or developing a norm in tackling them. The UNSC was instead
focused on engaging in “smart sanctions” to cut off the financial sources of UNITA and
diamonds happened to be one of the main financial sources.559 Regardless of its
intentions, and while this was an important first step in questioning the role of diamonds
in conflicts, “the issue sparked little public interest, and the embargo created little more
than a ripple in the diamond industry.”560
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Figure 1: Chronological Account of the Conflict Diamonds Campaign
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Around the same time the issue entrepreneurs, a number of human rights,
development and environmental NGOs, started to engage in simultaneous (yet to be
coordinated at the time) efforts to bring the issue to global attention (See Figure 1). One
of the very first and crucial steps taken in the placing of the conflict diamonds issue on
the global agenda was a report titled A Rough Trade prepared by Global Witness. Global
Witness was a London-based environmental and human rights NGO that works on
highlighting the “link between natural resources, conflict and corruption and …
systematically document[s] and expose[s] how this sustains poverty, fuels instability and
destroys the environment.”561
The report was primarily focused on Angola, and how the revenues made by
smuggling of diamonds were being used by the rebels. The report targeted the diamond
industry and specifically De Beers as it was the firm that was marketing about 80% of
world’s rough diamonds at the time.562 The report also highlighted the ineffectiveness of
the UN sanctions on Angola and suggested that “the UN embargo was being
systematically sidestepped by the industry and by an almost complete lack of compliance
on the part of countries as widely diverse as Belgium and Zambia.”563 While the A Rough
Trade Report did not use the term “conflict diamonds” it repeatedly emphasized the
causal connection between diamond and civil war.

561

“20 Years of Impact,” available at <http://new.globalwitness.org/20yearsimpact.php>, accessed 8
January 2015.
562
“Betting on De Beers: Can Anglo American Revive the World’s Leading Diamond Miner?,” The
Economist, November 12, 2011, available at <http://www.economist.com/node/21538145>, accessed 25
January 2013; Global Witness 1998. Since the beginning of the “diamond mining rush”, De Beers has been
informally in control of the industry through keeping supply and demand in control, and making sure that
diamond is desirable for the consumer and profitable for the industry. For more discussion on the role and
dominance of De Beers in the diamond industry see such as Global Witness 1998; Saunders 2000; Hazleton
2002; PAC 2009.
563
Smillie 2002a, 16.

204

Table 15: The Actors Involved in the Campaign and Their Roles
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The most important contribution of the Global Witness’s report to the campaign
was to attract the UNSC’s attention to the issue by providing detailed information on the
situation in Angola. Shortly after the release of the report, in January 1999 Global
Witness was invited to the UNSC to give an informal briefing on their report.564
Following the briefing, Robert Fowler, Canadian Ambassador to the UN who was
recently appointed as the Chair of the Angolan Sanctions Committee, put together an
expert panel to “assess the effectiveness of the Angola sanctions and the link between
diamonds and conflict.”565
While the UNSC Expert Panel was working on investigating the functioning of
the diamond industry, Global Witness, shifted gear and joined forces with Medico
International (a human rights NGO), the Netherlands Institute for Southern Africa
(NIZA) (a human rights and development NGO) and Nederlandse Organisatie Voor
Internationale Bijstand – Dutch Organization for International Aid (NOVIB) (a human
rights and development NGO) and launched a public awareness campaign in October
1999 which was called “Fatal Transactions.” The campaign approached the issue from
human rights perspective and threatened to “convince consumers that diamonds were the
"physical embodiment of human rights abuses.”566 The consumer campaign’s primary
goal was to reframe “De Beers’ carefully constructed marketing frame of love and
eternity” with a frame of “war, destruction, and gruesome images of children with
chopped-off limbs.”567 However, the campaign did not aim to stop diamond consumption
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but rather to raise awareness among consumers about the need to know the origins of the
diamonds they purchase.568 The industry was quick to respond to the consumer campaign
and shortly after De Beers announced that they would no longer be purchasing Angolan
diamonds – including the ones sanctioned by the government.569
Around the same time a second influential report, Heart of the Matter, was being
prepared by PAC which was then released in 2000. The PAC’s report was focused on the
role of diamond trade in fueling Sierra Leone’s civil war. The report approached the issue
from a human rights perspective and highlighted the brutal methods used by the RUF
such as mutilation of hands, feet and breasts.570 The main contribution the PAC’s report
made was to challenge the general perception in the literature and among the policy
makers that saw Sierra Leone as yet another failed state dragged into civil war. The report
stated that:
The point of the war may not actually have been to win it, but to engage in
profitable crime under the cover of warfare… Over the years, the informal
diamond mining sector, long dominated by what might be called ‘disorganized
crime’, became increasingly influenced by organized crime and by the
transcontinental smuggling not just of diamonds, but of guns and drugs, and by
vast sums of money in search of a laundry. Violence became central to the
advancement of those with vested interests [emphasis in the original].571
While the industry was quick to reply to the consumer campaign they were not equally
responsive to the reports. The initial reaction to both of these reports by the industry was
not a welcoming one. In fact, Smillie, Gberie and Hazleton suggest that “[i]nitial
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reactions to The Heart of the Matter from the industry and some governments were
extremely hostile, and there was no rush to accept any of the recommendations.”572
Although the reports and the public awareness campaigns have contributed to the
efforts to put the issue on the global agenda, the incidents happened around the same time
also provided an opportunity for the advocates to garner further support from both allies
and targets of influence. For instance, around the same time period, the peace settlement
in Sierra Leone collapsed and 500 UN peacekeepers got kidnapped by the RUF and this
gave an additional incentive to the governments and the UNSC to pay more attention to
the issue.573
These events encouraged not only the industry but also a number of states to take
action. In May of 2000, diamond extracting and trading countries along with NGOs and
the representatives of the industry came together in Kimberley, South Africa to create a
mechanism to “clean” the industry from “conflict/blood diamonds.” The meeting was
initiated by South Africa, Namibia and Botswana (three major diamond extracting
countries) who invited Britain, the United States and Belgium (three major trading
countries) to join.
These developments put more pressure on the industry to take further action. With
the rising awareness on the part of the diamond industry, especially on the part of De
Beers, that “the campaign was here to stay”, The World Diamond Council (WDC), an
“industry NGO”, was established in 2000. The primary purpose behind the establishment
of WDC was to represent the industry on the issues related to conflict diamonds and
prevent an overall boycott from happening. WDC held its first meeting in Tel Aviv in
572
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September 2000 with the participation of other NGOs574 and WDC represented the
industry in the Kimberley Process negotiations from that point onward.
The launch of the Kimberley Process negotiations did not bring an end to the
campaigning efforts but rather brought in more allies and strengthened the coalition. In
October 2000, a new public awareness campaign was staged by Amnesty International
USA. The first action of the campaign was to hold a protest in New York in front of
Cartier’s. The protest was staged to support a bill drafted by the Congressman Tony Hall
(the Consumer Access to a Responsible Accounting of Trade Act, CARAT) that
proposed to require diamonds entering the USA to have a certificates of origin.575 Even
though the bill did not pass, the protest succeeded in attracting a number of human rights
NGOs’ attention to the issue.
In the light of the success of the previous efforts 200 NGOs got together in the
USA to lend support to ongoing Kimberley Process negotiations and launched a
campaign called “Campaign to Eliminate Conflict Diamonds.” The campaign was led by
a number of human rights NGOs such as Physicians for Human Rights, Amnesty
International USA, World Vision and Oxfam. Their first action was to organize a protest
at Tiffany’s on Valentine’s Day in 2001.576 This campaign was useful in keeping the
issue on the public’s agenda and making sure that the industry and the states followed
through with the negotiations.
UNSC showed its support to the ongoing KP negotiations by listing diamonds as
one of the five key minerals (along with coltan, copper, cobalt and gold) that fueled the
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war in Democratic Republic of Congo.577 UN General Assembly joined through a
Resolution and mandated the Kimberley Process to develop “international certification
scheme for rough diamonds.”578
As the Kimberley Process negotiations were proceeding one round after another,
NGOs focused on keeping the pressure on both the industry and governments on the one
hand, and keeping public interest alive, on the other. To that end, NGOs focused on fact
finding and reporting efforts in addition to public awareness campaigns. As a part of
these efforts, for instance PAC started to publish its periodic newsletter titled Other
Facets “on the international effort to end diamond-related conflict, human rights abuses
and corruption around the world.”579 Similarly, Fatal Transactions released its study on
the diamond trade in the European Union (EU), titled Conflict Diamonds: Crossing
European Borders? in August 2001. One month later, 180 NGOs got together and signed
a petition to urge “greater speed and accountability in the Kimberley Process.”580
After three years of negotiations, Kimberley Process Certification Scheme
(KPCS) was established in 2003 and endorsed by the UN General Assembly and the
UNSC. Although it became a major source of controversy later on, KP defined the
conflict diamonds as “rough diamonds used by rebel movements to finance wars against
legitimate governments.”581 Based on this definition, KPCS requires the trading countries
to certify the origin of rough diamonds and implement strict control over the supply chain
to prevent conflict diamonds from getting into the system. Participating states also
577
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Figure 2: Structure of the Kimberley Process
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committed to trade diamonds only with those who also take part in the KP.582 The KP
currently has fifty-four participants representing eighty-one countries583 (See Figure 2).
While it is the member states’ responsibility to implement KP measures, the
system is established in such a way that NGOs and industry representatives hold official
observer status, and take part in both day-to-day working and decision making processes
of the KP. The PAC is the only issue entrepreneur that is currently represented in the KP
Civil Society Coalition since Global Witness quit the KP in 2011 and Fatal Transactions
shifted their focus to other extractive industries in 2012.584 The PAC performs this
function in collaboration with a number of development and environmental NGOs who
joined the issue in later stages. Industry, on the other hand is represented by the World
Diamond Council. African Diamonds Producers Association (ADPA) and Diamond
Development Initiative International (DDII) also hold observer status. ADPA aims to
ensure better representation of African producers in the process585 whereas DDII focuses
on bettering the developmental implications of diamond trade.586
Studies estimated that the share of conflict diamonds in the world diamond trade
rose as high as 15% when it peaked in 1990s.587 While it is hard to provide accurate
estimates for the current situation, the share of conflict diamonds is believed to be around
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1% in today’s diamond industry.588 While there are a number of concerns regarding the
long-term effectiveness of the KP, as well as regarding its ability to impose sanctions
when necessary,589 it can be argued that KP is one of the fairly successful examples of
international efforts to address a transnational problem.
To Securitize or Not to Securitize: Building Networks and Engaging Targets at the
Agenda Setting Stage
During the agenda setting stage of the campaign, which took place between the
publication of the very first reports on the potential connection between diamonds and
deadly conflicts in Africa and the first meeting of the Kimberley Process, was mainly
dominated by a core group of NGOs and therefore, shaped by their framing preferences.
As the campaign evolved, the states and the industry have gained a more central role in
the process. Such change in the network dynamic resulted in a transition from a
simultaneous use of human rights and security frames to a strict use of a security frame.
The analysis conducted on written sources as well as the interviews held with actors
involved in the campaign reveals four main insights into actors’ framing preferences at
this stage of the advocacy campaign.
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During this stage, NGOs engaged in multivocalization by utilizing a number of
frames at the same time not only to attract the attention of targets of influence but also to
reach out to allies to strengthen their coalition. While human rights frame was mainly
used to attract other NGOs, the industry’s and the public attention to the issue, security
frame was used initially to get the support of the UNSC. The security frame was then
taken over by the industry who wanted to avoid the human rights frame. Thus, during this
stage, security frame was adopted by NGOs as a strategic tool to attract attention to
human rights problems associated with the trade of illicit diamonds rather than to
highlight the security implications that the issue has for the states.
The findings also illustrate that the motivations behind adopting security frames
are more complex than acknowledged by the existing literature. The extant scholarship
explains the motivation behind adopting security frames with one of two dynamics.
Security frames are either utilized by non-state actors to incentivize states to prioritize an
issue on their agenda590 or they are utilized by states themselves to take an issue outside
of the realm of politics.591 However, the Conflict Diamonds case illustrates that a security
frame can also be utilized in prioritizing an issue on a non-security related private actor’s
agenda. The analysis of the agenda setting stage illustrate that the security frame was
adopted and then enforced by the industry that was afraid of the implications that a
human rights frame could have for the industry.
The analysis of the agenda setting stage also illustrates that as the composition of
the campaign network changed, the power dynamics within the network evolved so did
the actors’ capacity to frame the issue. This was exemplified in the shift away from a
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human rights frame toward a strict use of the security frame, as the power of the states
and industry gradually increased at the expense of NGOs within the campaign.
The evidence also shows that the political context within which the campaign was
launched is also important in shaping the framing choices. At the agenda setting stage,
the ongoing civil wars in Africa as well Canada’s willingness to bring the issue onto the
UNSC agenda provided a fertile ground for security language to be utilized in
communicating the issue to the broader audience.
Cultivating Allies – Framing the Issue for the UNSC
At the agenda setting stage, the most important ally that the Conflict Diamonds
Campaign managed to cultivate was the UNSC. The UNSC supported the issue by not
only attracting states’ attention to it but also by helping NGOs pressure the diamond
industry. Ensuring UNSC’s support was a result of three dynamics: (i) existing concerns
that UNSC had about ongoing civil wars in Africa, (ii) Canada’s desire to prioritize
humanitarian concerns on the UNSC agenda, and (iii) the NGOs’ success in framing the
issue in a way that appealed to the concerns and the priorities of the Security Council.
The UNSC’s concern about the civil war in Angola preceded the campaign as
evidenced by the sanctions imposed on Angola in 1998.592 Requiring diamonds imported
from Angola to be certified by the government of Angola was part of the sanctions
imposed by the UNSC. However, at that point, the UNSC did not identify diamonds as
the main source of the problem or proposed an industry-wide certification mechanism.
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The sanctions instead approached certification of Angolan diamonds as a component of
the multifaceted attempts to limit the financial sources of UNITA.593
The ad hoc nature of the UNSC’s approach to the connection between diamonds
and conflict was evident in the wording of the sanctions as well. Diamonds were
mentioned only once in the Resolutions and they were not framed as an “issue” to be
systematically addressed. It was stated in the resolution that “[UNSC] decides also that
all States shall take the necessary measures… to prohibit the direct or indirect import
from Angola to their territory of all diamonds that are not controlled through the
Certificate of Origin regime of the GURN [Government of Unity and National
Reconciliation].”594 Nevertheless, the concern that the UNSC had about the civil wars in
Africa created a fertile ground for the campaign to get their arguments resonate with the
Council within a short period of time.
While the UNSC was concerned about the potential connection between the
diamonds and conflicts, they were not the ones who initiated the campaign or coined the
term conflict diamonds. Their involvement in the campaign was realized as a result of
two developments. The first important development was the beginning of Canada’s term
as a non-permanent member of the UNSC. With the beginning of Canada’s term, Robert
Fowler, Canadian Ambassador to the UN became the chair of the Angolan Sanctions
Committee which created a receptive ear for the issue of conflict diamonds to be heard by
the UN.595
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Canada’s receptive ear within the UNSC provided a significant point of access for
the issue entrepreneurs. Shortly after the release of the A Rough Trade report, which did
not use the term “conflict diamonds” itself, Global Witness was invited to the UNSC to
give an unofficial briefing on their findings.596 This briefing not only presented Global
Witness an opportunity to promote their cause but also paved the way to the creation of
an Expert Panel by Fowler to investigate the connection between diamonds and civil wars
in Africa.597 After that point onward the UNSC became an ally and showed its support to
the efforts to create an international mechanism in regulating the diamonds industry.
Getting the UNSC as an ally played a significant role not only in shaping the
framing preferences of the advocates but also in determining the campaign’s success. As
discussed in Chapter 2, a campaign’s success is highly dependent on the influential
actors’ (gatekeepers) willingness to adopt and promote the issue.598 The support that these
allies show is crucial in “signal[ing] the worthiness of certain issues”599 to both other
potential allies as well as to the targets of influence.
Not just “NGO superpowers,”600 but also international organizations perform the
function of “collective legitimization” where they are perceived as “the dispenser of
politically significant approval of the claims, policies, and actions of states.”601 The
UNSC plays especially a significant role due the structural power it has within the UN
System. UNSC uses this gatekeeping role mostly in issues that pertains to international
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security such as the role it plays in legitimizing the use of force.602 Yet, as True-Frost
analyzes, the UNSC has also been illustrating an increasing willingness to be as a
consumer of human rights and humanitarian norms.603 This willingness opened up a room
for the advocacy campaigns to get their voices heard through UNSC.
The receptive environment that the UNSC’s approach and the Canada’s initiative
created did not automatically lead to the securitization of the issue. Issue entrepreneurs
strategically highlighted the connection between ongoing conflicts in Africa and
diamonds in order to engage UNSC’s sensitivities and their current interest in African
civil wars. One strategy was to highlight the ineffectiveness of the existing sanctions
imposed by the Security Council to convince them that there is a need for a more
systematic approach. For instance, A Rough Trade argued that “the impact of the
embargo has been minimal and resulted in changes of export logistics rather than major
alterations in volume. Diamond traders and analysts confirm that the embargo has not had
a major impact on trade. The traders have simply altered the routes and obtained
deceptive paperwork from obliging countries.”604 In the reports that followed Global
Witness repeatedly emphasized the role of diamonds in supporting UNITA’s war efforts
as well as the inadequacy of the existing sanctions in solving the problem. For instance,
in a press release published in December 1998, it was similarly stated that “the UN has
failed to ensure that member states are rigorously implementing the embargo on
unofficial diamond exports from Angola.”605
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Once the issue entrepreneurs managed to get the UNSC to start listening to them,
they strengthened their security approach by starting to use the term “conflict diamonds”
in their statements when referring to the problem. Their goal was to convince the UNSC
that their efforts in ending conflicts would be futile unless the issue of diamonds was
addressed. In a press release published in January 2000, Global Witness used the term
“conflict diamonds” for the first time in pointing out the “loopholes” in the existing
“Certification of Origin” system put in place by the UNSC. Global Witness argued that
these loopholes “undermined international efforts to implement the UN embargo.”606
As the campaign was getting closer to the end of the agenda setting stage, the use
of “conflict diamonds” became more visible. This change became evident in the
consistent and repeated use of the term in a briefing document prepared by Global
Witness titled Conflict Diamonds: Possibilities for the Identification, Certification and
Control of Diamonds where they presented their visions for establishing a diamond
certification and verification mechanism. The document defined the conflict diamonds as
“[d]iamonds that originate from areas under the control of forces that are in opposition to
elected and internationally recognised governments, or are in any way connected to those
groups.”607 Adoption of such definition indicated that the use of multiple frames by the
issue entrepreneurs was getting replaced by a strict use of a security frame.
The strategy to emphasize the security implications of illicit diamond trade
proved to be useful both in the short run and in the long run. In the short run, a similar set
of sanctions were issued against Sierra Leone following PAC’s report. The primary goal
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of the sanctions was to prevent the trade of rough diamonds originated from Sierra Leone
in the international diamond market.608
In the long run, the framing efforts of the campaign succeeded in turning the
UNSC’s case by case approach in dealing with illicit diamond trade into a systematic one
under the “conflict diamonds” frame and paved the way to their support to the initiation
of the Kimberley Process. This effect became evident in the language used in UN
resolutions. While a number of resolutions that were published since 1998 emphasized
the link between diamond trade and conflicts,609 it was not until 2001 that the concept of
“conflict diamonds” started to be used in UN resolutions.
The UN General Assembly was first to use the term “conflict diamonds” within
the UN system in its Resolution 55/56 and stated that
The General Assembly, [e]xpressing its concern over the problem of conflict
diamonds fuelling conflicts in a number of countries and the devastating impact of
these conflicts on peace, safety and security for people in affected countries,...
Acknowledging that the problem of conflict diamonds is of serious international
concern, and that measures to address the problem should involve all concerned
parties, including producing, processing, exporting and importing countries, as
well as the diamond industry.”610
The UNSC followed suit and used the concept of conflict diamonds for the first time in
their Resolution 1343 in welcoming the UNGA’s take on the issue.611
Therefore, tailoring the issue as a security problem at the agenda setting stage was
a strategic move on the part of the advocates to reach out to a powerful potential ally.
This finding supports the arguments developed in the previous chapters that campaigns’
framing choices are also motivated by their desire to strengthen their coalitions.
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Engaging Targets – Getting the Industry to React
The initial attempts to frame the issue as a problem that is worthy of global
attention had diamond trading companies rather than states as their primary targets. To
that end, advocates initially used the human rights frame to both galvanize public support
and convince the industry that their actions need to be changed. Diamond industry
reacted to these initial frames fairly quickly as they were worried about the financial
implications of a campaign that focuses on human rights consequences of the issue. For
that reason, the industry counteracted by emphasizing the security frame at the expense of
the human rights frame with the hopes that the issue would not taint the entire industry
and lead to a financial catastrophe.
The industry has been in the spotlight since the very first stages of the campaign.
One of the very first reports that triggered the campaign, A Rough Trade, defined the
industry’s practices as the main source of the problem and suggested that “lack of
understanding and government scrutiny of the functioning of the diamond trade has
resulted in the absence of any serious examination of corporate culpability, allowing
many diamond companies to continue to operate without fear that their actions may be
called into question by consumers.”612 Not only the report portrayed the industry as the
main source of the problem but also the suggested course of action the report came up
with was a change in the way the industry functions: “It is time that a business which
operates in an arcane way, like a family business, re-assess its operation and accepts that
corporate accountability is now an important factor in international business.”613
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While the report held the diamond industry responsible for the damages created
by illegal diamond extraction and trade, the described “damage” was framed in human
rights terms. “A Rough Trade approached the issue of Angolan conflict diamonds
squarely in terms of unethical and unacceptable corporate conduct rather than as an
international or Angolan peace issue” [emphasis in the original].614 The report
highlighted the implications that such trade had on human rights and stated that:
[l]eading companies should accept that the rationales used to justify the buying of
‘outside goods’ (unofficial diamonds) in countries such as Angola and Sierra
Leone must be weighed in the balance with the possible and severe implications
that such a purchase can have, including the destruction wreaked by conflict, the
suffering of millions of people, the deaths of hundreds of thousands, the billions
of dollars of lost development and the high cost of conflict resolution.615
The consumer awareness campaign that was launched shortly after also had the
industry as its target. The goal of the Fatal Transactions campaign was detailed out as
“calling on the public and other interested organisations to ask governments and
companies involved in extractive industries to implement effective controls to ensure that
the trade in natural resources does not finance or otherwise support conflict and economic
injustice in Africa. The campaign wants to raise awareness and increase understanding of
how western companies are involved in conflicts in Africa through buying natural
resources from combatants.”616 Thus, the campaign primarily targeted the diamond
trading companies and focused on convincing them that keeping diamond trade a
profitable business depended on addressing the issue of illicit diamonds.617
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The second report that played a critical role in getting the campaign started, The
Heart of the Matter, also targeted the industry and used a similar combination of frames
in trying to get the industry to react. This report was prepared by PAC and concentrated
on the role of diamonds in Sierra Leone’s civil war: “Diamonds, in fact, have fueled
Sierra Leone’s conflict, destabilizing the country for the better part of three decades,
stealing its patrimony and robbing an entire generation of children, putting the country
dead last on the UNDP Human Development Index.”618 Thus, similar to the report
prepared by Global Witness, this report also focused on the responsibility of the industry
in fueling the armed conflict and held them responsible for the consequences that this
conflict had on people’s wellbeing.
One of the first people within the industry who reacted to the campaign was
Martin Rapaport, a prominent figure in the diamond industry who later became an ally
and one of the biggest critics of the diamond industry’s practices. After paying a visit to
Sierra Leone, Rapaport wrote an op-ed titled Guilt Trip in which he asked the industry to
take responsibility and work to clean the industry from “conflict diamonds.” He
suggested that
De Beers decision to certify the non-conflict nature of the diamonds they sell on
every invoice opens the way for other mining companies to provide similar
certification on their invoices. It also opens the way for subsequent buyers to state
— ‘The diamonds sold under this invoice have been certified by the seller as
being non-conflict diamonds.’ Such disclosure based on an affirmative statement
by the seller could be passed on through the entire diamond distribution system.619
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Martin Rapaport’s approach to the issue not only helped campaign put further
pressure on the industry but also paved the way for the industry to rally around the
concept of “conflict diamonds.” The industry never used the concept of “blood
diamonds” and never acknowledged their responsibility in leading to human rights
violations.620 Yet, promoting the “conflict diamonds” concept allowed them to replace
their generic use of “illicit diamond trade” with a new concept that would neutralize the
issue by packaging the problem as an isolated event.
For the industry, conflict diamonds were primarily a “public relations problem”
that had the potential to significantly damage both their reputation and also their financial
interests.621 Thus, the primary goal of the industry was to prevent a large scale boycott
that would stop the diamond trade all together. For that reason, it was in industry’s
interest to frame the issue as an “anomaly” that only affects a small portion of the traded
diamonds rather than a problem that stains all of the diamonds traded in the market.
Moreover, by using the term “conflict,” which is more abstract than the term “blood,” the
industry also meant to impersonalize the issue and strip the industry away from any
responsibility in the staining of these diamonds.622
As a function of the industry’s perception of the issue, testimonies also revealed
that the industry was receptive to the connection between diamonds and conflict
advocated by the campaign and promoted by Martin Rapaport. This acceptance was
mainly because the use of this particular language confined the issue to only a small
620
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portion of the traded diamonds and as a consequence it limited the potential financial
burden that the campaign was likely to create for them:
… industry worried that if something wasn’t done soon, their product which is
only good for decoration, a luxury product would soon be in trouble in the market
place. (Interviewee 1)
I think this forced the diamond industry particularly De Beers which at the time
had a larger control of the industry to do something. They recognized that the idea
of people throwing blooded Tiffany’s and you know in New York that wasn’t
going to be very good for optics. They really had to do something. So that was in
part forced them to sit down and start talking about something. (Interviewee 3)
The diamond industry was also a soft target, because [the industry] deal in nonessential luxury products which are very much dependent upon their reputation
among the consuming public. This meant that, where other industries may often
ignore reputational challenges, [the diamond industry] have no choice but to react.
(Interviewee 6)
For the industry, the emotional connotations of the term “blood” appeared to be the
primary reason behind the industry’s insistence on using the term “conflict diamonds.”
As a part of the industry’s initial efforts to limit the financial implications of the
campaign by framing illicit diamonds as an “anomaly” they also unsuccessfully
attempted to frame the Campaign itself as a security threat. For instance, in an article
published in Professional Jeweler in January 2001, the author argued that the conflict
diamonds campaign itself had the potential to “destabilize Southern African nations
where diamond revenue is used to improve the standard of living.”623 The industry also
tried (and failed) to shift the emphasis from “conflict diamonds” to “prosperity
diamonds” where they “proudly spoke of” legal diamond mining and trading practices in
Botswana, South Africa and Namibia and the contribution that diamonds make to these
countries’ economies.624 PAC reacted by publishing a number of reports in showing the
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limited impact that diamonds so far had on economic development of African
countries.625
Even though allies and targets of influence had varying reasons for being
receptive to different frames, toward the end of the agenda setting stage the security
language gained dominance with the coining of the term “conflict diamonds.” This in
turn resulted in the sidelining of human rights frame in the process. As is discussed in the
following section, when it came to the political commitment stage, the dynamics within
the network changed - leading to a change in the reasons behind and implications of
using a security frame.
States In, Blood Out: Changing the Power Dynamics, Institutionalizing the Security
Frame at the Political Commitment Stage
In a relatively short period of time, the advocates’ efforts have paid out and states
and industry representatives decided to come together to create a concrete mechanism to
clean the diamond industry from illicit diamonds. In May 2000, South Africa, Namibia
and Botswana spearheaded a meeting which turned into the first KP meeting.
Representatives of the industry, NGOs and the UK, the USA and Belgium (the major
trading countries) were called to attend the meeting and discuss how to “clean” the
market from conflict diamonds.626
When the framing of the issue is analyzed, four important dynamics are observed
in transitioning from the agenda setting stage to the political commitment stage. First, in
this process, the campaign adopted a narrow definition of “conflict diamonds” and
sidelined alternative frames. This change was mainly a consequence of the changing
dynamics within the network that brought states into the center of the network while
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decreasing the relative power of the NGOs. The industry was already a proponent of
using a term that would define the issue as an anomaly and states’ preferences to use the
term “conflict diamonds” was guided by their desire to make sure that the institutional
mechanisms developed in regulating the diamond industry would not put states’ practices
into question. While the decreasing power of NGOs within the network limited their
capacity to frame the issue, it did not completely strip them of their framing capacity,
either. Instead, NGOs used their limited framing capacity as a bargaining tool that they
utilize occasionally to ensure states’ and the industry’s commitment to the process.
Second, and related to the increased role of the states within the network, while it
was not the first time that the security frame was introduced, the nature and the
implications of the security frame changed significantly. At the agenda setting stage,
security language was a function of NGOs’ desire to get the UNSC on their side and the
industry’s motivation to prevent a large-scale boycott. Thus, the use of the security
language at the agenda setting stage was mostly instrumental in addressing the human
rights consequences of these conflicts without destroying the diamond industry
altogether. However, when it came to the political commitment stage, the security
language in the sense of “protecting national security” got embedded in the very
definition of the “conflict diamonds” upon which the KP was established. This in return
resulted in the shunning of the human rights frame from the debate. This supports the
arguments in the literature about the long-term negative consequences of adopting
security frames.627
While the second finding supports the arguments in the securitization literature,
the third one challenges them. The securitization literature suggests that the motivation
627
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behind adopting a security frame is what this frame implies for the actors. In other words,
security frames are useful in attracting states’ attention to an issue because of the
receptiveness of the states to the imminent danger that the issue is argued to present.628
However, the states’ and the industry’s motivations in adopting a security frame illustrate
that the reason behind opting for a security frame can also be a function of what this
frame leaves out (human rights practices) rather than what it entails (a threat to national
security).
Lastly, while the broader political context within which the campaign was
operating was gradually changing, rather than initiating a change in the framing of the
issue, the newly rising dynamics in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks reinforced
the prioritization of national security concerns in the framing of the conflict diamonds
issue.
Institutionalizing the Security Frame
One of the very important steps in strategically reframing the issue of conflict
diamonds as a threat to national security took place in the early stages of the political
commitment phase, and resulted in the institutionalization of the “conflict diamonds”
concept into the KP. This subsection traces the changes in framing preferences and then
discusses the reasons behind them.
Once the KP negotiations began, issue entrepreneurs that focused on highlighting
the human rights consequences of the issue at the agenda setting stage started to make
“conflict diamonds” the only frame through which they discuss and promote the issue.
For instance, within the period between the years 2000 and 2003 PAC published twelve
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issues of Other Facets. These newsletters are important as they have been the primary
publications through which PAC communicates its perceptions and assessments of the
developments pertaining to Kimberley Process. In these newsletters the term “blood
diamonds” was used nine times in total whereas the term “conflict diamonds” was used
hundred and twenty-six times. In instances where “blood diamonds” was used, it was to
indicate that they were using this concept in replacing the term “blood diamonds.”
Similarly, PAC published a total of eleven reports within the same period. In these
reports, that are more formal expressions of PAC’s approach to the issue, PAC used the
concept of “conflict diamonds” hundred and forty-four times whereas they did not use the
term “blood diamonds” once (See Table 16).
Table 15: The Use Blood Diamonds and Conflict Diamonds in PAC publications (20002003)629

Other Facets
Reports
Total

number of
Blood
Conflict
publications
Diamonds Diamonds
12
9
126
11
0
144
23
9
270

The securitization trend was also apparent in the reports published by nongovernmental actors who got involved in the issue at the political commitment stage. For
instance, in their 2002 report World Peace Foundation used “blood diamonds” concept
once while the concept of “conflict diamonds” was used in seventy-four occasions.630
Similarly, in CRS Report for Congress prepared in 2003, the concept of “blood
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diamonds” was mentioned once631 whereas the concept of “conflict diamonds” was used
seventy-five times in this thirty-six page long report.632
The changes in the advocates’ framing choices did neither happen in a vacuum
nor without a reason. Instead, they were built on the industry’s insistence on using a
limited definition and the interest that states saw in doing so. The disproportionate power
that the negotiation process vested in the states resulted in the institutionalization of the
security frame. The same trend surfaced during the Kimberley Process negotiations as a
part of the efforts concentrated on coming up with a definition of conflict diamonds that
would keep both the industry and the large number of states with varying interests at the
table. As Interviewee 3 notes:
I don’t think that the people who were negotiating the Kimberley Process all had
very homogeneous intentions; I think everybody had different motivations in
doing it. I think from African government point of view I think a lot of it would
have been very much about this idea of controlling their national boundaries better
and securing more revenues perhaps from these diamonds. Essentially toppling
civil, rebel groups, you know undermining their legitimacy in some ways.
In this respect, efforts to develop a limited definition of conflict diamonds that
focuses on national security were a function of the changing dynamics within the network
and a reflection of the priorities of those who had the upper hand in the network. In other
words, the increasing role of states and the industry and the need to incorporate large
number of actors with diverse interests and priorities can argued to be the primary reason
for adopting a limited definition of conflict diamonds. Thus, the campaign adopted a
security frame mainly because, as Nichols puts it, “without limiting “conflict diamonds"
to a small percentage of all diamonds, De Beers would have backed out; without focusing
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on rebel movements' use of diamonds, the governments would not have agreed.”633 This
reasoning was echoed by the interviewees, as well:
This was a negotiation between states and every new meeting a new state would
join because it started with a small group of states, mainly sub-Saharan diamond
producers, the US and Belgium, the UK, Israel but more and more countries
understood that “wait a second we trade diamonds, we need to be a part of it or
we want to trade diamonds in future or we think we have diamonds in our soil and
we want to exploit these diamonds in the future, we need to be a part of it”. Then
you have got your typical problem, all the time with countries that are not
accepted to exist like Taiwan is not accepted by China, your issue with European
Commission not being a country but trade issues are a European competence and
not the competence of individual member states so they have a role. Diamond
traders among themselves, De Beers being the biggest player, the World Diamond
Council in Antwerp wanting to have a say so everybody had different fuse…
(Interviewee 2)
While the reasons behind the industry’s insistence on using a securitized notion of
illicit diamonds were discussed in the previous section, the motivation that states had in
adopting a similar approach requires some explanation. The literature argues that states’
receptiveness to security frames was a function of the indisputable place that security
concerns occupy on their agendas. As a result of that, securitized issues are argued to
have a better chance at attracting states’ attention as they appeal to these priorities.634 In
other words security frames work because it tells states what they want to hear. However,
the analysis of the Conflict Diamonds campaign illustrates that the security frame worked
because it left out what states did not want to hear: the human rights consequences of
their diamond handling.
You would never have an agreement with a country like Russia or China if you
would have dealt with human right abuses by governments. Governments are not
signing up to an agreement that puts them on the spot. I mean we tried and it
shows now with the issue in Zimbabwe for the last couple of years that it actually
harms the Kimberley Process that it limits itself to rebel movements but at that
633
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point it was still quite a gain that we managed to have such a broad coalition to
sign up. (Interviewee 2)
In the end of three-year long negotiations and as a result of these dynamics, KP
defined conflict diamonds as: “rough diamonds used by rebel movements or their allies to
finance conflict aimed at undermining legitimate governments, as described in relevant
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions insofar as they remain in effect, or
in other similar UNSC resolutions which may be adopted in the future, and as understood
and recognised in United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 55/56, or in
other similar UNGA resolutions which may be adopted in future.”635 The formal adoption
of this definition finalized the institutionalization of the security frame within the KP
structure.
As also suggested by the securitization literature, institutionalization of the
security frame resulted in the sidelining of human rights concerns. Human rights
violations were indeed mentioned in the KPCS,636 but by limiting the very definition of
conflict diamonds to diamonds that are used in financing rebel actions against legitimate
governments, KP sidelined the human rights consequences of governments’ handling of
diamonds. In other words, by limiting the definition of conflict diamonds to diamonds
that pose a threat to “legitimate governments,” the political commitment stage
essentialized the national security dimension of the issue as a condition for being
considered as “conflict diamond.” As a result, the language that was initially adopted by
the advocates strategically with the assumption that it would also encompass human
635
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rights concerns became the very reason why human rights violations as well as other
concerns got sidelined at the expense of national security.
I think that the human rights aspect, I think it has been very implicit in the KP. I
think if you look back at why the KP was created; it wasn’t created because a
bunch of governments wanted to exchange certificates about in extraction figures
and trade figures. It was created because it was a human rights problem that had
to be resolved. And I think this is one of the oversights of the founding fathers with the exception of one woman I think pretty much was a bunch of men - I
think that this perhaps was what they overlooked, they just thought that it was so
self-evident that you didn’t have to put that explicit language in there.
(Interviewee 3)
While the changing dynamics within the network was the most important factor in
altering the framing of the issue at the political commitment stage, it is important to note
that the changes within the broader political context also contributed to this process. In
understanding how the actual content of the security frame has evolved to a one that
strictly focuses on the protection of legitimate governments, the impact of September 11
attacks that took place during the KP negotiations also need to be taken into
consideration. While the securitization of the conflict diamonds issue cannot be attributed
to these attacks or the political atmosphere that developed afterwards, it nonetheless had
an impact on the negotiation process. For instance, one interviewee recalling the
negotiation process stated that:
When 9/11 took place the whole Kimberley process was in session in London. So
we were there, we all stayed, all diplomats all NGOs and we watched the flights
going to the tower. So you could say that it had a little bit of a change atmosphere
afterwards and I have heard some people arguing that diamonds are also very
useful to trade for Al Qaeda kind of groups. (Interviewee 2)
Some NGOs also incorporated this new security language into their approach. For
instance Global Witness’s report For a Few Dollars More: How Al Qaeda Moved into
the Diamond Trade, published in April 2003, was crucial in solidifying the security
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threats that conflict diamonds issue was argued to present. The report stated that “Global
Witness presents evidence that confirms that al Qaeda has been involved in the rough
diamond trade since the 1990s. First in Kenya and Tanzania and then in Sierra Leone and
Liberia, where they began to show an interest in diamond trading in 1998, following the
crackdown on their financial activities in the wake of the US embassy bombings in
Kenya and Tanzania.”637 Thus, the institutionalization of the security frame was not only
a function of the states’ and the industry’s framing preferences but it was also enforced
by the developments in the broader political context.
Holding onto “Blood Diamonds” for a Rainy Day
The decline in the relative power of the NGOs within the network limited their
ability to frame the debate and pursue alternative approaches. Nevertheless, despite the
central role that states assumed at the political commitment stage, NGOs did not
completely lose their ability to frame the discussion, either. Once the combined use of
human rights and security frames accomplished its primary goal of reaching out to
potential allies and targets of influence, NGOs’ priorities have changed and keeping the
related parties at the negotiation table became the number one priority. With that purpose,
NGOs have complied with states’ and the industry’s framing preferences evidenced by
above discussed examples.
Despite the overall compliance with the security frame, NGOs occasionally used
the term “blood diamonds” as a bargaining tool, as well. While the NGOs agreed to use
the term conflict diamonds to keep the industry, as well as the states, committed to the
process, they resorted to “blood diamonds” whenever they feel the need to strong-arm the
industry and states into keeping their commitment to the negotiation process.
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The use of “blood diamonds” term as a bargaining tool became apparent in the
press releases distributed by the issue entrepreneurs during the KP negotiations. For
instance, in a joint press release by PAC, Global Witness and Fatal Transactions, which
was published as a reaction to the stalemate that the negotiations were in, stated that
“[t]he Kimberley Process must succeed. To do so, it must produce a strong and effective
plan at its forthcoming meeting in Botswana, for presentation to the United Nations
General Assembly in December. Less would be a mockery of blood diamonds’ innocent
victims and a travesty of the current international resolve on terrorism.”638
The term “blood diamonds” was similarly used in pressuring the industry, as well.
For instance, in reacting to the resolution reached at the World Diamond Congress in
October 2002, Amnesty International called the industry to take more tangible steps in
developing solutions by stating that, “There are no credible guarantees that this system
will serve to break the link between diamonds and human rights abuses. For example, it
is likely to do nothing to stop blood from being spilled on a daily basis in the diamond
fields of the Democratic Republic of Congo.”639
Advocates’ testimonies revealed similar insights:
The business and governments wanted to talk about conflict diamonds and if we
want to make them very angry we would talk about blood diamonds. (Interviewee
2)
… In the Kimberley process we pretty soon settled without much debate on the
term conflict diamonds. And occasionally, an NGO or somebody in one of the
meetings would use the term blood diamonds and you would pretty soon, if it
persisted, you would see somebody from the industry’s hand shooting up and
638
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saying “listen I thought we agreed we were going to use the term conflict
diamonds.” (Interviewee 1)
Thus, while the advocates’ decreasing power within the network as well as their
interest in keeping the industry and the states at the negotiation table encouraged them to
settle on a security frame, they nevertheless, strategically invoked human rights frames
embedded in the term “blood diamonds” whenever they felt the need to strong-arm the
targets of influence.
The analysis of the political commitment stage illustrated that changes in the
composition of the actors involved in the campaign altered the power dynamics and the
actors’ capacity to frame the issue. The shift of power from the NGOs to the industry and
the states turned a strategically-used security frame to attract attention to human rights
consequences of the issue into a discursive structure that aims to limit the meaning and
the purpose of the campaign to focus on the protection of national governments against
the rebels. NGOs, nonetheless, resumed some of their framing power and used the
concept of “blood diamonds” as a bargaining tool to keep the negotiations going. This
shift shaped the content and the nature of the policy implementation process, as well.
Once Securitized, Always Securitized (?): Criticizing the Institution, De-securitizing
the Issue – Policy Implementation Stage
The three-year long negotiations resulted in the establishment of the Kimberley
Process Certification Scheme which also marked the beginning of the policy
implementation stage. KPCS can be considered as an example of policy implementation
success as the certification scheme is being implemented by almost all of the diamond
extracting and trading countries and the system regulates about 99% of the international
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rough diamond trade.640 The KP is, in its structure, a voluntary agreement but
nevertheless, it has been functioning as a compulsory one as the established system
requires the states to abide by the KPCS standards if they want to trade diamonds with
KP countries.641 The last ten years’ records illustrate that the KP has accomplished an
important level of success “in curtailing the trade in illegal and illegitimate diamonds.” It
has been also acknowledged to play a role in nearly complete elimination of conflict
diamond trade originating from Central and West Africa (with the notable exceptions of
some regions in Côte d’Ivoire and the DRC)”.642
The analysis of the policy implementation stage reveals that the changes in the
political context made various actors aware of the states’ wrongdoings in handling
diamonds. This in return paved the way to numerous attempts to de-securitize the KP’s
approach to diamonds. Despite these efforts no significant change has been observed so
far due to the power dynamics as well as the institutional structure of the KP.
Unchanging Power Dynamics within a Changing Political Context – Early Attempts
to De-securitize
Despite the KP’s relative success, this stage has also been witnessing an
increasing tension between those who insist on adhering to the limited conceptualization
of conflict diamonds and those who work to expand the frame in order to bring human
rights and development implications of the problem into the debate.
This tension was a result of two dynamics. On the one hand, institutionalization of
the “conflict diamonds” concept into the structure of KPCS as well as member states’
640
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framing preferences have perpetuated the use of a strict national security frame despite
increasing criticisms. On the other hand, the fact that the major diamond fueled civil wars
have come to an end altered the broader political context within which the campaign
operates and led to two sets of trends: one for those who want to keep the momentum
behind the KP and one for those who want to reform it.
Those who want to keep the KP’s momentum have turned their attention to the
ongoing and potential security threats that conflict diamonds pose in order to show the
continued need for the KP. For instance, in a report published by Global Witness in 2006
it was stated that “[d]iamonds are still fuelling conflict... The number of conflict
diamonds has significantly reduced because peace agreements have been signed in
countries in Western and Southern Africa. But more diamond-fuelled wars could happen
in the future unless the Kimberley Process strengthens government controls and the
diamond industry cleans up its act.”643
The end of the civil wars also created an opportunity for the critics who wanted to
highlight the problems with governments’ handling of diamonds. Despite the early
success and the efforts to keep the momentum up, KP’s slowness in suspending members
that violate the terms of the agreement created an important challenge for the proponents
of the existing frame. The narrowness of the conflict diamonds definition itself started to
be highlighted as the core reason behind the KP’s limited capacity to address violations.
The main concern was that the current emphasis on security has been giving leeway for
states to use diamond trade to violate human rights, damage the environment, and hinder
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economic development.644 This criticism, in return, has found its reflection in the calls for
reform that ask to replace conflict diamonds frame with “blood diamonds” to
accommodate non-security related concerns.
The advocates who became critical of the KP started to focus on de-securitizing
the issue by reintroducing the use of the term “blood diamonds” much more frequently
than they were used at the political commitment stage. This trend becomes clear when the
number of times that the concept of “blood diamonds” and “conflict diamonds” were
used by the advocates in their publications is analyzed. The combined use of the term
“blood diamonds” in the reports published by Global Witness and reports and newsletters
published by PAC adds up to ten instances between the years 2000 and 2003. During
same time period, the same publications used the term “conflict diamonds” two hundred
and eighty-three times. When the process transitioned to the policy implementation stage,
we observe that the concept of “blood diamonds” started to be used more frequently. The
same actor’ publications have resorted to the concept of “blood diamonds” hundred and
fourteen times since the establishment of the KPCS whereas the concept of “conflict
diamonds” appeared four hundred and sixty-one times in the same publications (see
Figure 3).
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Figure 3: The Number of Times the Concepts Appeared in Publications (2000-2003 and
2004-2015)
The attempts to de-securitize the issue have not only been apparent in the sheer
frequency at which the concept of “blood diamonds” was used. These attempts have also
been apparent in the contexts in which the term “blood diamonds” was used. While the
reports kept using the term “conflict diamonds” when referring to the official functioning
of the KP, the term “blood diamonds” was invoked when the system was being criticized.
For instance, in their report titled The Truth about Diamonds, Global Witness used
“conflict diamonds” in defining the issue and emphasizing the role of diamonds in
fueling conflicts, but they switched to “blood diamonds” when they were highlighting the
limitations of the existing system:
Although the Kimberley Process makes it more difficult for diamonds from rebelheld areas to reach international markets, there are still significant weaknesses that
undermine its effectiveness and allow the trade in blood diamonds to continue...
Kimberley Process meeting held in Botswana in early November [2006] made
welcome commitments to strengthen the scheme but governments must
accompany this with action if they are serious about stopping blood diamonds.645
Similarly, in their joint report with Global Witness, Amnesty International stated that
“poor government controls and enforcement are allowing blood diamonds to be certified
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as conflict-free. Unscrupulous diamond traders are knowingly violating the Kimberley
Process and national laws.”646
Marange Incident – A Turning Point for the Credibility of the Security Frame
The increasing criticism peaked with reports revealing that the Mugabe regime in
Zimbabwe killed around 200 miners in the Marange region in a military operation. 647 The
report detailing the killings initiated a reaction in the KP and resulted in an embargo
against Zimbabwe in 2009. The embargo was lifted in 2011 which triggered even more
reaction from the NGOs. The reactions intensified as it became apparent that the revenues
that Mugabe regime made from their partnership with Anjin Investments (Chinese led
diamond producing venture) were used to oppress the opposition prior to the elections.648
The support the Mugabe regime received was in many forms and the reports suggested
that “the feared Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO), Mugabe's secret police, is
flushed with cash, and has bought hundreds of vehicles and weapons from China in
recent months. Salaries have been increased and thousands of new officers are being
trained, raising concerns that they will be used to intimidate voters in next year's
elections.”649
Both the tendency to use the term “blood diamonds” and the emphasis put on the
need to address human rights violations increased as a result of the developments in
Zimbabwe. Not only the newspaper articles written on Marange region650 but also the
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NGOs that have been deliberately using the security frame started to pay more attention
to non-security related consequences of illicit diamond trade. For instance, while the
human rights implications of conflict diamonds were mentioned in a total of twenty-four
times in thirty-six publications produced by Global Witness and PAC between the years
2004 and 2008, the same implications were mentioned hundred and forty-eight times in
nineteen reports published since 2009 (See Figure 4).

Figure 4: The Number of Times PAC and Global Witness Publications Refer to Human
Rights Implications of the Issue in Their Publications
Martin Rapaport, the leading figure in the diamond industry who has been
working to clean the industry from conflict diamonds, was one of the critics who resorted
to such a use. Following the developments in Zimbabwe he directly criticized the conflict
diamonds definition of the KP by stating that “The KP definition of conflict diamonds
does not address human rights violations and does not include blood diamonds. It is a
legal definition established by governments to limit the scope and authority of the KP.
accessed 21 January 2014; Evans-Pritchard, “Zimbabwe’s ‘Blood Diamonds’ exposed by Wikileaks
Cable,” The Telegraph, 10 December 2010, available at
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/industry/mining/8192700/Zimbabwes-BloodDiamonds-exposed-by-Wikileaks-cable.html>, accessed 21 January 2014.
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The KP is a highly politicized process controlled by governments for governments. Its
primary function is to protect governments and their revenue - legitimate or not - from
rebel forces and consumer boycotts. The KP is essentially agnostic when it comes to
human rights.”651 In order to remedy this problem, Rapaport suggested replacing the term
conflict diamonds with blood diamonds which he defined as “diamonds involved in
murder, mutilation, rape and forced servitude.”652
Following Rapaport’s suggestion to replace “conflict diamonds” with “blood
diamonds,” other key NGOs also started to use the concept of “blood diamonds” more
freely with the purpose of reforming the international regime. For instance, in their report
on Zimbabwe published in 2010 PAC adopted such a use and suggested that
“Zimbabwe’s diamonds are ‘blood diamonds’” and cited the very definition of conflict
diamonds within the KP as the basis for Zimbabwe’s denial of their wrong-doings.653
Similarly, Global Witness published a report in 2010 titled Return of the Blood Diamond
criticizing the KP’s reaction to the developments in Zimbabwe.654
The criticism surrounding the KP’s inability to properly react to the developments
in Zimbabwe emphasized the non-security consequences of these developments and
strengthened the calls to reframe “conflict diamonds”. For instance, PAC explained the
situation in Zimbabwe in its report:
the story of Zimbabwe’s contested diamond fields is about many things:
smuggling and frontier hucksterism; a scramble fuelled by raw economic
desperation and unfathomable greed; and, of course, heart-wrenching cases of
government-sponsored repression and human rights violations... Zimbabwe is not
the only country failing to meet some or all of the basic requirements asked of
diamond producing nations by the Kimberley Process…But Zimbabwe sets itself
651
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apart from the others because of the government’s brazen defiance of universally
agreed principles of humanity and good governance expected of adherents to the
Kimberley Process.655
These developments brought the discussion on the need to address the “human
rights violations conducted by state and non-state actors” to the forefront of the KP’s
agenda, as well. KP’s Civil Society Coalition started to raise its voice and demanded the
definition of conflict diamonds to be revisited. They argued that “implicit in the KP’s
response to Marange was the acceptance that rights violations by those other than rebel
movements not only matter to the KP, but that the KP has the moral authority to
investigate and take remedial action.” 656 Yet, their call did not trigger any tangible action
within the KP.
The debate over the need to move away from a security frame became so heated
that Global Witness, one of the issue entrepreneurs and a member of the KP Civil Society
Coalition left the KP in 2011 arguing that KP will remain in a stalemate unless such
move is made – which they evaluated as something that is not likely to take place.657
Nevertheless, despite these criticisms, the unchanging preferences and priorities of the
states and the industry prevented any meaningful change from taking place.
Interestingly, the security frame embedded in the KP has not only been perceived
as a source of KP’s inability to address human rights concerns but also as a source of
655
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KP’s limited ability to address variety of security concerns, as well. In other words, the
problems with KP’s effectiveness have also been partially attributed to its inability to
adapt to changing security needs. Thus, it has been argued that by building the system on
a very limited definition of conflict diamonds, the KP’s ability to foresee and react to
different sources of violence got curtailed. Alan Martin of PAC explained this by saying
that “[t]he violence in the diamond sector has changed since the creation of the
Kimberley Process…Today, it is not only the rebel groups sanctioned by the Kimberley
Process that stand accused of abuses, but state bodies and private security firms. There is
also growing concern that diamond revenue is not ending up in the pockets of the people
who need it most.”658
One example of such failure on the part of the KP was regarding the rebel
movement in Central African Republic (CAR). While there were reports suggesting that
Seleka, the coalition of rebel groups in CAR was funding their efforts through
exploitation of diamond extraction,659 the KP only took steps after the rebels gained the
control of the government.660 The official reason provided by the KP in explaining their
lateness in reacting to the situation in CAR was that the “restrictive definition of conflict
diamonds only allows for intervention should rebel groups attempt to overthrow a
government”, which was not the case when the initial reports were published.661 This
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event has led even the state representatives to question the restrictive definition of
conflict diamonds.662
What Prevents De-securitization from Succeeding?
The limited capacity that the KP so far had in not only acknowledging the nonsecurity consequences of the illicit diamond trade but also in addressing the changing
security concerns supports the arguments of the securitization literature regarding the
long-term negative implications of adopting a security frame. Nevertheless, a close
analysis also reveals that the reasons behind the negative implications of using security
frames as well as the difficulty in de-securitizing an issue are not necessarily a function
of the “unique” position that security threats occupy on states’ agendas.
In the case of the conflict diamonds, two factors have so far hindered the attempts
to de-securitize the issue. First, the relative power of states within the network has been
critical in their ability to insist on using a security frame as evidenced by the problems
experienced with Angola. Angola played an active role in the establishment of KPCS in
2003. Angola’s approach, and therefore their framing preferences at the time, was a
function of their experience with a decade long civil war.663 After the establishment of
the KP, the civil war in Angola came to an end and the president José Eduardo dos
Santos, who became triumphant at the end of the civil war, is still in power. Civil war
induced violence in the diamond industry was replaced with important roles that generals
of the Angolan army play in the industry. Angolan government has been accused of
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various human rights violations664 but they rejected these allegations665 and they strongly
opposed any sanctions to be imposed on Zimbabwe, as well.666
Thus, the difficulty in reframing conflict diamonds has been partially a function
of states’ reluctance to open themselves to any allegations of human rights violations.
Since states are holding their central role within the network, their priorities are still
playing a significant role in the framing of the issue. As stated earlier, “conflict
diamonds”, by definition, refers to extraction and trade of diamonds by rebels. In joining
the KP, the states were diligent in making sure that the definition of conflict diamonds
was kept narrow and that it made no reference to government actions or human rights
consequences of such actions.
The second reason why the calls for reframing the issue of conflict diamonds have
not found reflection on the ground was due to the institutional structure of the KP. The
KP’s decision making structure requires consensus for a decision to be made. While nongovernmental organizations and representatives of the industry are official participants of
the KP, member states are the only ones who get to vote when decisions are being made.
Therefore, a reform that would expand the definition of conflict diamonds would require
unanimity, which is proved to be extremely difficult given states’ positions on the
issue.667 Interviewees also raised similar concerns in their testimonies.
I think certainly the architecture that was created was very, it was created hastily
without thinking through how the landscape would change over time. I think if
you look at some of the new multi stake-holder initiatives particularly EITI
[Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative], I think there is a more of
664
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acceptance and an inclusion in language in core documents that accepts that the
world would change. I think even particularly on the kind of voting, decision
making mechanisms, making sure that you can actually not get bogged down in
people who you know where one country just says “I want to say no because I am
somehow compromised therefore there will be no forward movement”. And I
think this is where I think the Kimberley Process is falling down in its inability to
be adaptive, ability to recognize that the world will constantly change and the
scene in our landscape will constantly change and expectations of governments
and industry will always change. (Interviewee 3)
We couldn’t get agreement inside the Kimberley Process to deal with anything
except what was on the initial agenda. So, expanding the mandate, going into
human rights, going into development, going into the environment, a lot of
countries understood the need for that, many would have agreed to that in the
Kimberley Process but a lot said “no, that’s too much, we are not interested” and
the way decision making works in the Kimberley Process, if you don’t have pretty
much everybody on board, you couldn’t go ahead (Interviewee 1)
Thus, it can be argued that the sustained use of a particular frame does not have to be a
function of the perceived benefits of using that frame. The utilization could also be a
function of the institutional structure that makes it difficult to alter the frame even when
there is demand for it.
In this respect, the findings supported the arguments in the literature that adopting
a security frame results in the sidelining of other concerns associated with the issue,
which in return has a potential to lead to unintended negative consequences in the longrun.668 The analysis of the Conflict Diamonds campaign supports this argument as
securitization of the issue resulted in decreased attention being paid to the human rights
implications of diamonds. Yet, the findings also illustrated that this sidelining was not
due to the unique role that security concerns play on states’ agendas, but rather a
consequence of the institutionalization of the frame which makes it difficult to initiate a
change even when security frame is no longer perceived to be desirable.
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Any Hope Left for De-Securitization?
Nevertheless, the difficulty in reframing conflict diamonds within the KP system
has not brought an end to the attempts to do so. For instance, the KP’s inability to address
development concerns has given rise to development of alternative efforts one of which is
Diamond Development Initiative International (DDII). DDII was later followed by Peace
Diamond Alliance, Community and Small Scale Mining Initiative and The Campaign for
Just Mining among other multi-stakeholder efforts.669 While security frame that became
embedded into the system has been limiting KP’s ability to address various concerns, it
does not mean that the actors’ hands have been completely tied.
Similarly, actors who are not satisfied with KP’s ability to address human rights
consequences of conflict diamonds have been pursuing alternative venues. For instance,
Survival International (SI), a British-based NGO, worked to bring the relocation of the
“Bushmen” in Botswana, which was done in order to clear the potential diamond mines
from natives, onto the international agenda. As a part of their efforts SI and their partners
tried to threaten the Botswana’s economy by targeting its goal to become a tourist
destination. The efforts paid out and as a result, the Botswana’s high court decided to
recognize the “Bushmen’s” right to return to their land.670
Overall, when the developments in the policy implementation stage were analyzed
it can be concluded that once a security frame that is strictly limited to the protection of
national security got embedded into the system, the frame itself became an obstacle in
front of addressing the main problems associated with the issue. While the relative power
of the actors within the network as well as the institutional structure contributed to the
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perpetuated use of a narrow definition of conflict diamonds, the changing political
context encouraged NGOs to question this definition and provided opportunities to work
toward reframing the issue to address non-security implications.
Conclusion
The close analysis of the Conflict Diamonds issue, on the one hand, provided a
number of insights into the dynamics and implications of securitization and supported
some of the arguments in the literature while challenging the others. On the other hand,
the analysis also provided evidence that supported the arguments developed in the
previous chapters regarding the dynamics of framing.
The analysis of the agenda setting stage illustrated that campaigns engage in
multivocalization where they use multiple frames simultaneously to reach out to not only
the targets of influence but also to potential allies. The advocates simultaneously used
security and human rights frames together at the early stages of the campaign where they
utilized the former to appeal to the UNSC as a potential ally and the latter to invoke a
reaction from the industry. This finding further supported the arguments of the previous
chapters and illustrated that the strategic motivations’ behind advocates’ framing choices
are not necessarily about convincing target actors, they are also tailored as an instrument
of coalition-building.
The campaign’s attempts to multivocalize the issue has not come to end when the
security frame got institutionalized into the KP’s structure. During the political
commitment stage the advocates selectively used a human rights frame as a “stick” to
ensure the compliance of the targets of influence. The advocates started to use the human
rights frame more frequently at the policy implementation stage and this time with the
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goal of pressuring the targets of influence to change their approach and embrace the
human rights frame.
The findings also illustrated that the actors’ motivations in adopting security
frames are more complex than appreciated by the literature. The literature suggests that
security frames are used to attract states’ attention to an issue based on the assumption
that framing an issue as a security threat automatically prioritizes that item on states’
agenda. However, the analysis illustrated that adopting a security frame does not have to
target states; it could be tailored to get non-state actors to commit to an issue as
exemplified by the use of the security language to convince the diamond industry to take
action. The analysis also showed that states’ and other actors’ receptiveness of a security
frame does not have to be a function of what that frame implies (a security threat) but it
could also be a function of what it leaves out (human rights violations).
The discussion on how the content and implications of using a security frame
have changed over time illustrated the importance of network dynamics. Once the states
and the industry became involved in the issue and became the main actors that have the
capacity to frame the discussion, they shifted the security frame to a one that only focuses
on the threats to national governments. This presented a significant shift away from the
agenda setting stage where framing was primarily in the hands of the NGOs. During this
period, rather than focusing on the protection of national governments, the NGOs utilized
the security frame as an opportunity to attract attention to human rights consequences of
conflict diamonds. While the NGOs’ framing capacity decreased over time, they
nevertheless, engaged in alternative methods to use their limited power to reshape the
discussion on the issue.
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The analysis additionally revealed that the strategic environment within which a
campaign takes place has an important bearing on the framing of the issue, as well. The
political context can both function as an enabling factor and also as a limitation in
shaping the frames used. While the ongoing civil wars in Africa as well as the Canadian
presence in the UNSC provided the necessary initial momentum for NGOs to
successfully start the campaign, the September 11 attacks functioned as an impediment
when the NGOs wanted to move the frame away from the protection of national security
to the protection of individuals. Similarly, when it came to the policy implementation
stage, the changing political dynamics in Africa encouraged NGOs to bring states’
handling of diamond extraction and trade into the spotlight.
Finally, the fact that the security frame has not been replaced with an alternative
frame, despite mounting criticism at the policy implementation stage, illustrated the role
of institutional structures in sustaining advocacy frames. While the analysis supported the
arguments in the literature and exemplified the long-term negative implications of
adopting security frames, it also supported the arguments made in the previous chapters
in challenging the uniqueness attributed to security frames by the literature. The close
analysis illustrated that rather than being a consequence of the unique importance
attached to security concerns, it is the institutionalization of the frame that sustains
securitization over time. The KP’s mechanisms that were built on a very strict version of
a security frame empowered the actors who benefit from sticking to this narrow
definition and made it almost impossible for alternative frames to find themselves a place
within this structure. While the institutional structure made it difficult to de-securitize the
issue, it did not stop the critics from pursuing alternative venues that would be responsive
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to their concerns. Therefore, no matter how difficult the securitization process has made
the issue for the advocates, it has not brought an end to them.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
This study explores why transnational advocacy campaigns use security frames as
a part of their attempts to get the international community to address transnational social
problems. The puzzle that triggered this question was the discrepancies observed between
the arguments developed in the literature and the evidence observed on the ground.
Securitization literature, which focuses on the articulation of security issues
through language, argues that framing issues as security threats is useful in getting issues
onto the agenda and persuading the audience to the need of extraordinary measures in
dealing with them.671 The literature grounds its argument on the assumption that security
is the actors’ primary concern and appealing to these concerns increases the chances of
getting attention to an issue.672 The literature uses this premise to explain the widening
and the deepening of the security field which led to the securitization of number of issue
areas ranging from food security673 to environmental security.674 Yet, while attracting our
attention to the evolving nature of what counts as security, the literature does this with a
normative concern; these scholars suggest that securitization leads to the removal of the
issue from the realm of normal politics and that it justifies the initiation of extraordinary
measures which are damaging to democratic structures and practices.675
The scholars who analyzed the reflections of the widening and the deepening of
the security field on the global politics took a closer look at how transnational advocacy
campaigns themselves appropriate the security language into their efforts to address
671
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transnational social problems. A number of case studies were conducted in analyzing the
securitization of advocacy campaigns ranging from HIV/AIDS676 and climate change677
to women’s rights.678 The studies that focus on the short-term success of these campaigns
appreciated the contribution that securitization made while the ones that focus on the
long-term implications directed our attention to the negative influences such framing
choices had on solving the root-causes of the problem. Despite these differences the
assumption that cross-cut these studies is that “securitization” has unique characteristics,
dynamics and implications which distinguish the use of this particular discourse from
other alternatives.679
Despite the uniqueness that these studies attribute to security frames, the TANs
literature shows us how campaigns can succeed without using security frames. As
discussed in Chapters 2 and 4, most of the successful advocacy campaigns such as
ICBL,680 Maternal Mortality,681 Female Genital Mutilation,682 and Anti-sweatshops683
succeeded either without using a security frame or after they moved away from a security
approach (de-securitized). These studies challenge the explanatory power of the
“uniqueness” claim in explaining the reasons for using them.
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While contributing to our understand of the security field, the myopic focus of
these studies prevented them from taking a closer look at the dynamics that lead to
securitization and the lack of comparative studies limited these studies’ capacity to
adequately test the uniqueness attributed to security frames.684 There is very limited
dialogue between these two lines of research and almost no studies comparatively test the
extent to which security frames correlate with transnational advocacy success and the
conditions that shape advocates’ decisions to use them.685
In analyzing the use of security frames by transnational advocacy campaigns, this
study addresses the shortcomings of the literature through pursuing two goals. The first
goal was to engage in a systematic comparison across transnational advocacy campaigns
to test whether the arguments about the assumed positive correlation between security
frames and advocacy success would hold when securitized campaigns are weighed
against the non-securitized ones.
When the comparative analysis illustrated that adopting a security frame is neither
a necessary nor a sufficient condition for advocacy success, the second goal became to
take a closer look at the advocates’ motivations in using security frames and the
dynamics surrounding these decisions. In doing so, I treated securitization as an instance
of framing and utilized the insights gained from the framing and TANs literatures to test
the extent to which these insights can be used in explaining securitization of advocacy
campaigns.
684
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In conducting this research I neither argued nor proved security frames to be
epiphenomenal. Rather, I illustrated that security frames function like any other frame
which means that (i) security frames do not necessarily correlate with advocacy success;
(ii) advocates’ motivations in using security frames are more complicated than
appreciated by the securitization literature, and (iii) the impact that security frames have
both on the direction and the success of a campaign depends on the strategic environment
within which campaigns operate.
This chapter serves as a conclusion and is composed of four sections. The first
section presents a summary of the empirical findings of the study. The second section
discusses the theoretical, methodological and policy implications of these findings. The
chapter then acknowledges the limitations of the study and highlights the ways through
which the study worked to overcome them. The chapter concludes by providing
suggestions for future research.
Empirical Findings
The discrepancies observed between the findings of the securitization and TANs
literatures raises doubts about the securitization studies’ ability to account for the reasons
behind using security frames and the implications that such choices have for the success
of advocacy campaigns. The findings of the medium-n comparison proved these concerns
valid by testing the under-analyzed assumptions and showing their limitations in
explaining securitization. The closer comparative analysis and the illustrative case study
conducted on the Conflict Diamonds campaign then took a closer look at successful and
unsuccessful examples of securitized, de-securitized and non-securitized campaigns and
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shed light onto the dynamics surrounding the decisions to use security frames as well as
the conditions under which such choices translate into advocacy success.
Fundamentally, the medium-n comparison of thirty-eight cases proved the
rationale behind the research question that triggered this study valid by illustrating that
the prominence attached to security frames is not supported by the evidence when tested
comparatively. As the comparative analysis I detailed in Chapter 3 illustrates, of the
thirty-eight cases analyzed at the agenda setting stage only five of them used a security
frame. The percentage of campaigns that used security frames has increased slightly
when we looked at the political commitment (eight campaigns out of thirty-two) and the
policy implementation stages (eight out of twenty-eight campaigns) yet, the shift was not
prominent enough to claim a tendency among transnational advocacy campaigns to use
security frames.
The findings of the comparative analysis also illustrated that the myopic focus of
the conventional wisdom overestimated the role that security frames play in leading to
campaign success. Thus, as the evidence revealed, securitized campaigns are not
necessarily more likely to succeed at any stage of global agenda setting or policy making.
At the agenda setting stage 80% of the securitized campaigns reached at least partial
success while the success rate for non-securitized cases was 84.8%. The analysis of the
political commitment stage also revealed similar insights: the percentage of securitized
campaigns that succeeded at the political commitment stage added up to 75% while the
ratio was 95.8% for non-securitized campaigns. All of the securitized and non-securitized
campaigns that have made it to the policy implementation stage secured at least partial
success, hence, no significant difference was observed at that stage, either.
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The comparative analysis of Small Arms and Landmines campaigns presented in
Chapter 4 further supported the above reiterated argument by illustrating that not only
using security frames does not guarantee success but also strategic de-securitization of an
issue can contribute to the success of a campaign. As my analysis illustrated, successfully
de-securitizing the issue of landmines allowed the ICBL to graft their issue onto the
existing norms about the protection of civilians in times of war686 whereas the lack of
such de-securitization has so far curtailed the attempts to regulate the trade and the use of
small arms.687
On the one hand, these findings illustrated that adopting a security frame is
neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for advocacy success. On the other hand,
they also highlighted the importance of taking a closer look at the motivations and
dynamics behind advocates’ framing choices as the increased likelihood of success is
proved to be not enough of a reason in explaining the advocates’ decisions to use a frame
with potential negative implications.
Comparing the framing choices of advocacy campaigns allowed me to identify the
patterns that cut across campaigns and helped me pinpoint the dynamics that illustrate the
parallels between securitized, non-securitized and de-securitized campaigns. The
comparative analysis illustrated that advocates tend to engage in multivocalization, i.e.
the use of multiple frames simultaneously to reach out to as many targets of influence and
potential allies as possible. As I showed in Chapter 3, even when advocates resort to
security frames, security very rarely is the only dominant frame utilized by the campaign.
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Except for the Conflict Diamonds case,688 all of the campaigns that utilized security
frames at one stage of global agenda setting and policy making or the other did so by
combining these frames with the others.689
The closer analysis presented in Chapter 4 provided insights into the reasons
behind such simultaneous use of frames and illustrated that campaigns combine frames in
order to reach out to allies from as many advocacy and policy circles as possible and
pressure targets of influence from as many angles as possible. For instance, the Child
Soldiers campaign combined humanitarian and human rights frames together in order to
appeal to both the UNHCR, which is responsive to the former frame, and the UNICEF,
which is responsive to the latter, simultaneously.690 Similarly moving the issue of
HIV/AIDS from the realm of health into the realms of human rights and development
helped the campaign to surpass its initial failure and allowed them to lead to the creation
of UNAIDS, co-sponsored by eleven organizations from different networks.691
Identifying the tendency to engage in multivocalization both provided insights into the
framing processes and also helped me illustrate the parallels between securitized, nonsecuritized and de-securitized campaigns.
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The insights gained through treating securitization as an instance of framing is not
limited to those gained into advocates’ tendency to use multiple frames together, the
empirical results I presented in Chapter 4 also illustrated that the dynamics surrounding
the decisions to adopt security frames are similar to those surrounding the decisions to
use any other frame. Moreover, I suggest that they are shaped by the structural and nonstructural factors embedded in the strategic environment within which the campaigns
operate.
Structurally, the broader political context within which the campaigns operate
plays a significant role in shaping advocates’ framing choices. As I discussed in Chapter
4, the efforts to draft the Millennium Development Goals encouraged both the HIV/AIDS
and Maternal Mortality campaigns to emphasize the developmental implications of these
health issues.692 Similarly, the analysis also illustrated that the security implications of a
number of issues ranging from development aid to conflict diamonds started to be
emphasized as a reaction to the change that September 11 attacks made to the priorities
on the global agenda.693
Non-structurally, the advocates’ fields of expertise as well as their previous
experiences are also revealed to play a role in determining advocates’ framing choices.
The clearest link was observed between the Landmines campaign, on the one hand and
Child Soldiers and Sexual Violence in Conflict campaigns, on the other. Once the ICBL
succeeded at the political commitment stage, the advocates moved to other issue areas
and either tried to replicate their strategies (as in the case of Child Soldiers)694 or utilized
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their existing networks (as in the case of the Campaign to End Sexual Violence in
Conflict Zones) as a part of their strategies to succeed.695
In addition to providing insights into the parallels between securitization and other
framing processes, the findings also shed a closer light onto the inner dynamics of
securitization and provided answers for questions that the conventional wisdom falls
short of adequately addressing. As the illustrative case study I presented in Chapter 5
discussed, security frames can be utilized by advocates not necessarily to prioritize an
issue on states’ agendas (as argued by the literature) but also to attract the attention of
non-state actors, such as the industry. Relatedly, the appeal of the security frame to an
audience does not have to be a consequence of the threat that the security frame voices
(as proposed by the literature) but it could also be about which other concerns the frame
silences. In the case of the Conflict Diamonds Campaign what the security frame silenced
was the questioning of states’ human rights practices and a potential industry-scale
boycott which made both the states and the industry receptive of the security frame. As I
showed in Chapter 4, not only security frames but also other frames can also be tailored
to various actors and they can also resonate with the audience not because of what they
represent but because of what they leave out as it is observed in de-securitization of
landmines696 and de-healthization of HIV/AIDS.697
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As opposed to the extant literature which claims that the outcome of a successful
securitization to be the initiation of extraordinary measures in dealing with the problem at
hand, the closer analysis of the Conflict Diamonds campaign illustrated that using
security frames can lead to different types of policies depending on the author of the
frame and the strategic context within which the frame was adopted. The change in the
power dynamics within the Conflict Diamonds campaign, as I discussed in Chapter 5,
had significant implications for the impact that the security frame had for the campaign.
The security language that was initially adopted by the NGOs to attract attention to the
humanitarian implications of the trade in illicit diamonds then became re-appropriated by
the industry and the states. These actors then utilized the frame to make sure to guide the
process in such a way that the established regulations neither created an industry scale
boycott nor led to the questioning of the diamond producing and trading countries’
human rights practices.
Similarly, the illustrative case study conducted on the Conflict Diamonds
Campaign also revealed that the “stickiness” of security frames (i.e. that the security
frames tend to be sustained even when they are no longer desirable for the advocates) is
not a function of the fact that securitization brings issues out of the realm of normal
politics as claimed by the securitization literature.698 Contrary to the arguments in the
securitization literature, the analysis showed that the persistent use of security frames is a
function of the institutionalization of the rules and network dynamics rather than the
uniqueness of security frames. As I showed in Chapter 5, security frame got embedded
into the very definition of conflict diamonds which then laid the foundation of the
Kimberley Process. The decision-making structure of the Kimberley Process was
698
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established in such a way that decisions are made based on unanimity which in return has
been functioning as an impediment in front of the efforts to reform the formal agenda.
Thus, it is this structure that keeps security frames at the core of the global policy making
pertaining to conflict diamonds even though the security language is no longer perceived
to be desirable by the advocates and by important number of policy makers.
The argument that the frames tend to “stick” once they become institutionalized
at the political commitment stage was also supported by the findings of the comparative
analysis presented in Chapter 3. Except for the case of Avian Influenza that experienced
a drastic change in its framing (from health to security and biosecurity) all other cases
that have succeeded at the political commitment stage sustained their dominant frames
when they moved to the policy implementation stage. Thus, the sustained use of frames is
proved to be neither unique to the security frames nor a function of security frames’
ability to move an issue to the outside of the realm of normal politics.
The insights gained through combining a systematic treatment of thirty-eight
cases with a closer analysis of a smaller set of campaigns not only illustrated the parallels
between securitization and other instances of framing, they also shed light onto the
dynamics and motivations that lead to securitization and the factors that shape the
consequences of such choices. These findings have helped this study explore the research
question at hand and also showed the contribution that treating securitization as an
instance of framing can make to the literature.
Broader Implications of the Findings
The empirical findings of the study have theoretical and methodological
implications for the literature as well as policy implications for the advocates. By
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approaching securitization as an instance of framing, this study highlights the benefits
that can be gained by increasing the dialogue between framing, TANs and securitization
literatures; helps the securitization literature ask the questions it was overlooking and
better answer the ones that it identified but fell short of adequately answering. Deepening
our understanding of the dynamics behind advocates’ framing choices and their
connection to success also has potential to inform advocates’ framing choices.
While this study problematized the under-analyzed assumptions made about the
uniqueness of security frames, it neither claimed nor proved that security frames are not
used or that they do not lead to success. Securitization literature itself does not claim that
every attempt to securitize will translate into successfully creating a perception of a
security threat.699 Thus, the literature already accepts that certain conditions should exist
for this transition to happen.700 However, what the existing studies in the securitization
literature do not do is to provide a detailed account of the factors that make this transition
possible. By treating securitization as an instance of framing, this study provided an
alternative perspective on the factors that could better explain what distinguishes
successful securitization from securitizing moves.
The findings that illustrated that the motivations behind adopting security frames
are similar to those behind using other frames contributed to the insights we have into
what the literature identifies as “securitizing actors.” Securitization literature argues that
security language is invoked by those who are in power with the purpose of legitimizing
the use of extraordinary measures in addressing a problem.701 Studies that utilized the
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insights of the securitization literature in explaining advocacy campaigns’ framing
choices expanded on the securitization literature’s argument and suggested that any actor
(state and non-state) can be a “securitizing actor” and use security frames to appeal to
states’ (or security organizations’) security concerns in an attempt to get them to
prioritize a particular issue on their agendas.702
Yet, as my discussion on the comparative analysis of nine transnational advocacy
campaigns illustrated, advocates’ framing choices are not only motivated by their desire
to appeal to targets of influence but also by their goal of reaching out to potential allies.
The closer analysis of the Conflict Diamonds campaign, then, illustrated how unlikely
actors might become “securitizing actors” themselves (such as the diamond industry) and
how these actors might engage in such an attempt not only to appeal to the security
concerns of state actors but also to appeal to non-security concerns of non-state actors
(the use of security language by the advocates to get the industry to worry about their
financial gains). Thus, the findings expanded our understanding of who can be a
“securitizing actor” and with what purposes.
The insights that this study provided into the dynamics of securitization by
treating it as an instance of framing also enhanced our understanding of why a particular
audience accepts the claims of security threats raised by a securitizing actor.
Securitization literature is criticized for not properly explaining the role of the audience
in securitization processes, yet, the attempts to address this shortcoming only focus on the
conditions under which the audience is convinced about the security implications of the
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problem at hand.703 These studies do not account for alternative reasons that may lie
beneath the audience’s acceptance of such security claims.
As the illustrative case study revealed an audience might be receptive of a security
frame not necessarily because they are convinced about the security implications of the
issue but because of what focusing on this frame means for their non-security concerns,
such as the questioning of human rights practices of the states and the financial structure
of the industry in the case of the Conflict Diamonds campaign. This approach contributed
to the securitization literature’s ability to better explain the conditions under which
security frames resonate with an audience.
Approaching securitization from a framing perspective helped us appreciate
alternative policy implications to which securitization can lead. Securitization literature
claims that when done successfully securitization brings the issue out of the realm of
normal politics and justifies the use of extraordinary measures.704 Yet an increasing
number of studies questioned this approach and argued that securitization could also lead
to alternative types policy implications.705 The international policy measures (the
Kimberley Process Certification Scheme) developed as a result of the securitization of
conflict diamonds provided evidence to support that insight. Rather than overlooking the
potential long-term implications of building policies on security frames, such an
appreciation contributed to the way we measure securitization.
The study also makes a methodological contribution to the literature by engaging
in a comparative analysis of successful and unsuccessful examples of securitized, de703
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securitized and non-securitized transnational advocacy campaigns. As stated in the
beginning of the study, one of the important gaps in the securitization literature is the lack
of comparative studies that would provide an opportunity to test the claims made across
different campaigns with varying framing choices. Comparing securitized advocacy
campaigns with the “dogs that did not bark” illustrated the validity of the research
question and is proved to be useful in better judging the role and importance attached to
security frames by the literature.
The findings of the study also contributed to the broader inquiries within the field
of international relations by deepening our knowledge of norm-building and of the factors
that shape transnational advocacy campaigns’ role in it. Illustrating the similarities
between the dynamics that surround securitized and non-securitized campaigns provided
opportunities for the TANs and framing literatures’ arguments (such as the role of the
strategic environment and advocates’ fields of expertise) to be tested across wider range
of issues and hence, contributed to their validity. Additionally, the new insights gained
into the dynamics of framing through this study (especially multivocalization) provided a
new perspective to be further tested by the literature.
The contribution of the study is not limited to the literature. The findings also
provided insights for the advocates, who are in position to make strategic choices in
framing their campaigns. Taking the potential negative long-term implications of
adopting security frames into consideration, first, the advocates could benefit from the
insights of the comparative analysis by observing that adopting a security frame is not a
necessary or a sufficient condition for achieving success. Second, the findings regarding
the “stickiness” of frames (that frames tend to stay once adopted) could be taken into
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consideration in making framing choices as frames adopted strategically for their shortterm implications have the potential to become impediments in the long-run.
In making these theoretical and practical contributions, the study on the one hand
answered the calls of a newly developing approach that highlights the need to increase
the dialogue between securitization and framing literatures.706 On the other hand, the
study set a new research agenda that utilizes transnational advocacy campaigns as a
testing ground to better understand the dynamics of global agenda setting and policy
making.
Limitations of the Study
This study faced two limitations: the first one pertained to the number of case
studies conducted by the study and the second was regarding the generalizability of the
insights gained into the advocates’ “motivations” in choosing frames. The study
addressed these limitations by paying specific attention to clearly defining the scope of
the research in dealing with the former, and by rigorously analyzing the available
resources to triangulate the answer in addressing the latter.
First, I explored the actors’ motivations in using security frames through a single
case study. Analyzing the securitization of the Conflict Diamonds case from the framing
perspective both deepened our understanding of this particular case and also shed light
onto various dynamics surrounding advocates’ decisions to use such frames. However, as
the findings illustrated, advocates’ framing choices are shaped by both cross-cutting
tendencies (such as multivocalization) and by dynamics peculiar to each campaign (such
as network dynamics and advocates’ field of expertise). Therefore, the insights we have
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gained into the dynamics of securitization should be further tested through replication of
illustrative case studies in order to deepen our understanding.
Even though expanding the scope would have lent further support to the
arguments of this study, the lack of in-depth cross-case comparison did not take away
from the main arguments. That is because the purpose of this study was not to put
together an exhaustive list of dynamics that shape advocates’ decisions to use security
frames that would be valid for every instance of securitization. The goal was rather to
question the mostly unidimensional explanations that the existing studies provide in
explaining why advocates adopt security frames and what implications such choices have
for the advocacy efforts which this study succeeded in showing. Testing and expanding
the list of factors identified in this study would be the next step to take in furthering the
research agenda.
Second, due to the nature of the question at hand the insights gained into the
advocates’ motivations in securitizing an issue were inevitably limited to the perceptions
and recollections of the advocates. This constituted a limitation as a small number of
advocates who took part in the Conflict Diamonds campaign were willing to participate
in the research. The combination of these factors raised two questions: did the
interviewed individuals constitute a representative sample of the actors involved in the
campaign, and how closely their recollections corresponded to actual events. The study
took two measures to tackle with these limitations.
To address the first question, the interviewees were strategically selected from
organizations that were at the center of the campaign at various stages of global agenda
setting and policy making and have worked in a decision-making capacity. The goal was
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to gain insights into the perceptions of the main actors and also to make sure to hear
about the perceptions of those who had the capacity and the interest in framing the issue,
which the interviews reasonably provided.
Yet, by itself, such interview selection process would not have answered the
concerns identified above. For that reason a rigorous analysis of available academic and
non-academic sources on the issue was conducted to trace the history of the campaign
and to triangulate the factors that shape the advocates’ framing choices. As indicated in
the previous chapter, a number of organizations and individuals have been very prolific in
their writings and forthcoming about their stance on the issue.707 These numerous reports,
briefings, scholarly papers, and interviews conducted by other scholars provided
additional access points into the advocates’ perceptions and concerns.
These insights were then compared with other scholarly works written on the
issue as well as with official documents to test any discrepancies that might result from
errors in actors’ recollections. The measures taken by this study to tackle the
shortcomings helped the study’s claim to function as an initial step for a fertile research
agenda.
Recommendations for Future Research
This study opened the doors for a research agenda that would better our
understanding of the dynamics behind and the consequences of using security frames, in
particular and dynamics surrounding framing strategies of advocacy campaigns, in
general. The research agenda can be further developed mainly in three directions, both in
terms of the questions to ask and also in terms of methods to utilize.
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First, as indicated above, the insights gained into security frames and their role in
advocacy campaigns can be further tested by conducting more in-depth case comparisons
across securitized campaigns. The securitization of Women, Peace and Security
campaign is one of the issue areas that have been attracting increasing scholarly attention.
A number of studies have analyzed how the issue got placed on the UNSC agenda; what
role security frames played in that process and how it affected the policies developed in
addressing the issue.708 Analyzing this case comparatively has great potential to provide
further insights into the dynamics of securitization as the security language adopted by
this campaign is particularly interesting. In this campaign securitization did not take the
form of redefining of the issue as an existential threat to security but rather in the form of
redefining women’s rights as a necessary condition for the establishment of lasting
peace.709 Such comparative analysis would not only give an opportunity to further test the
arguments developed in this study, but it would also allow us to further our knowledge on
the various forms that security language can take and the varying implications such
different uses can have for advocacy campaigns.
Similarly, the scholarly work on HIV/AIDS campaign could also be expanded by
conducting such comparative assessment. The existing works that study the securitization
of HIV/AIDS are mostly interested in critically analyzing the long-term implications of
securitization of this particular health issue.710 While these studies provide important
insights into how the issue got securitized, they fall short of answering why they got
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securitized as they do not look into varying reasons that different actors had for
advocating or adopting the security frame.
Second, one of the important arguments developed in this study was that security
frames operate the same way that other frames do and in that respect they do not play a
unique role in shaping advocacy campaigns or leading to success. That is to say, as it is
the case for other frames, the adoption of security frames should coincide with a strategic
environment that is conducive for advocacy success. To further illustrate this argument,
in-depth comparison of issues that use alternative frames should be conducted. Such
comparative studies would give us an opportunity to further understand the strategic
nature of the framing processes and compare securitization with other framing trends
such as environmentalization, developmentalization and human-rightsization.
The case studies within the TANs and framing literatures explain how a number
of issues get strategically reframed as environment, development and human rights
issues. For instance, studies that look at the earlier stages of HIV/AIDS campaign
highlight the contribution that human-rightsization and developmentalization of this
health issue made for the campaign in the early stages.711 A similar set of insights are also
advanced concerning how indigenous rights movements succeeded by
environmentalizing their campaign.712 Yet, systematic studies that would test (i) the
tendencies to engage in such reframing efforts over time; (ii) how well these choices
resonate with advocacy success; and (iii) the advocates’ motivations in choosing these
frames are needed. Such comparative analysis would not only contribute to the framing
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literature but would also help us better situate securitization within the broader picture by
testing tendencies to securitize against other framing tendencies.
Third, the arguments of this study can be further supported by employing
additional methods of research such as focus groups and surveys in order to deepen our
understanding of the cases analyzed by this study. Conducting surveys would improve
our understanding of framing tendencies and advocates’ perceptions about their framing
preferences as well as dynamics surrounding these choices. Such analysis would also
widen the reach of the studies by testing the arguments more rigorously across different
campaigns, organization types, and network dynamics.
Focus group analysis would afford us a better sense of advocates’ motivations in
an interactive setting.713 Ongoing or recent campaigns would especially be amenable to
such analysis for three reasons. First, advocates move across organizations and issue
areas which makes it difficult to track them down for a focus group study. Second,
advocates’ recollections of events and dynamics surrounding them are more likely to be
vivid for recent campaigns in comparison to events that took place a long time ago.
Third, as the interview process conducted for the Conflict Diamonds Campaign
illustrated, as the time passes, some organizations get frustrated with the process and end
up distancing themselves from the campaign which in return decreases their willingness
to take part in such studies.714
Among the cases that this study assessed, campaigns on Avian Influenza and the
Campaign to End Sexual Violence in Conflict are likely candidates for such an analysis
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as the former has recently reached to the policy implementation stage715 and the latter is
still at the political commitment stage716 which give us opportunities to trace the
developments as they happen. A recently developing campaign on climate refugees, the
Nansen Initiative,717 which is at the early stages of global agenda setting, could also
provide a fertile ground to conduct such an analysis.
Enhancing the dialogue between framing, TANs and securitization literatures has
a significant potential as each has important insights to gain from the others’ arguments,
methodologies and shortcomings. This study functions as a step toward that end by
pinpointing the problems arising from the limited dialogue between these literatures, and
by hinting the benefits to be gained through collaboration.
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APPENDIX
INTERVIEW PROCESS
Identifying the main actors
Identifying the nature and the extent of each actor’s involvement in the campaign
was crucial in understanding the actor’s role in framing the issue. Different combinations
of actors played a central role in the campaign at different stages of global agenda setting
and policy making: the agenda setting stage of the issue was dominated by NGOs – with
the sporadic involvement of various UN agencies. When it came to the policy making
stage, private sector actors started to play a more dominant role in the process and
claimed a central role alongside with states.
In order to identify the main actors, the literature718 as well as the Kimberley
Process Certification Scheme – the international certification scheme that was developed
as a result of the advocacy efforts – websites were surveyed.719 For each actor, a web
search as well as a survey of the literature was conducted to understand (i) when and why
the organization has become involved in the issue; (ii) how the organization framed the
issue and whether their framing choices have changed; (iii) the nature of their
involvement (writing reports, lobbying etc.).
The first question was answered based on the information provided on the
organizations’ websites, while the organizations’ own publications and statements were
surveyed in answering the second question. The answer to the third question was
assembled using multiple indicators: first, the organizations’ own assessments of their
718
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role were identified through a survey of press releases, yearly reports, and other materials
that are available on organizational websites. Second, the role of organizations within the
issue network was traced through a close analysis of interactions within the network to
see whether an organization’s actions were cited and/or adopted by the others. At this
point the key dynamic to analyze was how influential a particular actor was/is in the
issue. Building a sense of the level of influence that each actor had was crucial as the
framing choices of each actor do not weigh equally in the outcome of the framing efforts,
and dissecting the choices that matter in understanding the overall framing of the issue is
crucial. These organizations and their contribution to the issue are discussed in detail in
the following section.
Once the critical organizations and actors were identified, a number of methods
were used in identifying the persons to contact for in-depth interviews. The first step
toward this end was to analyze the organizations’ websites to identify the key actors in
each organization. Most of the organizations involved in the issue disclose their staff
information on their website along with information about when and in what capacity
they took part in the campaign. The second step was to survey the literature on the
conflict diamonds issue and pinpoint the names that these studies identified as key
players of the campaign. After this initial research, the identified individuals were
contacted. The contact information was gathered through internet search. Both advocates
and practitioners tend to move across different organizations and even across issue areas,
which meant that a good portion of individuals I attempted to contact were currently
affiliated with different organizations or now following different career paths. In these
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cases, these individuals were contacted regardless of a change in their organizational
affiliations.
When the name of the practitioner who took part in the issue on behalf of the
organization is not available, the highest ranking staff at the organization was contacted.
The initial contact letter, approved by the Internal Review Board at the University of
Massachusetts Amherst (IRB 2012-1437), included brief information on the scope and
the content of the study along with a request for an interview. When the individual was
unable or unwilling to participate in the study, they were asked to forward the request to
others who they thought might be interested in taking part in the study. A similar request
was also directed at the end of each interview to expand the reach of the study. Once an
interviewee agreed to take part in the study, they were provided with an Informed
Consent Form – also approved by the Internal Review Board – which included more
detailed information on the study, as well as a declaration that their names would not be
revealed in any product that would come out of this study without their prior permission.
The potential interviewees were contacted starting with those who are from more
influential organizations to less influential ones – determined based on the initial research
done on the organizations involved in the issue as described above. The order in which
the interviewees were contacted also reflected the historical development of the issue.
That is to say, actors who were active in the agenda setting stage of the issue were
contacted first, followed by those who took part in the political commitment and policy
implementation stages of the issue.
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Conducting the interviews
With one exception, interviews were conducted on the phone, and recorded and
transcribed afterwards.720 The questions were semi-structured and modified according to
the circumstances of the interviewee’s involvement in the issue. The interview questions
were tailored to address three main points. First, the interviewees were asked about the
reasons for and the processes through which they became involved in the conflict
diamonds issue. Second, the actors were asked about their perceptions on framing of the
issue as well as their opinion on the effects that security frame had on the success of the
campaign. Third, participants were asked about their perceptions on the possibility of
using alternative frames in addressing the issue and potential consequences of such a
tactic. The interviewees also received specific questions depending on the stage at which
the individual or the organization they represented became involved in the issue. These
questions were tailored to understand the actors’ individual assessments of the perceived
influence of framing choices that came before them.
The criteria I followed in choosing the practitioners to interview were threefold.
First, I created the interview schema to reflect all three sectors that played a part in the
Conflict Diamonds campaign. With that purpose, I interviewed individuals who
participated in the issue on behalf of NGOs, the diamond industry, and the diamond
extracting and trading states. Capturing the organizational diversity was crucial as
different actors had varying reasons for their involvement in the campaign, and also had
varying desired outcomes. This factor had an important bearing on the type of frames
they advocated and how they put these frames into use.
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Second, geographical diversity was another important factor in interview
selection. Capturing the differences generated by variance in locale was important to
reflect the differences in perspective among (i) Northern – Southern NGOs (ii) diamond
extracting and trading states and (iii) different segments of diamond industry. Talking to
representatives of both Northern and Southern NGOs was useful as their priorities and
the networks to which they pitched the issue varied (as did the reasons for adopting a
security frame over others). The priorities of diamond extracting and trading states were
also different as the former focused on the protection of national governments from
combatant rebels, whereas the primary focus of the latter was a combination of
minimizing responsibility and protecting economic interests. Nonetheless, they have both
settled on a security language despite their varying reasons.
Lastly, getting the perspective of different actors within the diamond industry was
crucial as all elements within the industry were not equally vulnerable to the damage that
a potential boycott would create. For instance, the industry within Europe and the USA
was more vulnerable, as its members had direct contact with the customers. Those
industry members in India and Israel are less vulnerable, as they lack such contact with
consumers. This difference has in turn shaped industry members’ perceptions of the
issue. In order to capture the above mentioned nuances, I interviewed participants from
Africa, North America, Europe and the Middle East. Third, the interviews were
conducted to gain insights into all three stages of global agenda setting and policy making
analyzed in this dissertation; thus, participants were sought to capture the main set of
actors for each stage of global agenda setting and policy making.
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